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ABSTRACT

This dissertation analyzes the contributions to the economic
analysis

of welfare made by the

ancient Greek philosopher Plato.

Heretofore unexamined, these contributions demonstrate the importance
of

the

development

of

notions

of

sufficiency

and

moderation as

integral parts of welfare analysis.
This dissertation also examines the significance of Plato's
method of

inquiry into matters of social science for contemporary

economic analysis.

In particular, the importance of metamathematical

induction for the acquisition of knowledge of the values upon which
welfare depend is analyzed in the form that it is employed in Plato's
dialogues.

This

analysis is conducted to the end that economists

might push beyond the aporetic conclusions of contemporary welfare
analysis.
Finally,
medieval

this

theories

dissertation

of usury and

explores

the

possibility

that

the just price are rooted in the

philosophy of Plato.

It is widely conjectured that the theories of

the Schoolmen derive

from the Aristotelian

usury

and

the

just

price.

This

and Roman theories of

dissertation

suggests

that the

theories of Aristotle, in turn, follow the same principles as Plato's
analysis of just value.

vi

INTRODUCTION

PLATONIC ECONOMIC THEORY:

THE ECONOMICS OF MODERATION

Man has always been confronted with the fundamental economic
problem of scarcity of resources relative to human wants and desires.
One might assume, therefore, that economics, the social science that
is concerned with the study of how scarce resources are allocated to
satisfy human wants,
Oddly,

many

problem

of

economists
scarcity

Specifically,
beginning

the

would

argue

that

man

has

approached the

in a scientific manner for but a brief time.

economic

with

scientific

ranks among man's older scientific endeavors.

science

work

developments

is perceived by many economists as

of Adam Smith.

in economics

during the last one hundred years,

Moreover,

the

important

are thought to have occurred

since the rise of marginalism.

To be sure, economics as a science has evolved during the
last

few

Indeed,

centuries,
an

argument

paralleling a growth of
could

be

made

that

it

science
was

not

in general.
until

the

eighteenth century, with the work of Adam Smith, that the analysis of
economic issues formally became a legitimate intellectual pursuit—
worthy

of

attention

from

minds

that

formerly

concentrated

questions of a more traditionally philosophical nature.
of the

growth of modern

science

on

The effect

on economics can be seen in the

2
development of a positive economic theory of the supply and demand of
scarce resources.
exists

This theory has served to unify economics.

There

a consistency of thought among economists, with respect to

positive

theory,

that

seems more

characteristic of the physical,

rather than social sciences.
Unfortunately,

the

modern

economist's

preoccupation

with

developing and refining a positive theory of economics has precluded
his appreciating the developments of ancient political economy.

Even

within the context of economic history and the history# of economic
thought,

there

scientific

has

analysis

been
of

insufficient

attention

economic problems.

paid

to

ancient

Although much has been

written speculating about the extent to which ancient man understood
economic phenomena,

ancient economic treatises have, in large part,

been looked upon as pre-scientific antecedents of modern economics.
Nowhere

is

the

economist's

inattentiveness

to

ancient

political economy more evident than with respect to the writings of
Plato,

the

fourth

modest

attempts

century,

have

B.C.,

been made

Athenian

to evaluate

economics made by the ancient Greeks,
been

largely

neglected.

popular among philosophers

Although

philosopher.
the

Whereas

contributions

to

the teachings of Plato have

the

Platonic

and political

dialogues

scientists,

remain

they receive

little attention from most economists.
Perhaps
economist's

"neglect"

treatment

of

does
Plato;

not

accurately

several

thought have examined the works of Plato.

historians

describe
of

the

economic

None, however, has fully

grasped the significance of the economic analysis contained within

3
the dialogues.
of

Plato's

This does not mean that economists are wholly unaware

attempt

to

resolve

certain

problems

of

scarcity and

allocation of resources, but, rather, that they find Plato's approach
unscientific.

Joseph Schumpeter best characterized the economist's

opinion of the works of Plato and other ancient social scientists
when

he

described

their

efforts

to

solve

economic

"economic thought," rather than "economic analysis."'*'

problems

as

To Schumpeter

economic analysis constituted scientific theorization about economic
phenomena, whereas economic thought could be defined as the descrip
tion of economic problems

in a manner satisfactory only for the

audience addressed directly in the discussion.
the

distinction

generalized

to

to
the

analysis

could.

economic

analysis

mean
level

that
of

Although
to

the

economic

scientific

Schumpeter

thought
theory,

attributed

ancient Greeks,

dialogues as essentially pre-scientific.

Schumpeter perceived
could

whereas
the

he viewed

not

be

economic

origins

of

the Platonic

He argued that the "value

of what [Plato] had to offer must not...be overestimated, apart from
its historical significance."
thought-analysis

distinction

2

It is safe to say that Schumpeter's
has

been

widely accepted.

Thus

the

writings of Plato have been ignored in modern economics.

Joseph A. Schumpeter, A History of Economic Analysis, ed.
Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954),
p. 7.

2

Idem, Economic Doctrine and Method: An Historical Approach
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 10.

4
While the Schumpeterean distinction between economic thought
and economic analysis is useful, it is sensitive to the economist's
definitions of science and scientific method, and can be misapplied
whenever an imperfect definition is utilized.
contributions
historical

to

ancient

changes

political

With respect to many

economy,

one

suspects

that

in the meaning of economic science have caused

certain scientific analyses to be relegated to the status of economic
thought.

In particular

the Platonic dialogues

have been

charac

terized as an example of early economic thought, when, in fact, it is
possible to demonstrate that they constitute a scientific investiga
tion of human welfare, in which economic problems figure prominently.
In

short,

the

dialogues

can

be

shown

to

be

economist beyond their historical significance.
strate this fact, however,
fundamental

changes

important

for

the

In order to demon

it is essential that one understand the

in the meaning

of economic

science that have

occurred between the times of Plato and Schumpeter.
One of the main reasons that Plato is so frequently dismissed
by

economists

as pre-scientific

is that the

scope

and method of

economics,

the Greek oikonomia, has changed over time.

the

of social

scope

sciences,

especially economics

For Plato,

and politics,

included the analysis of observed phenomena of a metaphysical nature.
In antiquity,
analysis

moreover,

as within the

Today economists

it was

not uncommon to embrace normative

realm of proper

scientific

investigation.

rely on the notions of positivism and value-free

science so strongly that certain channels of economic investigation
employed by the ancients are no longer considered to be scientific.

5
Despite differences in ideology, most economists adhere to the belief
that economics must remain value-free in order to be truly scien
tific.

Even

twentieth

century

economists

as

disparate

in their

beliefs as Milton Friedman and Oscar Lange maintain similar positions
toward a value-free social science.

In his essay, "The Methodology

of Positive Economics," Friedman comments:
I venture the judgment, however, that currently in the
Western world, and especially in the United States, dif
ferences about economic policy among disinterested citizens
derive predominantly from different predictions about the
economic consequences of taking action...rather than from
fundamental differences in basic values, differences about
which men can ultimately only fight.
Lange makes a similar point concerning the role of values and ide
ologies in economics in "The Scope and Method of Economics," in which
he notes:
The statements of economic science have objective validity.
This means that two or more persons who agree to abide by the
rules of scientific procedure are bound to reach the same
conclusions.
If they start with the same assumptions, thejr
are bound, by rules of logic, to derive the same theorems.
Ideologies have no interpersonal validity.
They convince
only those who share the same subconscious motivations and
undergo the same processes of rationalisation.
In an attempt to purge economics of the value-laden theories
of early political economists,

the modern economist has frequently

3

Milton Friedman, "The Methodology of Positive Economics,"
Essays on Positive Economics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1953), p. 5.
^Oscar Lange, "The Scope and Method of Economics," Review of
Economic Studies, 13 (1946), 22.
5Ibid., p. 23.

6
resorted to emulation of his counterpart in the physical sciences.
One result of this attempt to achieve an almost mathematical pre
cision and level of certainty in economics has been the sacrifice of
knowledge

concerning

the

solutions

to economic problems that were

developed by the ancients.
Unlike the modern social scientist, Plato and other ancients
made no attempt to excise values from social science.
characteristic

of ancient

social

science

In fact, it is

that normative theories,

based upon value judgments, dominate the analysis of social issues.
Platonic scientific investigation, for example, involves the attempt
to elevate knowledge of human values from the status of uncritical,
untested opinion, doxa, to the level of scientific fact.

The method

used in Platonic investigation is that of dialectical reasoning— a
process in which men examine phenomena of mind and soul, unlike the
process
around

in which modern scientists examine phenomena of the world
man.

The

dialectic

provides

the

social

scientist with a

method of constructing and checking hypotheses about issues of tran
scendent reality— the realm of the psyche or soul.
Plato employed dialectics,

It is because

rather than dogmatic demonstration as a

technique for investigation of virtue that his method is scientific.
The

fact

remains,

It

however,

is because

that Plato's

of this

technique was

distinctly normative

normative.

approach that

modern social scientists discount the efforts of ancient thinkers.
In social
values,

sciences

with

unscientific.

the

today a distinction is made between facts and
result

that

normative

theory

is

regarded

as

Like Descartes before them, modern social scientists

7
have "compared the ethical writings of the ancient[s] to very superb

£
and magnificent palaces built only on mud and sand."

Of ancient

philosophy Descartes noted:
it has been studied for many centuries by the most outstand
ing minds without having produced anything which is not in
disrepute and consequently doubtful.
I did not have enough
presumption to hope to succeed better than the others; and
when I noticed how many different opinions learned men may
hold on the same subject, despite the fact that no more than
one of them can ever be right, I resolved to consider almost
as false any opinion which was merely plausible.
Following

Descartes'

lead

some

modern

eliminate

from the body of scientific

social

scientists

knowledge

all

seek to

that

is not

knowable with objective certainty.
It is most unfortunate that the fact-value distinction has
created such a rift between ancient and modern social science.
only has

this

political

economy-modern

Not

distinction prejudiced our attitudes toward ancient
readers

often find it difficult to take

seriously the writings of ancient economic theorists— it has resulted
in the almost complete disappearance of ethics as a social science.
Consequently,

there is little scientific inquiry into human values

today.
Political theorist Eric Voegelin has noted that reality can
be divided into two parts:
cernible

by

imperfectly

man's

1) all things that are objectively dis

senses,

and

discern through the

^Rene Descartes,
Merrill, 1950), p. 5.
7Ibid., p. 7.

2)

things

fleeting

Discourse

on

which

man

can

only

glimpse with the mind's

Method

(New York:

Bobbs-

g
eye.
is

A chair is an example of the first category of real things— it
something fully observable by the senses.

Virtue, on the other

hand, is not fully discerned with the senses, but is recognizable to
the mind.

In modern social science, and particularly in economics,

very little effort is devoted to the acquisition of knowledge of the
second,

less objectively knowable type of reality.

logical dualism is the heart of Platonic science.
the

same

distinction

as

Voegelin

between

objects

Yet, this onto
Plato maintained
of sensation—

aisthesis— and objects of intellection— noesis.
Since modern economists qua social scientists routinely deny
the existence of noesis, they tend to view the objective of ancient
social science, i.e., scientific knowledge of metaphysical phenomena
— justice,

temperance,

jective goal.
modern

happiness,

etc.— as an unscientific and sub

Preoccupation with value-free "facts" has caused the

economist

to view the Platonic dialogues as an example of

Schumpeterean economic thought.
It is clear that there are differences between what is meant
by

oikonomia in the ancient sense and economics in the modern sense

of

the term.However,

sive;

rather,

logical

modern

outgrowth

economics.

of

the two disciplines are not mutually exclu
economic
a

subset

science
of

can be

concerns

thought
present

of as the
in

ancient

Plato, for instance, was aware of and interested in the

market problems associated with resource allocation among competing

g
Eric Voegelin, "The Structures of Consciousness," Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge, 3 April 1979.

ends.

However,

he

was

also

keenly

interested

in

the normative

problems of human welfare as it is affected by economic processes.
It would appear that a major difference between ancient and modern
economics is one of focus and scope.

Plato and other ancients con

centrated on normative welfare analysis, elevating it to the status
of scientific investigation, while many modern economists focus their
attentions on the development of positive analysis of market alloca
tion and efficiency.
If one approaches economic literature from the perspective of
the

ancient

social

scientist,

it

becomes

possible

to

scientific analysis that otherwise would be overlooked.

find much

Since modern

economics is based upon the idea that interpersonal comparisons of
utilities are not scientific— that values have no basis in facts— the
economic analysis contained within Plato's dialogues has not received
the attention it deserves.

The key to appreciating the importance of

Platonic thought for modern economics is the willingness to accept a
broad

definition

validity

of

of

normative,

economic
as

well

science— one
as

positive

that

recognizes

scientific

the

analysis.

The theme of this dissertation is that by transcending the
fact-value distinction one uncovers a hitherto unrecognized economic
analysis

in

the

Platonic

dialogues.

As

a philosopher

Plato was

interested in finding answers to the questions "What are goodness and
happiness?" and "How do men become good and happy?"

The dialogues of

Plato constitute a dialectical inquiry into human values and opinions
that attempts to derive a scientific answer to these questions.

The

recurring conclusion of the dialogues is that men are truly happy and

10
good if they are wise, honorable, and moderate.

These virtues cor

respond to the three parts of the human soul, psyche— the reasoning,
honor-loving,

and appetitive parts.

different parts

of the

Moreover, Plato observed that

soul dominate the

characters of different

people, accounting for the different types of personality one sees in
society.

Plato concluded that only when a proper balance is struck

between the parts of the soul, in which reason, the least cultivated
faculty in most people,

governs the spirited and appetitive urges,

can men be truly happy.

This theory of the soul led Plato to an

analysis of human welfare, which appears in his dialogues Republic
and

Laws.

Recognizing

the

fact

that many people

are

slaves

of

appetitive urges of all kinds, Plato devised a theory of welfare that
hinges

upon temperance or moderation,

sophrosyne, as the means of

achieving happiness for the many.
Plato's economic analysis of welfare was not intended as a
subjective

argument

designed

to take

its place beside the myriad

other social welfare theories that have appeared over time.

Despite

the fact that modern economists are wont to disregard all normative
analyses which are based upon value judgments, tne economic theory of
moderation

is

an

important

contribution

to

economic

analysis.

Because of the normative content of the dialogues, however, Platonic
economic

analysis

has

fared

poorly

in

economic

literature.

The

critiques of Plato's economic thought that have appeared in economic
literature are surveyed in Chapter One of this dissertation.

11
Chapter Two of this thesis is devoted to the task of reviving
a definition of economics that is compatible with both ancient and
modern methodologies.

Understood

from the perspective

of ancient

methodology the dialogues of Plato contain much that is of interest
to economists
with

today.

welfare,

Throughout

economic

and

the dialogues Plato is concerned

otherwise.

manifest in his theory of justice, which,
summed

up

with

the

notion

of

His

welfare

analysis

is

in large measure can be

moderation— for

the

many.

Plato

envisioned moderation of the appetitive urges as a participation in
justice.
Much of this dissertation is given over to the analysis of
Plato's

theory of economic welfare.

Chapter Three focuses on the

virtue of moderation in Platonic economic theory.

The fourth chapter

examines a feature of Plato's welfare theory that is important for
today.

Central to the theory of moderation in the dialogues is the

idea of sufficiency.

Plato was one of the earliest Western writers

to recognize the desirability of limiting economic growth.

Although

he approached conservation from the need to feed men's souls rather
than their bodies,

he

championed the notion of sufficiency as

means of limiting economic growth.

a

Finally, Chapter Five traces the

roots of the theories of the just price and usury, which flourished
under the Schoolmen, back to the dialogues of Plato, rather than the
writings of Aristotle.
This
shuffling

of

dissertation
fragments

is not intended to be a taxonomical re

of

Platonic

thought demonstrating Plato's

12
awareness of certain features of modern economic theory— such treat
ments

can

already

methodological
economic

be

found

barriers

thought

to

in

the

literature.

seem to have

this

level

restricted

of analysis.

In

the

surveys

past,

of Greek

Instead, this paper

argues that Plato possessed a strong interest in the investigation of
human welfare.

The dialogues contain an analysis of welfare that

remains important today.

By transcending the fact-value distinction,

and thereby removing the methodological blinders worn by the modern
economist, it is possible to show that Plato engaged in an economic
analysis

of

restrictions
along

with

represent

welfare
of
the

positive

helps

to

fill

analysis.

The

accompanying

attempts

objectively

that

to

normative
this

notions

of

theorize

issues

fashion

that

dissertation the

the void

created by the

economics

of moderation,

justice

and

sufficiency

of economic welfare

remains
lost

unique

science

of

in

in an

economic

science.

In

normative

economic problems is rediscovered through exposition and

analysis of the Platonic theory of economic moderation.

inquiry

into

CHAPTER 1

A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON PLATONIC ECONOMICS

Many histories of economic thought begin with a statement of
intellectual

indebtedness

to the ancient

Greek philosophers.

The

writings of the early Greek philosophers, especially Plato and Aris
totle, are said to contain the earliest attempts by Western man to
reflect scientifically upon problems of political economy.
of

this

claim,

economics

is

economics

is

literature

scarce.

devoted

Analysis

practically

to

analysis

of

In spite

ancient Greek

of Plato's contributions to modern

nonexistent.

While

some

historians

of

thought pay lip service to the connections between Greek philosophy
and economics, many more

subtly

condemn the works of the ancient

Greeks by neglecting them.
It is not difficult to surmise the reasons that underly the
failure by economists to incorporate the works of Plato, Aristotle,
and other ancient Greeks into the body of economic science.

With the

rise of logical positivism in the nineteenth century, economists and
other social scientists made a conscious attempt to develop valuefree theories of man's social intercourse.
Robert F.

Hebert note

in their A History

As Robert B. Ekelund and
of Economic Theory and

Method, An Introduction:
Many economists, especially those of the twentieth century,
have attempted to link the scientific character of economics

13

14
to positivism, defined as expressions of "what is" rather
than "what should be." Economics, in this view, is "posi
tive" because it is value- free. To admit value judgments—
or, equivalently, to make normative statements— is considered
unbecoming and nonscientific...
Because the writings of Plato, and, to a lesser extent, Aristotle are
rich

with

normative

analysis

and

value

judgment,

thought is often dismissed as pre-scientific.
seems

to

fare

worse

than

Aristotle

in

their economic

In this light Plato

his

treatment

in

the

literature.
However, some attempts to analyze the contributions of Plato
to modern economics do exist.
by Albert Augustus Trever,

2
A History of Greek Economic Thought,

constitutes an earnest study of Plato's

major dialogues with an eye toward discerning tidbits of economic
3

analysis.

Similarly, M. L. W. Laistner's Greek Economics

organizes

the writings of Plato, through the judicious use of excerpts, so as
to make

clear the economic thought contained therein.

And, Barry

Gordon's Economic Analysis Before Adam Smith: Hesiod to Lessius

4

is

heavily devoted to analysis of the Socratic conception of economics.
Apart from these few works, however, little attempt has been made to

^Robert B. Ekelund and Robert F. Hebert, A History of Economic Theory and Method:
An Introduction (New York: McGraw-Hill,
19757, p. 5.

2
(Chicago:

Albert Augustus Trever, A History of Greek Economic Thought
University of Chicago Press, 1916X7

q

M.

L.

W. Laistner,

Greek Economics

(London:

J. M. Dent,

1923).
^Barry Gordon, Economic Analysis Before Adam Smith:
to Lessius (New York: Harper and Row, 1975J7

Hesiod

15
analyze critically Plato's economic thought.

In this survey of the

economic literature devoted to Plato's dialogues, I will attempt to
demonstrate that the cause of this peculiar treatment of Plato is a
fact-value

distinction maintained by modern historians of economic

thought.

I.

A Survey of the General Histories of Thought:

One can perceive the attitude with which economists address
questions

of economics

contained within the Platonic dialogues by

scanning the material devoted to pre-Smithian economics in some of
the popular histories of economic thought.

In A History of Economic

Thought, Eric Roll comments on the economic thought of Plato in a way
characteristic

of many historians

of thought.

Roll

confines

his

analysis to Plato's Republic and Laws, noting that these works con5

tain Plato's

"main economic ideas."

Since the Laws and Republic

deal largely with the construction of a well-ordered state, they are
invariably the dialogues analyzed by historians of economic thought.
One sees in Roll's History a dismissal of the significance of
the economic ideas contained within the Republic and Laws, which is
made clear in the following passages from his History:
On a purely analytical side Plato's main achievement is
the account of the division of labour and the origin of the
city with which he prefaces his outline of the ideal
republic.
The city, he says, arises because of division of
labour, which is itself the result of natural inequalities in
human skills and the multiplicity of human wants...There is

^Eric Roll, A History of Economic Thought (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey:Prentice-Hall, 1956^, p. 27.
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as yet no concern with the cheapening of products which
specialization brings about.
It is not surprising, there
fore, that Plato should have no idea of that connection
between the size of the market and the deggee of division of
labour which Adam Smith was to make famous.
Plato put his theory of the division of labour to an
essentially retrograde use.
In his hands, it became an
idealization of a caste system and a support for^the aristo
cratic tradition which was then on the defensive.
These passages contain much that is true.

Plato was in fact one of

the first writers to stress the importance of the division of labor
in the development

of the polis.

Moreover, he did conceive of a

division of labor that was, in many respects, far different from the
division made famous by Smith.

In the passages above, however, Roll

betrays a prejudice in his treatment of Plato's division that seems
to be out of place in a positive analysis— he concludes that Plato's
division of labor is inferior to Smith's.

This conclusion calls for

some explanation or defense, although none is provided.
Plato
basic

suggests

differences

that

that

exist

division of labor based
Smith,
yielded

however,
an

merely

increase

a division of labor would arise from
in

men's

souls

upon psychological
defended the

in

economic

and temperaments— a

comparative advantage.

division on grounds

efficiency.

Roll

uses

that

it

Plato's

perception of basic human inequalities as evidence of some subtle
value judgment, which is supposed to lessen the usefulness of Plato's
conception of the division of labor.

6Ibid., pp. 27-28.
7Ibid.

Actually, Plato's theory of the
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inequalities of human character is based upon positive analysis, as
will

be

shown.

Roll's

preference

for Smith's

division seems

to

derive from his preference for economic efficiency over happiness as
the goal
caste

of economic action.

systems

and

of

uncharacteristically

Further, his subtle condemnation of

aristocracy

normative.

as

Roll

a

political

simply

regime

pronounces

seems
Plato's

division of labor to be put to a retrograde use, presumably because
Roll does not like aristocracy or castes.

Plato, however, defends

his division with hard analysis, which is demonstrated elsewhere in
this thesis.

I would contend, therefore, that it is Roll who puts

the Smithian division of labor to an essentially retrograde use—
supporting

it

for

its

liberal and efficient tendencies.

Although

some attempt has been made to link Smith's notion of divisions of
labor to Plato's, Smith's is presumed to be superior by reason of its
g
positive, rather than normative, analysis.
The tendency to dismiss ancient normative analysis as prescientific is common among historians of economic thought.
Bell,

in A History of Economic

Thought, notes

John Fred

of Greek economic

thought:
In spite of the vast contributions made by the Greeks to
almost every branch of human knowledge, they paid relatively
little attention to political economy as a subject. No Greek
treatise devoted solely to political economy has been
preserved, nor is there evidence that such a work was ever

g
Smith,"

See Vernard Foley's, "The Division of Labor in Plato and
History of Political Economy, 6, No. 2 (1974), 220-242.

18
written. Grgek economics is bound up with ethics and politi
cal science.
Bell

appears

to

view the

social

sciences,

ethics,

science as functionally separable from economics.

and political

To be bound up in

ethics and political science, if one reads Bell correctly, is to be
uninterested in economic questions at best and to be preoccupied with
subjectivism at worst.
Bell seems to suggest that Plato was the victim of his own
imperfect subjective methodology.

While Bell accurately details some

of the features of Plato's best state, he does so in an attempt to
point out the supposed insignificance of Plato's scientific thought,
owing to its subjective nature.

Bell notes:

Plato pictures the perfect society, not the perfect man,
since the idea of perfection and happiness is not to be found
in the individual but in the species. Happiness is for the
whole of society, and the ideal of happiness can be reached
only in the ideal state. The Republic is an attempt to show
how justice, as a social virtue, can be attained. The state
has but one real function, namely, to insure happiness to
everyone-j^through virtue, which means that justice will
prevail.
Bell is nearly correct in everything he says in the above passage.
Plato

did,

indeed,

desire

to

obtain knowledge

happiness to everyone through virtue.

of how to ensure

And, too, he did not envision

that the idea of happiness would be found in the individual.

Happi

ness itself was perceived by Plato to be a virtue in which men could
participate to varying degrees.

q

Virtue itself, however, is neither

John Fred Bell, A History of Economic Thought (New York:
Ronald Press, 1953), p. 26.
10Ibid., pp. 32-33.
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to be found in the individual nor in the state; it is, for Plato, a
metaphysical Form.
logical

and

Bell

fails

ontological

to get at the important epistemo-

distinctions

economics from that of modernity.

that

distinguish

Plato's

More important, however, Bell does

not make the connection between the Platonic quest for happiness and
its importance for modern welfare theory.
Herein lies the distinction between Plato's understanding of
economic

welfare

welfare economist

and

that

seeks

of

the

modern

economist.

The modern

to maximize welfare by efficiently giving

people what they want, whereas Plato sought to ensure happiness by
making people do what they should.
succeed

in constructing

reference to virtue.
normative.

Thus,

Plato realized that he could not

a theory of welfare maximization without

Of necessity, then, Plato's welfare theory is

for

the modern economist

at least,

it becomes

something "about which men can ultimately only fight."
W. E. Kuhn,
refers

to

in his book The Evolution of Economic Thought,

subjective

theories

examined by Plato, Aristotle,
welfare

economics."^

Kuhn

of economic welfare,

such as those

and other ancient Greeks,
gives

economics from Plato's dialogues.

no

examples

of

as "crude

crude

welfare

He does, however, make a connec

tion between the work of Plato and Aristotle, as do many historians
of economic thought, because both Plato and Aristotle employ the same
outmoded method of normative analysis.

U W.
(Cincinnati:

Kuhn's characterization of

E. Kuhn, The Evolution of Economic Thought, 2nd ed.
South-Western, 1970), p. 7.

Aristotle's value theory gives an insight into his regard for ancient
Greek normative analysis in general.

Aristotle's value theory is,

according to Kuhn, an example of crude welfare theory.

Kuhn charac

terizes it in the following way:
Aristotle's power of analytical thinking justifies his
being ranked among the founders of the core of the subject
matter of economics.
This far-ranging Greek philosopher put
forth the fundamental proposition that every commodity may
be viewed from two angles:
whether it serves to satisfy a
want directly, its proper use, as when shoes are worn; or
whether it serves to satisfy a want indirectly, as when shoes
are exchanged for something else.
This latter, improper
use— in contrast to the former— lends itself to abuse because
it may lead to an accumulation of goods exceeding the neces
sities of life.
Several distinctions grow from this dichotomy:
(1) that
between value in use and value in exchange; (2) that between
true or genuine wealth, to which there is a limit set by
nature, and unnatural wealth, the acquisition of which is,
broadly speaking, unlimited, being regulated only by the
greater or lesser cupidity of man in his capacity as an
economic agent; (3) that between the requirements of domestic
economy, or finance in the good sense of the term, and wh^£
exceeds these requirements, or finance in the bad sense.
Kuhn follows this summary of Aristotle's work on value by noting:
Distinctions (2) and (3) are scientifically of little import,
as they imply value "judgments" and presuppose a theoretical
ideal concerning the stratification of wants in society as
well as tlji<| means to their satisfaction (crude welfare
economics).
Kuhn intends crude welfare economics to be understood as any attempt
to comment on economic welfare in which value judgments are implied,
which would render it unimportant scientifically.

Here the reader

gets a clear picture of the relationship between scientific analy
sis and normative thought in modern economics.

The scope of economic
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science has been whittled away to include only those economic issues
that can be analyzed apart from human values.
Kuhn
analysis

and

appears

to

have

borrowed

this

thought

from Joseph Schumpeter.

distinction

between

In his introduction

Kuhn enthusiastically endorses Schumpeter's work on economic thought,
as the following passage indicates:
Since 1954, year of the posthumous publication of J. A.
Schumpeter's History of Economic Analysis (under the editor
ship of his widow, Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter), the science
of economics has been enriched by an English language
reference work in which schools and streams of economic
thought are discussed with rare comprehensiveness, insight,
and clarity. The History, written primarily for professional
economists and social scientists, testifies to such immense
scholarship as few writers can ever hope to attain.
Certainly the level of scholarship evidenced in Schumpeter's History
is beyond reproach.

Indeed, even the distinction between economic

analysis and economic thought put forward in the History and else
where

is useful

question

is

analysis

axe

to the

where
fall.

with a fact-value
important

on

historian of economic

the

When

tree of economics

should

The

only

the thought-

the Schumpeterean distinction is coupled

distinction,

contributions

thought.

the modern economist

is robbed of

to economics made by the ancient Greeks.

That is, ancient analysis is sometimes catalogued as economic thought
because it contains statements that imply value judgments.
Schumpeter's regard for the work of Plato is made clear in
Economic Doctrine and Method:

■^Ibid., p. 1.

An Historical Approach.

In this work
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Schumpeter traces the origins of economic science back to the ancient
Greeks, noting:
The "philosophic" strand [of economics] has its ultimate
literary base in the thought of Ancient Greece and can
clearly be distinguished from the conceptions of everyday
life and -|£he principles of legislators and founders of
religions.
In History of Economic Analysis Schumpeter credits the Greeks with
originating

economic

science,

which

he

notes

in

the

following

passages:
Let us recall our distinction between Economic Thought— the
opinions on economic matters that prevail at any given time
in any given society and belong to the province of economic
history rather than to the province of the history of eco
nomics— and Economic Analysis— which is the result of
scientific endeavor in our sense.
The history of economic
thought starts from the records of the national theocracies
of antiquity whose economies presented phenomena that were
not entirely dissimilar to our own, and problems which they
managed in a spirit that was, in fundamentals, not so very
dissimilar either.
But th^ history of economic analysis
begins only with the Greeks.
So far as we can tell, rudimentary economic analysis is a
minor element— a very minor one— in the inheritance that has
been left to us by our cultural ancestors, the ancient
Greeks.
Like
their
mathematics
and
geometry,
their
astronomy, mechanics, optics, their ecoij^nics is the fountainhead of practically all further work.
Schumpeter's
scribing the
Greeks,

endorsement

is

qualified,

however.

In

de

quality of economic analysis fostered by the ancient

Schumpeter claims that, "Even Aristotle and Plato presented

^Joseph A. Schumpeter, Economic Doctrine and Methods:
Historical Approach (London: Allen and Unwin, 1954), p. 10.
^Idem, History of Economic Analysis (New York:
versity Press, 1954), p. 52.

17Ibid., p. 53.

An

Oxford Uni
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exceedingly

poor

and

above

all

'pre-scientific'

pictures

of eco

nomics; they do not differ substantially from that of laymen of all
ages."

18

Like other historians of thought,

Schumpeter prefers the

economic analysis of Aristotle to that of Plato, in terms of analyti
cal rigor:
A whole world separates [Aristotle's] achievements from
the highly coloured phantoms in Plato's thought. The latter
offers us neither precise conceptions of an economic charac
ter nor sustained analytical arguments. His aim was not to
explain an economy which was problematic in itself but to
create an economic order which was adapted to his ethical
principles and to the conditions that prevailed in his ideal
State.
It is probably true that this was partly merely a
form which he chose in order to present scientific ideas, but
even his pronouncements on the division of labour, to which
reference is always being made, afford little proof that he
possessed a deeper insight into the sphere of economics.
Even Xenophon was easily his superior in this respect while
the rest of h ^ economic statements and arguments are those
of the layman.
In the following passages from History of Economic Analysis one sees
as clear a condemnation of Platonic economic analysis as one is apt
to find in economic literature:
Plato's aim was not analysis at all but extra-empirical
visions of an ideal polis or, if we prefer, the artistic
creation of one. The picture he painted of the Perfect State
in his Politeia (The Republic) is no more analysis than a
painter's rendering of a Venus is scientific anatomy... But
analysis comes in after all. There is a relation between the
painter's Venus and the facts described by scientific
anatomy.
Just as Plato's idea of 'horseness' obviously has
something to do with the properties of observable horses, so
his idea of the Perfect State is correlated wi||j the material
furnished by the observation of actual states.

18

Idem, Economic Doctrine and Method, p. 11.

19Ibid., p. 13.

20

Idem, History of Economic Analysis, p. 55.
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Reasoning of an analytic nature is still more prominent in a
later work, the Nomoi (Laws). But nowhere is it presumed as
an end in itself.
Consequently it does not go very far.
Plato's Perfect State was a City-State conceived for a
small and, so far as possible, constant number of citizens.
As stationary as its population was to be its wealth. All
economic and non-economic activity was strictly regulated—
warriors, farmers, artisans, and so on being organized in
permanent castes, men and women being treated exactly alike.
Government was entreated to one of these castes, the caste of
guardians or rulers who were tf^ live together without
individual property or family ties.
Plato's "constitution" does not exclude private property
except on the highest level of the purest ideal; at the same
time it enforces a strict regulation of individual life,
including limitation of individual wealth and severs restric
tions
upon
freedom
of
speech;
it
is
essentially
"corporative"; and it recognizes the necessity of a clasjg
dirigente--features that go far toward defining facism.
The analytic background, such as it is, comes into view as
soon as we ask the question:
why this rigid stationarity?
It is difficult not to answer.. .that Plato made his ideal
stationary because he disliked the chaotic changes of his
time...Whatever we may think of Platonic stationarity as the
remedy, is there not a piece of— almost M a r i a n — economicosociological analysis behind that diagnosis?
Schumpeter is clearly dissatisifed with Plato's prescriptions for the
Greek

state.

He

implies

that

the

subjective,

analysis found in the dialogues is pre-scientific.

"almost Marxian,"
Schumpeter is a

positivist.
In

the

following

passage

Schumpeter

summarizes

his views

on Platonic economics, noting that the Athenian's contributions to

21

22
23
24

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., pp. 55-56.
Ibid., p. 56.
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economics lie in his having sponsored the idea of the division of
labor as well

as one of the first fundamental theories of money:

We need not stay to consider the numerous economic topics
that Plato touched upon incidentally.
It will suffice to
mention two examples. His caste system rests upon the per
ception of the necessity of some Division of Labor.
He
elaborates on this eternal commonplace of economics with
unusual care.
If there is anything interesting in this, it
is that he (and following him, Aristotle) puts the emphasis
not upon the increase of efficiency that results from divi
sion of labor per se but upon the increase of efficiency that
results from allowing everyone to specialize in what he is by
nature best fitted for; this recognition of innate dif
ferences in abilities is worth mentioning because it was so
completely lost later on. Again, Plato remarks in passing
that money is a 'symbol' devised for the purpose of
facilitating exchange.
(Rep II, 371) Now such an occasional
saying means very little and does not justify the attribution
to Plato of any definite view of the nature of money. But it
must be observed that his canons of monetary policy— his
hostility to the use of gold and silver, for instance, or his
idea of a domestic currency that would be useless abroad—
actually do agree with the logical consequences of a theory
according to which the value of money is on principle
independent of the stuff it is made of. In view of this fact
it seems to me that we are within our rights if we claim
Plato as the first known sponsor of one of the two funda
mental theories of money, just as Aristotle may be claimed as
the first known sponsor of the other.
Schumpeter appears to have been guilty of committing at least
two errors common among Plato's modern critics.
characterizes
political
Plato's

Plato

economy.

On the one hand, he

as having too little insight into problems of
Here,

Schumpeter

contributions because

subjective methodology.

of his

is

unwilling

to

recognize

dissatisfaction with Plato's

On the other hand, Schumpeter may be guilty

of giving Plato too much credit when he ascribes sponsorship of one
of the fundamental theories of money to the ancient Greek.

Plato was
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aware of the independence of the value of money from its physical
composition,

as Schumpeter claims, but the reasons Plato gives for

limiting the use of gold and silver as currencies do not correspond
to any modern theory of money.

Plato opposed the use of gold and

silver in order to make the currency of the ideal state unsuitable as
a currency in foreign trade.

His desire to change the currency of

the Greek polis arises from his desire to curb foreign trade, which
he opposed for moral reasons.
Schumpeter's dissatisfaction with the analytical rigor of the
Platonic

dialogues

is

reminiscent

of

the

criticisms

of Platonic

economics made by James Bonar in Philosophy and Political Economy:
In Some

of Their Historical Relations.

quick to

credit the

Like Schumpeter, Bonar is

ancient Greeks with having first

questions of political economy.

dealt with

Once again, however, one finds an

economist's disapproval of ethical analysis, as the following state
ment of Bonar's shows:
The conceptions of Wealth, Production, Distribution, and of
the economical functions of State and Society are treated by
Plato, some incidentally, others at length, but always in
subordination of Ethics, and never as (even in theory)
separable from ethical considerations... in the early Socratic
dialogues of Plato he does not take hold of the notion of
wealth or any other economical ng£ion and sift it as he would
have sifted a metaphysical idea.
Henry

W.

Spiegel

shows

his

feelings

toward ancient Greek

economics to be similar to Schumpeter's and Bonar's in his introduc
tion to The Development of Economic Thought:
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Great Economists in

James Bonar, Philosophy and Political Economy: In Some of
Their Historical Relations (London: Allen and Unwin, 19275", p. 11.
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Perspective.
philosophers."

"Social thought," he says, "...begins with the Greek
27

He continues:

With them there was born the spirit of critical enquiry,
which never tires of examining human institutions, appraising
them in the light of moral and political ideals.
In the
writings of the Greek philosophers economic arguments are
developed only incidentally, ^id they are fused with ethical
and political considerations.
Among

the

popular

histories

of

economic

thought,

only A

History of Economic Theory and Method by Ekelund and Hebert gives the
reader an account, however brief, of the Platonic dialogues that cuts
to the heart of their economic import.

Ekelund and Hebert have taken

Plato seriously and appear to

be familiar with the applications to

economic

welfare

attempt

justice.

They note:

of

Plato's

to discover the

nature

of

At the heart of Plato’s Republic is a search for the meaning
of the normative concept of justice, both for the individual
and for society, that is, social justice. Individual justice
is characterized by Plato (speaking, of course, through the
character of Socrates) as a harmonious blending, furthered by
the "conditioning" of music, gymnastics, and associations, of
passion, desire and reason within man. In order to describe
the just man, however, Plato has to explicate the nature of
the macro constraints upon men.
The result is a contrast
between ^lstice for the individual...and justice within the
state...
Ekelund and Hebert move in the right direction by focusing on Plato's
concern over

social justice as it applies to economics.

27

However,

Henry W. Spiegel, ed., The Development of Economic Thought:
Great Economists in Perspective, Abridged ed.
(New York:
John
Wiley, 1964), p. 3.
Ibid.

29
Ekelund and Hebert, pp. 20-21.
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they

make

an

error

common

in

modernity

"normative concept of justice."

in

interpreting Plato's

It is true that Plato's concept of

justice is normative— at least if that term is understood to imply
that a concept is not value-free.

Plato might argue, however, that

attempts

justice

itself,
vention.

to
but

discover

a

wertfrei

do

not

produce justice

rather produce a concept that is the product of con

Plato's investigation of justice, both for the individual

and the state, was intended to be descriptive— it produced a defini
tion of justice by sifting through subjective opinions and testing
hypotheses,

finally arriving at knowledge of justice itself.

This

attempt to describe justice is different from the normative exchange
of values that discourse on the subject of justice generally produces
today.

Plato's investigation was incapable of producing an "objec

tive" result— it simply was not intended to appeal to everyone in the
way that a rhetorical

speech might.

It was not, however, merely

subjective opinion; the dialectic on justice was intended to produce
descriptive

knowledge— i.e., definition— of justice in the mind of

the participant in the dialectic.
On this count Ekelund and Hebert appear to confuse the posi
tive-normative

distinction

with the

fact-value

distinction.

They

suggest that Plato maintained a normative concept of justice, which
he did, when they mean to suggest that he maintained a value-laden
theory of justice.

Normative

concepts are value statements.

Con

sistent with the epistemology of Plato and other ancients, however,
is the notion that proper values are factually based— they partici
pate in real, existent Forms that engender them with their qualities.
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Thus

for

Plato

systematic

a

normative

investigation,

concept,

was

not

if

it

was

necessarily

the

product

of

counter-factual.

Therefore, while Ekelund and Hebert focus, appropriately enough, on
Plato's concept of justice in an attempt to uncover his thoughts on
economics, they fail to give this concept the attention it deserves,
owing to their association of normative concepts with mere opinion.
Like
particular

Plato's
attention

other

critics,

toPlato's

Ekelund

implications

for

and

Hebert

economics

call
that

result from his analysis of justice— the division of labor and the
proper use

of wealth.

Of the division of labor, they point out:

The very core of Plato's ideal state, within which the
positive and negative constraints upon men are established,
lies in the concept of specialization. Specialization arises
from individual differences between men, and output may be
increased by specialization...Exchange and trade, within and
without the state, are an integral part of societal organiza
tion.
Production will be undertaken for both domestic and
international trade, and classes of merchants and retailers
arise.
Money as a medium of exchange and as a standard of
value comes into use and facilitates trade and exchange.
Markets and marketplaces emerge to give impetus to the
increase of wealth. Specialization arising from diversities
of nature 2qLS at the root of all economic progress and
phenomena.
Concerning

Plato's

conception

of the proper use

of wealth,

claim:
Although specialization is the instrument of increased
average output...it is not entirely an unmixed blessing.
Progress requires expansion of population and territory, and
expansion
and
"unrestrained
needs"
require
war
with
neighboring states.
A soldier class is called into being,
which however valuable to the state, cannot be trusted to
abstain from attacks upon society.
Thus Plato must make
philosophers out of (selected) soldiers.
The resultant
elitists, aristocratic society of guardians would combine the

30Ibid., p. 21.

they
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qualities of "gentleness and spirit" and would specialize in
ruling society.
In order to produce gentle and spirited types, Plato
advised various kinds of conditioning, including, for the
guardians only, communal family and property arrangements.
His ideas on property are revealed in an assessment of the
reasons for these prohibitions.
Property communism was
necessary, according to Plato, for several reasons, the first
really including the others:
Property would corrupt the
guardians; inclinations toward moneymaking and conflict of
interest would be eliminated by communal property; and com
munism would prevent the ^acquisitive nonguardians from
wanting to become guardians.
Although Ekelund

and Hebert

do not,

in their analysis of

Plato's economics, seem to suffer from positivistic tendencies to the
extent that Plato's other critics do, in the final analysis their
investigation of Plato's thought is unhelpful.
of

economic

thought,

Ekelund

and

Hebert

As may befit a survey

confine

their

analysis

largely to a discussion of the commonly surveyed topics of Platonic
thought mentioned above.

When they venture onto new ground to dis

cuss Plato's concept of economic justice, they preface the analysis
by warning the reader with the caveat that Plato's concept of justice
is normative and, therefore, presumably, uninteresting.

II.

A Survey of the Journal Literature on Platonic Economics:

The

secondary

contain many entries.

literature

on

Platonic

economics

does

not

Perhaps it is because of the methodological

bias of many economists against the type of analysis conducted by
Plato that the literature is so small.

Out of the existing litera

ture devoted to the analysis of ancient Greek economics, only essays

31Ibid., pp. 21-22.
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by Welles, Foley, and Lowry provide the reader with glimpses of the
economic

content

of

Plato's

dialogues.

32

Welles

focuses

on the

economic background of the Republic and Laws— the Athenian economy in
which

Plato

Plato's

found

himself.

division of labor,

Foley

discusses

the

significance

of

attempting to demonstrate a connection

between it and Smith's better known treatment of labor specializa
tion.

Lowry, who has analyzed the contributions of the Greeks to the

theories

of

conservation

and

natural

resource

economics,

reviews

Plato's economics with less enthusiasm than Welles or Foley.
recent

survey

demonstrates

of

the

the

literature

contemporary

on Greek economic
economist's

In a

thought Lowry

dissatisfaction

with

Plato's method of economic analysis.
In "The Economic Background of Plato's Communism" C. Bradford
Welles

stresses

the

political

and economic

turmoil

of

fifth and

fourth century Athens as causes of the reactions to mercantilism by
Plato in the Republic and the Laws.
during

a period

of political

Welles notes that Plato lived

decay which

Athens in the Peloponnesian War.

followed

the

defeat

of

At this time in Athenian history

the labor force, which had produced large quantities of commodities
for export from Athens, was reduced to half its former size.
famous

silver mines

of Athens

were

shut down,

The

and the system of

”30

C. Bradford Welles, "The Economic Background of Plato's
Communism," in The Tasks of Economic History, Supplement VIII to the
Journal of Economic History, 8 (1948Xj 101-114; S. T. Lowry, "The
Classical Greek Theory of Natural Resource Economics," Land Eco
nomics , 41 (1965), 203-208; Idem, "Recent Literature on Ancient Greek
Economic Thought," Journal of Economic Literature, 17 (1979), 65-86.
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agriculture, which had supplied many of the export commodities, was
in disarray.

According to Welles,

the disruption of the Athenian

economy after the Peloponnesian War produced the tyrannical political
climate to which Plato reacted.
Welles
communism.

places

wealth

33
at the

center of Plato's

The Republic and Laws were written, Welles

theory

of

argues, in

response to Plato's dissatisfaction with the distribution of wealth
in democratic Athens.

Welles observes that Plato thought that men

should

not be too concerned with accumulation of wealth.The com

munism

which Plato espouses in the Republic is, Welles

claims, an

attempt to place men as far as possible from the sensuous life of the
..

r

city of pigs.

34

In the Laws Welles finds Plato's theory of the second-best
state.

Gone

Republic.

is

the

youthful

optimism

found

in

Plato's utopian

The Laws, according to Welles, contains a legal framework

for the founding of a self-sufficient, steady-state economy.

Welles

writes of Plato's steady-state:
The goal of self-sufficiency was to be attained by providing
an adequate living for a fixed population. Luxury was for
bidden, on the general ground that prosperity was bettgjr
obtained through limiting desires than increasing income.
Like Ekelund and Hebert, Welles succeeds in his brief essay
on Plato's communism in describing the major economic features of the

33Welles, pp. 101-105.
34Ibid., p. 109.
35Ibid., p. 113.
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dialogues, without casting doubt over their significance because of
Plato's use of an archaic methodology in his analysis.
to have taken Plato seriously.

Welles seems

And yet, he seems to have gone too

far in ascribing an economic motive to Plato's examination of politi
cal constitutions in the Republic and Laws.

It is clear from Plato's

dialogues that his principal concern was over man's ability to dis
cover true knowledge of the Good and its associated virtues.

To be

sure, Plato was concerned deeply with the injustice he perceived to
be associated with democratic and tyrannical distributions of prop
erty.

Indeed,

the Laws

deals with distributions

of property and

land that encourage moderation and temperance in economic life.

The

aim of Plato's discussion of distribution, however, is, the attain
ment of happiness for men and women.

The heart of Plato's Republic

and Laws is virtue rather than wealth.
women
called

behave

virtuously.

The

for in the dialogues

is

Plato desired that men and

moderation

of

wealth and appetite

intended to produce

the virtuous

behavior that Plato desired.
Welles is not the only contemporary economist to have read
too much into Plato's economic analysis.

Foley, too, overemphasizes

economics as the motive behind Plato's writing.

Foley attempts to

demonstrate a connection between Plato's division of labor and that
of Adam Smith.

In his

excitement he manages to read more of an

economic motivation behind Plato's

theory of labor specialization

than has previously been noted, and more than perhaps exists.
Vernard Foley has elevated the importance of Plato's notion
of the division of labor for the modern economist by claiming that

34
Smith was influenced by Plato's work when he proposed his own divi
sion.

If Foley is correct, Smith may well have borrowed from Plato

in constructing the famous version of the specialization of factor
inputs.

In "The Division of Labor in Plato and Smith," Foley notes:

Since Plato was one of the first to enunciate this conception
i.e., [the division of labor], the question suggests itself
of whether Smith drew any inspiration from the formulation of
his predecessor.
Several textual parallels between the two
men, which seemingly have not yet been treated in^an inter
related fashion, suggest that borrowing did occur.
Based upon fragments of Smith's Edinburgh lectures, "the
possibility seems to arise that Smith could have gotten his
original inspiration for the division of labor principle, not
from the sources usq^lly cited in this connection...but from
the ancient Greeks."
While

it

is heartwarming

to

see an economist seriously trying to

weave the thread of Platonic economic theory into more recent eco
nomic analysis, Foley relies too much on simple parallels that exist
in both Plato's and Smith's writings as the basis for his conjecture.
Calling upon A. Skinner's work on the Scottish Enlightenment, Foley
comments:
One can begin by recalling that considerable attention has
been given of late to what Skinner...has called the fourstages theory in eighteenth-century Scottish thought.
To
recapitulate them briefly, the four stages are as follows.
First, man exists in a primitive state, subsistent from the
natural and spontaneous fruits of the earth, by hunting and
gathering. Next, with the discovery of herding, man comes to
live a pastoral life. Third comes the discovery of agricul
ture, and a more settled society. Last comes the development
of an exchange economy and thus the division of labor.

36Foley, p. 220.
37Ibid., pp. 220-21.
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In a passage in the Laws (667A-82B) Plato gives all four
of these stages...Thus Plato provides an explicit model for
Smith's four-stage theory.
Moreover, both men treat the
origin of the division of labor in connection with the fourth
stage, the establishment of human settlements.
Based upon this parallel Foley believes

that Smith and, perhaps,

Mandeville may have found the basis for their work on specialization
in the dialogues.
Another parallel that Foley sees between Plato's dialogues
and the Scottish Enlightenment concerns the nature of the division of
labor— i.e., for what purpose is the division intended.
breaks

with

following

tradition

passage

in

describing

from Foley's

output

article

Here, Foley

and efficiency.

serves

to

illustrate

point:
Plato's discussion of the division of labor in the
Republic contains one other characteristic which seems to
deserve mention.
In specifying why it is that divided labor
is more productive than the unspecialized sort, Plato gives
three reasons (370B-C, also 374B-C).
The first rests upon
the assumptions that men are essentially different from one
another, and that since different jobs require different
capabilities, the introduction of economic specialization
means that a man can now be more completely suited to his
work than was the case before.
The other two reasons are
rather more modern sounding, as they have to do with freedom
from interruption, and with doing the task at the moment when
it can be done best. Plato says that one must not let slip
"the right season, the favourable moment in any task, or the
work is spoiled." Again, he says "business will not wait
upon the leisure of the workmen, but the workman must attend
to it as his main affair, and not as a by-work."
And
finally, he states that "more things are produced, and better
and more easily when one performs one task according to his
nature, at ^hjs right moment, and at leisure from other
occupations."

38Ibid., pp. 224-25.
39Ibid., p. 223.

The
this
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Tying

this

efficiency argument

in with Smith's,

Foley notes that

"several...passages in Smith's work which seem to echo Plato in other
respects, also repeat his efficiency arguments."

40

One must admire Foley's attempt to break with the majority of
historians

of economic thought for whom Plato's division of labor

represents only a crude approximation of its modern form.

Objections

have been raised to Foley's work concerning the true end served by
the

division

of

labor

in

Plato's

dialogues.

These

objections

invariably evoke the judgments of Schumpeter and other economists who
have

dismissed the Platonic division of labor as pre-scientific.

Paul

J.

McNulty responds to Foley's article,

saying "There are...

certain fundamental differences between Plato and Smith on the divi
sion

of

labor

which

[Foley]

does

not

examine

but

which

are

significant for the subsequent development of economic analysis."

41

McNulty points out further:
Although division of labor had long before Smith's time been
recognized as of economic importance— Schumpeter referred to
it as "this eternal commonplace of economics"— its use had
generally been in connection with some justification for
occupational stratification and^abor immobility. This was
the case in the Platonic system.
The view expressed by Aquinas that one man is unable to do
all the things that society requires is precisely that of
Plato, for whom the origins of the state are to be found in

40T,
Ibid.
^Paul J. McNulty, "A Note on the Division of Labor in Plato
and Smith," History of Political Economy, 7, No. 1 (1975), 372.
42T.
Ibid.
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the juxtaposition of the diversity of man's wants with his
individual inability to satisfy them.
For Plato...the natural differences in talents and abilities
between individuals, and their inability to provide for all
their own wants, leads to a division of labor which, in turn,
leads society to a higher level of economic wellbeing than
would otherwise be possible.
But the division of labor in
the Platonic system, based on societal economic stratifica
tion and labor immobility within an artisan and handicraft
economy, is of a fundamentally different character from the
concept as employed by Adam Smith.
McNulty

is

correct

on

this point— that

between Smith's and Plato's divisions of labor.
based upon characteristics of human nature.

differences

exist

Both conceptions are

However, each is based

upon a unique notion of what human nature is.

Smith envisioned a

division of labor arising in society gradually as the "consequence of
a certain propensity

in human nature,

which has

in view no such

extensive utility; the propensity to truck, barter, and exchange one
thing for another."

45

Plato, on the other hand, viewed the division

of labor as a consequence of human nature in which men pursue their
individual natural talents in order that they suit the temperaments
of their

souls.

That

is,

Plato argues

psychological comparative advantage.
talents"

argument

in favor of a notion of

McNulty points to this "natural

in an attempt to refute Foley's contention that

Smith borrowed his division from Plato.

He says:

43Ibid., p. 373.
44Ibid., p. 374.
43Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the
Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan (Chicago:
The University of
Chicago Press, 1976), p. 17.
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By far the greatest difference, however, between Plato and
Smith on the division of labor is the latter's early and
substantial qualification of the "natural talents" argument.
No sooner has Smith introduced the idea...than he adds that
"the difference of natural talents in efferent men is, in
reality, much less than we are aware of."
McNulty no doubt finds the stratification of the labor force result
ing

from

Plato's

loathsome.
and

talents

He stresses the freedom of Smith's free market for goods

services,

liberty'

division of labor according to natural

noting

that

was the freedom

"An

important

component

of

'natural

[in Smith's system] of the worker to seek

employment in any industry or trade."

47

Again, one finds evidence of the modern historian's liber
tarian tendencies.
dialogues,

views

McNulty, like other interpreters of the Platonic
Plato's

observation of the differences

in human

temperament, which leads to a division of labor, as a value judgment.
More important, however, is that McNulty finds Plato's observation to
be based upon a value judgment with which he does not agree, pre
ferring

instead the

"freedom"

of Smith's market

system.

For the

positivistic social scientist, the beauty of his science is that if
he

finds

a

value-laden

observation

not

to

his

liking,

he

can

immediately dismiss it as non-factual.
One finds in Lowry's work on ancient Greek economics the same
sort of positivistic bias

against value judgments as can be seen

in McNulty's critique of Foley's essay on Plato's division of labor.

^McNulty, p. 376.
47Ibid., p. 378.
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Lowry is a leading scholar in the field of ancient Greek economics.
Even

so,

one

finds

precious

reviewed in Lowry's work.

little

of

Plato's

economic

thought

In "The Classical Greek Theory of Natural

Resource Economics" Lowry hails the work of Aristotle and Xenophon,
leaving

Plato

out

of his

discussion entirely.

Welles

has noted

Plato's concern with the conservation of resources, pointing out that
Plato advocated a steady-state economy as the best constitution of an
economy.

In spite of this, Lowry writes:

In any discussion of self conscious and formal presenta
tions of ancient Greek theories of natural resources, the
analysis may b ^ justifiably limited to the works of Xenophon
and Aristotle.
The

rationale

behind

the

omission

of

Plato's

economics

from an

analysis of ancient Greek theories of natural resources is, according
to Lowry,

that only the theories of Xenophon and Aristotle provide

clear and formal statements of economics.
have

49

Thus, for reasons that

earlier been identified as methodological and epistemological

prejudices against the Platonic dialogues, Plato is left out entirely
from a discussion of ancient Greek resource economics.
More recently Lowry has surveyed the literature on ancient
Greek economics.
Thought,"

Lowry

In "Recent Literature on Ancient Greek Economic
does

mention

Plato's

contributions

to

economic

thought in connection with the works of contemporary economists, such

AO

Lowry, "The
Economics," p. 203.

Classical

Greek

Theory of Natural Resource

40
as

Welles,

who

analyze

Plato's

economics.

In particular,

Lowry

mentions Plato's division of labor and his fiat system of money in
connection with Schumpeter's criticism of Plato's work.

Rather than

describe

to

these

theories,

however,

Lowry

is

content

express

Schumpeter's view that "These observations, of course, were reflec
tions of economic systems and thoughts on economic subjects with no
analytical content."

50

Elsewhere in the same essay, Lowry reviews Welles' analysis
of Plato's theory of communism, which he refers to as Plato's theory
of "administered production."

Lowry concedes here that the goal of

Plato's state was self-sufficiency— the creation of a "steady state
economy."

51

Lowry insists, however, that based upon Welles' survey

of Plato's economics it is clear that economic thought at the time of
Plato's writing was "embedded" within the total legal fabric, i.e.,
that economics was only a part of political economy.
Lowry,
Plato's

like the

economics

economists

contained

surveyed

52

in the

literature

in the popular histories

on

of economic

thought, contends that the Schumpeterean distinction between economic
thought

and

economic

analysis

sideration of the dialogues.

effectively precludes

serious

con

Like the economists mentioned earlier,

Lowry is convinced that the value-laden theories of Plato are not

^Lowry,
Thought," p. 67.

"Recent

“^Ibid., p. 66.

Literature

on

Ancient

Greek

Economic

41
sufficiently formal and scientific to merit attention from economists
in search of the origins of economic analysis.

III.

A

Survey of the Major Treatises on Greek Economic Thought:

The conclusion that the dialogues of Plato contain no eco
nomic

theory of importance

for the modern economist is echoed to

varying degrees in the major treatises devoted to the economics of
Ancient Greece.
economic

Some of the criticisms contained in the histories of

thought and other essays mentioned earlier

can be found

"writ large" in lengthy treatments of Greek economics.
survey
to

the

modern

dialogues
economic

and

theory

conclude
are

that

small,

Plato's

almost

to

These works
contributions

the

point

of

insignificance.
One

of the early surveys of Plato's dialogues in economic

literature is Albert Augustus Trever's A History of Greek Economic
Thought, published in 1916.

In his History, Trever reviews Plato's

work in a manner that is, at once, sympathetic to Plato's ideals and
yet

characteristic of the positivistic histories.

"Plato," Trever

says,
was the first great economic thinker of Greece.
Plato,
however, was primarily interested in neither economics nor
politics, but moral idealism. All his economic thought is a
direct outgrowth of it, and is shot through with its
influence. Yet, despite this fact, he exhibits considerable
insight into some of the basal principles of economics, and
his entire Republic is founded upon an essentially economic
theory of society.

"^Trever, p. 22.

42
Here, one sees a classic observation made by an economist concerning
the

Platonic

dialogues.

Trever

society as the underpinning

recognizes

an economic

of the Republic.

theory of

Even so, Trever is

tempted to downplay the significance of this economic theory because
it is "shot through" with moral idealism.
On Plato's discussion of economic value and wealth, Trever
notes that "Strictly speaking, Plato's contribution to a theory of
economic value and a definition of wealth is practically nil.

In his

discussion of a just price, he merely hints at the fact of exchange
value."

54

subjective

He follows this statement with a denunciation of Plato's
analysis

when he

says

that

"Plato

has much to say of

wealth, though he deals with it strictly from the standpoint of the
moralist.

We look in vain for a clear definition,

or for a con-

sistent distinction of economic wealth from other goods."
Trever's

criticism of Plato

centers

55

on Plato's

method of

analysis rather than the Greek's avowed end of the dialectic inquiry,
the greatest happiness for society.
with

Plato's

use

of value

judgments

He is, at once,
and taken

in by

dissatisfied
those

same

values, which must be close to his own sentiments concerning politi
cal economy.
for

achieving

In defending Plato's use of communism as an instrument
social

happiness,

Trever

is

quick

Plato's communism from its modern manifestations.

55Ibid., p. 24.

to

distinguish

He notes:

43
The ideal state of Plato's Republic has often been presented
by socialists and other modern writers as the great prototype
of all socialistic doctrine. We must consider to what extent
such a view is justified.
In his famous myth of the three
metals, Plato divides his citizens into three classes—
rulers, auxiliaries, and farmers and artisans.
His avowed
purpose here, as indeed throughout his Republic, is to secure
the highest degree of happiness for all the citizens.
In
order to gain this end, he provides for a most thoroughgoing
system of communism, including all property, both for produc
tion and for consumption, except such as necessary for the
immediate need. He extends it even to the common possession
of wives and children, that all private interests may be
reduced to a minimum. He provides further for a common work
and education for men and women.
Such, in brief, is the system proposed in the Republic.
Superficially considered, it would seem to be the parent of
modern socialism and communism. There is, however, actually
but slight similarity between them. The so-called communism
of Plato extends only to the first two classes, which can
include but a small minority of the citizenship. Thus the
masses, with whom modern socialism is ^specially concerned,
are not directly touched by his system.
Trever concludes that "The Republic cannot...be classified as truly
socialistic either in motive or in general plan."~*7
In an attempt to catalogue Plato's economics, Trever pushes
farther than other historians of economic thought.

Besides the usual

interest in Plato's division of labor ("[Plato] evidently recognized
it as the necessary basis of all higher life"),

58

Trever demonstrates

an insight into Plato's theories of welfare, money, trade, and the
limits to growth.
In

noting

that

Plato's

dialogues

do

important to modern economics, Trever points out:

56Ibid., pp. 54-55.
57Ibid., p. 57.
58Ibid., p. 29.

contain

information
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a sympathetic study of Plato's thought on exchange reveals an
insight into certain specific points, of interest to modern
economics, which are commonly overlooked.
His protest
against the former axiom of economics, that the prime purpose
of trade is profit, and that the mere fact that goods change
hands, necessarily increases the wealth of a country, is
substantially correct.
Commerce for commerce' sake is a
clear case of mistaking the means for the end, and is
contrary to sound economics as well as ethics. The objec
tions of Plato and Ruskin against the principle too generally
accepted by business and economy of the past, at least
tacitly, that "it is the buyer's function to cheapen and
the seller's to qheat," are being recognized today as worthy
of consideration.
Trever also appreciates

Plato's

mercialism and immoderate wealth.
market

restraints

applauds
souls

Plato's

of the

unacceptable
desire

citizens

to

inveighing against excessive com
While he finds Plato's system of
for

instill

the

modern

economy,

Trever

temperance as a virtue in the

of the polis, which the following passages

demonstrate:
To be sure, Plato's demand for a limitation of private
and national wealth, and his general negative attitude are if
interpreted rigidly, unfruitful and economically impossible.
It is not business that should be curbed, but bad business.
Individual or nation cannot become too prosperous, provided
there is a proper distribution and a wise consumption of
wealth, and Plato's idea that great prosperity is incom
patible with this goal can hardly be accepted by modern
economists.
Nevertheless, there is much of abiding truth in his
doctrine of wealth. Aside from the profound moral value of
his main contention, we may state summarily several points in
which he remarkably anticipated the thought of the more
modern humanitarian economists:
(1) in the fact that exces
sive private wealth is practically impossible without
corresponding extremes of poverty, and that such a condition
is the most fruitful cause of dissention in any state; (2) in
the fact that extremes of wealth or poverty cause industrial
inefficiency; (3) in the prevalent belief that no man can
gain great wealth by just acquisition, since, even though he

59Ibid., p. 44.

45
may have done no conscious injustice, his excessive accumula
tion has been due to unjust social conditions; (4) in the
growing belief that expenditures of great private fortunes
are not likely to be helpful either to individual or to
community, but are too liable to be marked by foolish luxury
and waste that saps the vitality of the nation; in this, he
was a forerunner of Ruskin, who opposed the old popular
fallacy that the expenditures of the wealthy, of whatever
nature, benefit the poor; (5) in the dominant note in
economic thought today, so emphasized by Plato and Ruskin,
that the prime goal of science is human life at its best...
(6) in the fact that the national demand for unlimited wealth
is not recognized, as Plato taught, always to have been the
most fruitful receiving ever-greater recognition by modern
economists and statesmen, that the innate quality of the
object for good or harm^must be considered in a true defini
tion of economic wealth.
Of course, even Trever's comments strike the modern economist
as

value-laden.

Trever appears to be guilty of that for which he

criticizes Plato— assuming the role of moral idealist.
Trever's thesis has been supplemented occasionally.
M.

L.

W.

Laistner

published Greek Economics.

In 1923

His study includes

excerpts of ancient writings which refer to topics of interest for
modern political economy, but it does not provide the reader with an
interpretive
extracted

essay.

the

Laistner

passages

appears

to

from the Platonic

have

conscientiously

dialogues

that bear

on

modern economics, but there is little in his work that serves to make
clear his opinion concerning the merit of Platonic economic thought.
Michell provides
which

is

Greece.

lacking
As

a

the

reader with the

in Laistner's book,

criticism

of

Platonic

interpretive thought

in The Economics of Ancient
economics

Michell's

survey

rivals the work of Schumpeter for its positivistic condemnation of

60Ibid., pp. 26-27.
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Plato's
serves

method.
as

separates

The

following

an excellent

insight

passage

from

Michell's

Economics

into the epistemological gap that

the modern economist from the ancient social scientist:

So great a gulf is fixed between our modern thought and
that of the ancients that it is utterly impossible to bridge
it.
To read into the writings of the Greek philosopher a
conception of economic theory which is recognisable to-day is
a vain endeavor.
Their thought was entirely dominated by
ethical ideas; there was an absolute separation of the ideas
of right and wrong in human conduct from that of economic
advantage and disadvantage.
It might, at first sight, be
thought that in this the Greek philosopher was superior to
the modern economist who is, apparently, too prone to over
look the ethical in favour of the practical, and to preach a
materialism in which spiritual values have no place. Reflec
tion will reveal that such would be far from the reality.
The Greek philosopher's outlook was too constricted for him
to appreciate the fact, which the modern economist has
grasped, that economic advantage or disadvantage is, in the
last analysis, conditioned by ethical values.
Michell

appears

to make a fact-value distinction,

modern economists.

so common among

The fact that those parts of ancient philosophy

that pertain to economics have an ethical flavor is quite logical,
given

the

epistemology

of

the

Aristotle understood economics

ancient

philosopher.

Plato

and

to be, along with politics,

social

sciences subordinate to the parent social science of ethics.

Plato

considered

an

ethical

fact

to

be

important, than an economic fact.
science,
As

a

the end of which

science

it

seeks

no

less

true,

and often more

For Plato, economics is a policy

is the achievement of human happiness.

the

true

answer

to

the

in political economy makes men good and happy?"

^ H . Michell, The Economics
MacMillan, 1940), p. 34.

of Ancient

question,

"What

In search of this

Greece

(New York:
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answer, the ancient economist sifts opinions and value judgments for
a truthful answer.
value-laden to
this

fact,

Consequently, ancient political economy appears

the modern

and

finds

it

reader.

Michell

unacceptable

is painfully aware of

for modern

economics.

He

concludes:
the fact remains that while we may learn from the philoso
phers the great truths and noble ideas of the relation of the
human soul to God, they have nothing to tell us regarding
those perplexing problems that so occupy our minds to-day.
Presumably, then, the "great truths" do not occupy our minds today.
Of course,
notion by

the

ancient

saying

that

social

scientist might

respond

to

such a

the perplexing problems that so occupy our

minds are solved as a consequence of attaining knowledge of the great
truths.
Concerning
dialogues

that

the specific economic theories found in Plato's

are

commonly

discussed

Michell provides

a survey quite

pre-positivistic

thought.

in

economic

literature,

in keeping with his dismissal of

Michell

downplays

the

significance

Plato's division of labor, arguing:
The idea of the division of labor is explicit in Plato's and
Aristotle's writings and is based quite simply upon such
human wants as food, clothing and shelter, which will be
produced most efficiently if each individual confines himself
to what he can do best...The concept of division of labor has
proceeded on lines familiar and simple to the modern mind;
but...it is given a twist, which presents the theory of the
state not from the standpoint of individual well-being, but
from that of the welfare of the state.

63Ibid., p. 25.

of
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In

his

discussion

of

Plato's

conception

of

communism,

Michell makes the familiar point that it was intended only for the
highest

classes.

He goes on to say that "It was not an economic

doctrine in any way; it had not anything whatever to do with solving
the evils of poverty through a distribution of wealth or a regimentation of the productive efforts of society."

On Plato's treatment

of wealth and poverty, Michell comments:
The treatment of poverty and wealth both by Aristotle and
Plato is sound but limited in the view of the modern econ
omist.
Riches lead to deterioration of the character in
those who possess them, while poverty is a deterent to the
best work. Plato finds it hard to believe that a man can be
rich, happy and good at the same time.
These comments all build to Michell's conclusion that "In general,
it may be asserted that whatever economic theory is to be found among
Greek

writers

is

immature.

Modern

political

economy

advance of any to be found among the ancients..."

is

far

in

66

In general, a progressive view of history— that things are
getting
ties

better

together

and
the

Schumpeter, Trever,

better— appears
economic

reviews

to
of

be
the

a

common

thread

dialogues.

that

Michell,

and others look upon the writings of antiquity

with the opinion that any economic thought appearing therein must be
"immature"

by

comparison

economic analysis,

with

modern

economic

theory.

Ancient

in other words, takes the form of Schumpeterean

^^Ibid., p. 26.
65Ibid., p. 32.
66Ibid., p. 33.
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economic thought, whereas its modern counterpart assumes the form of
true economic analysis.
The issue of whether or not things are getting better, or at
least more sophisticated, is not new, having been sorted out in one
form by economic anthropologists.

At one time the economic writings

of antiquity were thought to contain little of relevance to modern
economics

by

society.

The ancients,

problems

that

organized,
services

virtue

of

occupy

developed
precluded

the

economic

immaturity

it was argued,

economists

today

marketplace

for

their

of

a pre-market

reflected upon none of the
because
the

acquaintance

with

their

exchange
such

lack

of

of an

goods

problems.

and
Even

Polanyi, who worked to dispel some of the myths concerning a lack of
sophistication in early economies, pointed to a distinction between
ancient

economic

thought

and

modern

analysis.

In

"Aristotle

Discovers the Economy," Polanyi argued that "Economic analysis in the
last

resort,

mechanism,

aims

at

elucidating

the

functions

of

the

market

an institution that was still unknown to Aristotle."

67

The absence of any market mechanism would seem to rule out
the development of economic analysis of the market’s many functions.
One may safely assume that the earliest written documents surviving
from the
to

Greek civilization contain no analysis that would appeal

the modern economist.

67

In The World of Odysseus

Moses Finley

Karl Polanyi, "Aristotle Discovers the Economy," in Trade
and Market in the Early Empires: Economic History and Theory, ed.
Karl Polanyi, Conrad M. Arensberg, and Harry W. Pearson (Glencoe: The
Free Press, 1957), p. 66.
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describes
period

the exchange mechanism

of

Greek

development.

in operation during the Homeric

Finley

writes

that

"An

exchange

mechanism was then the only alternative, and the basic one was giftexchange."

68

During this phase of development of the Greek polis,

trade for profit was known, but it was discouraged as being evil.
Rather,

exchange was based upon mutual benefit of another sort— the

exchange of gifts among friends.

Finley writes:

In Adam Smith’s world [the] determination [of value] was made
through the supply-and-demand market, a mechanism unknown in
Troy or Ithaca.
Behind the market lies the profit motive,
and if there was one thing that was taboo in Homeric
exchanges it was gain in the exchange. Whether in trade or
in any other mutual relationship, the abiding principle was
equality and mutual benefit.
Gain at the expense of another
belonged to a different realm, to warfare and raiding, where
it was achieved by acts (or threats) of prowess, not by
manipulation and bargaining.
Thus the degree of market sophistication necessary to produce mean
ingful analysis was not present during the Homeric period.
this

time,

possessing
appear.

During

Finley points out, "The twin uses of treasure were in
it

and

in

giving

it

away,

paradoxical

as

that

may

„70
The gift economy was still a feature of the Athenian economy

of Plato

and Aristotle.

Indeed, both philosophers advocated this

type of exchange mechanism.

Plato went so far as to suggest in the

Laws a system of market regulation that would restore the purity of

I. Finley,
Press, 1954), p. 64.
69Ibid., p. 67.

70Ibid., p. 61.

The World

of Odysseus

(New York:

Viking
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the gift-exchange economy.

Nevertheless, there was in existence at

this time a sophisticated system, by Homeric standards, of domestic
and international trade.

Trade-for-profit, money-changing, and other

features of commerce were restricted to the occupation of the metic—
a foreigner, more-or-less permanently residing in the Athenian polis.
The type of exchange common today was considered beneath the dignity
of a citizen of the polis.

Still, Athens, and especially its port,

Pireaus, was the site of vigorous trade.
One can assume that Plato and Aristotle had every opportunity
to analyze the functions of the Athenian market.

Indeed, in the Laws

and elsewhere Plato appears to be quite aware of the complexities of
the exchange mechanism.
address

broader

issues,

However, both Plato and Aristotle chose to
rather

than

occupy

their

time

with the

pedantic analysis of an institution considered by them to be corrupt.
The seeming inability on the part of the modern historian of
economic

thought

to discern economic

analysis

in the writings of

Plato is, I think, less a function of the nature of the topics under
consideration in the dialogues than of the shift in epistemology and
methodology that parallels the rise in social sciences of Comtean
positivism,

historicism,

relativism,

and Popperian nominalism.

In

the twentieth century economics is restricted to the realm of that
which

can

instance,

be
men

objectively analyzed by the

social

scientist.

For

can objectively agree that prices are determined by

phenomena of supply and demand.

Because the economic ruminations in

the dialogues are not restricted to such topics as can be immediately
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perceived as objective in nature, Mitchell, Schumpeter, and others
have found little which they can embrace in the work of Plato.
More recently, Barry Gordon has written on the economics of
Plato and other ancients.

In Economic Analysis Before Adam Smith;

Hesiod to Lessius Gordon attaches more significance to Plato's eco
nomics than had his predecessors.
the

sentimental

ramblings

Gordon sees the dialogues not as

of a moral idealist, but rather as the

logical reaction by Plato to the economic and political decline of
the Athenian polis.

Also,

Gordon seems to understand the role of

economics as a social science for Plato.

Perceiving economics as a

branch of ethics, Plato could not let economics deteriorate into the
value-free scientism,

so aptly described by Hayek in this century.

Gordon writes:
[Plato and Aristotle]
reacted against the mercantilist
tendencies of their intellectual opponents, and this reaction
was to prove decisive.
Further, they refused to treat
economics as a technology.
Consideration of the relative
desirability of alternate goals of economic^ction was at the
core of their conception of the discipline.
Continuing in this vein, Gordon points out:
It is not surprising...to find that the economics of the
Socratics is not a technology of an age of growth and
development. Rather it is the product of an age of anxiety,
part of an attempt to work towards establishment of a social
order that might ensure a reasonable quality of life for
individuals, despite a political environment threatening
chaos. Economic analysis in the hands of the philosophers is
not a tool to be developed for use in the pursuit of a
transitory national strength such as the Athenian proved
to be.
Instead, it is an intellectual activity required
for an understanding of the nature of a just society and the

^Gordon, p. 21.
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application of that understanding to the preservation of a
certain quality of life.
Gordon's

insight

criticism

of

represents

Plato's

work

a
as

departure

from

the

pre-scientific.

long

line

of

In describing the

dialogues as more than just a "tool to be developed for use in the
pursuit

of transitory national

strength,"

Gordon is

setting them

apart from the type of economic thought common to antiquity.

Plato's

is a type of analysis; it is simply alien to the modern mind, owing
to its peculiar methodology.
In Economic Analysis Before Adam Smith Gordon takes a first
step

toward

dialogues.
undeniable

understanding
While

the

differences

fully

the

economic

content

result of this undertaking
between

Plato's

analysis

of Plato's

still shows the
and

that of the

modern economist, it also shows that Plato's work stands as economic
analysis in the Schumpeterean sense.

Gordon sees the incentive for

Plato to analyze the economy of Athens as lying in his preoccupation
with the attainment of knowledge of the good life, when he writes that
"This unswerving focus on the idea of the good life as attainable
through full participation of the individual in the communal inter
changes of a moderately-sized society led Plato and Aristotle into
examination of economic questions."
clear Gordon's
social

view that Platonic

scientist,

73

economics is the analysis of a

albeit an analysis

fashionable today:

72Ibid., pp. 22-23.
73Ibid., p. 26.

The following statements make

distinct

from that which is
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The philosophers' investigation of social evolution and
ethics yield not only a distinctive approach to economic
enquiry, but also a number of significant generalisations
relating to particular aspects of that enquiry.
From the discussion of the formation of community life
arise observations on the role of specialisation in economic
activity, the functions of money, and the organisation of
property.
Out of the concern with justice comes an essay
into the theory of value and consideration of the phenomenon
of interest payment.
In dealing with these particular issues still of concern
to modern economists, the philosophers constantly referred
them to a broader framework than is usually chosen as the
setting for similar discussions today. Aristotle, like Plato
before him, did not conceive of the economy as a group of
relationships which could be considered meaningfully apart
from tjie other forms of interaction which characterise social
life.
The distinction between the economic analysis of Plato and
Aristotle, and that of Schumpeter and other moderns is not a matter
of methodology alone.
ference between

As Gordon points out, there is a basic dif

the ends of ancient and modern economic analysis.

"Both Plato and Aristotle," Gordon notes," would see the modern claim
to autonomy

for economics

social enquiry."7^

as most inhibiting for the progress of

That is, "Economic analyses can only be conducted

properly as aspects of a much broader study than that for which most
modern economists seem content to settle."7^

More important, how

ever, is the fact, as Gordon sees it:
The philosophers' steps in economic analysis are not
motivated by any desire to stimulate a process of economic
development.
Plato's and Aristotle's economics is not the

74Ibid.
75Ibid., p. 27.
76Ibid.
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economics of growth. Their approach is guided by a belief in
the desirability of establishing a relatively stationary
state of economic activity at a level which ensures the
maintenance of~a moderate standard of material well-being for
the citizenry.
Whereas many modern economists operate under the assumption that more
of what people want is better than less, with its accompanying maxims
of welfare optimization, Gordon recognizes that Plato and Aristotle
sought

through economic

analysis

those

economic

components

of an

objectively "good life" that would truly maximize human welfare.
this

respect

Gordon's survey must be understood as a

In

significant

departure from the uniformly harsh criticism of Platonic economics
attributable to other historians of economic thought.
Gordon's

insight

into

the

validity

of

Platonic

analysis

carries over to his survey of specific doctrine mentioned by Plato.
Here,

Gordon

science

than

shows
is

a greater

the norm.

sensitivity to the aims
Gordon affirms

of Platonic

the efficiency motive

underlying Plato's conception of the division of labor, while point
ing to an even more important consideration covered by Plato.
this point Gordon claims:
the beneficial impact on growth of output is not the reason
for Plato's interest in [the division of labor]. He advo
cates division of labour to the extent that the quality of an
individual's life is improved by his being able to perform
that function for which he is best fitted by his natural
endowments. Impact of the division on the grow^| of national
product is, at best, a secondary consideration.

78Ibid., p. 28.

On
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In denying the "more is better than less" end of economic activity,
Plato and Aristotle are, in Gordon's words:
interested in economic growth only as a prelude to the
achievement of a certain modest standard of material well
being.
That standard is one which provides the opportunity
for maximisation of quality of life as they understand it.
Gordon even points
Platonic

to a "limits

economics,

seldom

to growth"

described

strand of thought in

in economic

literature.

He

writes:
The possibility that maintenance of a positive rate of eco
nomic growth is necessary to sustain an adequate scope for
individual choice in role-playing or for social choice in
such matters as population policy or management of the
natural environment, does not seem to have been considered
by...Plato...Such scope is ensured
achieving and holding a
given level of material well-being:
Unfortunately,
economics

pursue

deserves.
approachable

Gordon does

Plato's

Instead,

economic

Gordon

is

not

in his

analysis

content

to

to

survey of Socratic
the extent that it

comment

on

the

contributions to economics made by Aristotle.

more
Beyond

those issues mentioned above, Gordon considers only Plato's theories
of money, interest, and communistic holding of property.

Rather than

pull together the strands of economic analysis in Plato's dialogues
into a coherent economic theory, Gordon offers, in final analysis,
an insight, albeit a more keen insight than that of his colleagues,
into the fairly obvious economic ideas suggested by Plato.
On money, Gordon points out that Plato was one of the first
proponents of "non-metallism."

79Ibid., p. 29.
80Ibid., p. 33.

In the Republic and Laws Plato can be
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seen to espouse

a theory of money in which it serves as merely a

token of exchange for commodities.

Gordon writes:

Plato recognises that the presence of a division of labour in
society gives rise to the need for exchanges of commodities
amongst its
citizens.
The process of exchange will be
facilitated by the introduction of "a currency to serve as a
token for purposes of exchange." The end or purpose of money
then is its action as a medium of exchange, and for this
function as mere symbol or token can suffice. The material
of which money is composed is of little or no account.
Here, Plato is adopting a theory of money which can be
called "non-metallist."
Money, to function effectively as
money, need
not consist of a ^aterial that has a value
independent of its role as money.
Gordon makes a connection between Plato's advocacy of token money and
his

call

for the

abolition of

international

currency.

He notes:

That Plato was consistent in his non-metallism is illustrated
by a passage from the Laws, his last written work.
In this
passage he advocates a type of policy that was anathema to
orthodox monetary theorists of eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury Europe. He proposes a divorce between international
trading currency and the internal circulating medium of the
city-state.
The latter,g2he believes, should be devoid of
intrinsic material value.
It is important that one ask at this point in the analysis
why does

Plato

advocate

the

adoption of a non-metallist monetary

policy, as described by Gordon?

In answering this question, Gordon

adopts the attitude, common among Plato's critics, that no economic
concerns

underlie

Plato's

discussion

of

money.

Rather,

Gordon

points out that Plato's system of money issue and control is, "as
in the case of his advocacy of a division of labour.. .based on moral

81Ibid., p. 43.
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considerations."

From the

context of modern

economic analysis,

Gordon is correct in his recognition of Plato’s interest in moral
issues.

If

one

appreciating
issues

moral

thought

with

an

eye toward

science,

then these moral

shown to be rooted in economics,

understood in the

Plato perceived the end of science to be knowledge of

truths.

justice,

Platonic

the philosopher's view of

can be

ancient sense.

approaches

Knowledge

the nature

of

these

of temperance,

happy in their lives.

truths— i.e.,

the

nature

of

etc.— enables men to be truly

Certain virtues, such as temperance in acqui

sition of things, or liberality in the use of wealth, are economic in
nature.

Consequently,

the science of economics involves for Plato

the search for knowledge or wisdom that permits the attainment of
happiness through economic channels.

The moral concerns that Gordon

mentions

in

all

involve

participation

the

virtues

that

ensure

happiness through economic means.
Gordon's assessment of Plato's theory of interest exemplifies
his

tendency to

Plato's economics.

stop

short

of a complete analysis of a topic of

In his discussion of Plato's theory on the pay

ment of interest,

Gordon comments:

the

antiquity,

moralists

practice

of

of

interest

payment

"Plato, in a manner typical of

expresses
on

general

loans."

84

opposition to the

Gordon

distinguishes

between Plato's conception of voluntary and involuntary extensions of
credit.

Voluntary extension of credit involves the exchange of goods

88Ibid., p. 44.
84Ibid., p. 49.

for the promise of future repayment, or the lending of money for the
purchase of commodities with the promise of future reimbursement of
principle plus interest.
of

such

contracts,

Plato argued against the legal enforcement

arguing

that

they

promoted

profit

from

the

exchange of money, rather than gain from trade of real commodities.
Involuntary extension of credit, however, occurs whenever failure of
prompt

repayment

results

in the

course

of ordinary trade.

If a

person fails to make payment for goods and services received, Plato
argued that the law should provide for the recovery of principle plus
interest on behalf of the seller.

Gordon claims that this distinc

tion between voluntary and involuntary grants of credit is "a quite
fundamental element in scholastic thinking and served to shape the
course

of their enquiry into the economics of lending."

85

Gordon

does not, however, appear to be interested in the reasons for Plato's
advocacy of one type of credit and opposition to the other.

Yet, it

is only through analysis of Plato's justifications for his policy
prescriptions that one is able to discern the philosopher's economic
theory to be distinguishable from mere economic thought.
Gordon is even more vague in his discussion of Plato's system
of communal sharing of property.

While other historians of thought

have given this topic a thorough going-over,
appreciable
communism

end,
with

Gordon

is

Aristotle's.

of property among

the

content
After

to

although often to no

simply

noting

that

contrast

Plato's

Plato's

pooling

ruling and military classes is roughly the
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opposite of Aristotle's communism— it prevails for the masses— Gordon
proceeds

to discuss,

at length, the nature of Aristotle's system.

Although Gordon's Economic Analysis fails, at times, to cut
to

the heart of an issue of Platonic economic theory,

it must be

acknowledged to be one of the better surveys of the economic thought
of antiquity.

Overall,

Gordon appears sensitive to the method of

Platonic economics, albeit more interested in moving on in his survey
to

the

more

genuinely analytical work

of Aristotle.

Gordon,

at

least, does not fall into the rut of glossing over Plato's contribu
tions, using the arguments of a defunct positivism as the devices for
measuring the significance of the economic thought of the ancients.
In summary one must be struck,
unity

if not impressed, with the

of thought expressed by Plato's critics in their historical

surveys.

With only occasional exception, it appears that the study

of the history of economic thought and analysis has been colored by
the

scientistic

methodology

more

tendencies

of

appropriate

modern
for

the

economists
physical

to

adopt

sciences,

a
and

especially physics, as the yardstick by which to judge the lengths to
which

Plato

infancy.

and

other

ancients

carried economic analysis

in its

Even the sympathetic readers of Platonic philosophy, such

as Foley and Gordon, fail to change, to any appreciable degree, the
prevailing

attitudes

towards

Platonic

economics,

in

which

the

dialogues are viewed as the pre-scientific antecedents of the first
formal analysis contributed to economics by Aristotle.
Nonetheless, Plato's dialogues can be demonstrated to contain
an economic analysis of a level of sophistication at least comparable

61
to Aristotle's, and,

in many ways,

striking in its sensitivity to

issues of social science when compared with modern welfare analysis.
Demonstration of this quality of Plato's thought depends upon the
reader's being able to approach the dialogues from the context of the
methodology

intrinsic

to

ancient

economic

science.

Chapter

Two

serves as a guide to the method of ancient economics as practiced by
Plato,

with an eye

sensitivity
modern

to

economics

counterpart.

the

toward

the re-establishment in economics of a

craft

of

fails

to

subjective

develop

analysis— something

to the degree of

that

its ancient

CHAPTER 2

THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES
BETWEEN CONTEMPORARY AND PLATONIC ECONOMICS

In the survey of the literature devoted to an analysis of
Platonic economics, Plato qua economist appears to be regarded with
low esteem by modern economists.

The widely held belief that the

Platonic corpus is pre-scientific should not, however, be surprising.
Interpretations of what constitutes science and the scientific method
have

changed noticeably

response

to

changes

since antiquity.

in the

scientist's

Science

has

epistemology,

evolved

in

and in par

ticular to changes in his theory that explains the conscious mind's
perception of knowledge.

Since the time of Plato, and especially

since the nineteenth century,
have

changes in the scientific enterprise

corresponded to a growth in what political philosopher Eric

Voegelin

has

called

"ismology."^

"Isms,"

especially

ideological

beliefs in the historical tendency for change in human nature, are
incompatible with the Platonic method of investigation into issues of
social science.
A complete list of the many "isms" that have captivated the
attentions of social scientists since the Enlightenment would prove

*1

Eric Voegelin, "The Structures of Consciousness," Louisiana
State University, Baton Rouge, 3 April 1979.
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truly staggering.

Of these, however, several stand out in importance

for the pernicious effect they have had on the popularity of norma
tive

analysis

and,

thus,

positivism,

scientism,

ideologies

generally

economists.

The

on Platonic

Popperian

nominalism,

understood

force

and

science.

and

popularity

and

even
of

Moral

relativism,

historicism

embraced
these

by

"isms"

are

modern

serve to

severely undermine the credibility of Plato and other scholars who
focused their intellectual efforts on an attempt to elevate subjec
tive opinion concerning the proper ends of human action to the status
of objective, scientific knowledge, or episteme.
Plato was not a moral relativist— he believed that goodness
itself, the agathon, exists and serves as a steering force for human
action.

The agathon was not, for Plato, a psychological construct,

but rather it exists in its own right, quite apart from man's per
ception of it.

Plato's absolutism has been characterized as a kind

of idealism.

Aristotle criticized Plato for his preoccupation with

Ideal Forms.

Aristophanes painted

a picture of Socrates, Plato's

inspirer and mentor, that likens moral idealism to a sort of lunacy.
The

modern connotations

associated with the

concept

of

idealism,

specifically naivete, are inappropriate for characterizing Plato and
his

work.

Plato's

idealism

envisioned a branch of
Forms

are not

capable

developed

from

his

ontology.

reality that exists as pure Forms.
of being

discerned by mere

senses.

He
These
Plato

called these metaphysical Forms eidoi, from which we derive the word
"ideas."

Existing in the realm of the eidoi are the virtues (arete)
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--justice (dike), love (eros, philia, agape), truth (alethea), tem
perance

( sophrosyne), and the supreme virtue,

agathon or goodness

itself.
That

firm

belief

in

the

existence

of these metaphysical

concepts is uncommon among people is nothing new.

Moral relativism

existed and even dominated intellectual opinion in Plato's day.

In

fact, Plato focuses on Socrates' attempt to dispel the popular relativistic notions common among Athenians in several of his dialogues.
The acceptance of relativism today is almost universal.

The

notion that the desirability of certain ends of human action, e.g.,
living

a

temperate

life

or

behaving

dependent upon one's predilection,
mental

conditioning

self-evident.
concerning
account

for

the

culture,

is

functionally

history,

and environ

is widely regarded by social scientists to be

Widespread

the

honorably,

acceptance

interpersonal
economist's

validity
dismissal

of

relativism,

of

value

of

especially

judgments,

Platonic

helps

economics

as

poppycock.
More

damaging to

the appeal of Plato's investigation into

issues of social science than relativism has been the appeal of posi
tivism for the social scientist.

The desire for what Weber termed

wertfreiheit, or value-free science, appears to have survived in the
social
phy.

2

sciences
First

2

even beyond the eclipse of positivism in philoso-

described by

Comte

and,

later,

by Weber, positivism

Bruno Leoni, "Some Reflections on the 'Relativistic' Mean
ing of Wertfreiheit in the Study of Man," in Relativism and the Study
of Man, ed. Helmut Shoeck and James W. Wiggins (Princeton: D. Van
Nostrand, 1961), p. 158.
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is today dominant in the methodology of the social sciences, par
ticularly in economics.

Economists

are justifiably

interested in

uncovering facts concerning man's economic interactions.

Facts are

understood to be only those concepts that have some claim to objec
tive validity.

From the perspective of the positivist, investigation

of the Platonic virtues cannot be carried out objectively.

There

seems to be little acceptance among economists today of Plato's claim
that proper values have a factual basis--they are grounded in the
qualities of the eidoi that engender them.
Another

ideology

that

produces

Platonic philosophy is scientism.

hostile

attitudes

toward

Scientism is a term used by Hayek

and the Austrian economists that, when applied to the work of German
historicists

and

American

institutionalists,

describes

purely

empirical economic inquiry that does not admit the existence of a
priori

theory.

blindly attempts
sciences

to

"scientific

his

The

guilty

of

indulging

in

scientism

to apply the inductive methods of the laboratory
own

method"

suppositionless

economist

craft.

results

economics.

Presumably,
in

the

Rothbard

this

development
defines

devotion
of

a

to

pure,

scientism,

the
pre-

in

"The

Mantle of Science," in which he states:
The key to scientism is its denial of the existence of
individual consciousness and will.
This takes two main
forms:
applying mechanical analogies from the physical
sciences to individual men, and applying organism^c analogies
to such fictional collective wholes as "society."

3

Murray N. Rothbard, "The Mantle of Science," in Scientism
and Values, ed. Helmut Shoeck and James W. Wiggins (Princeton: D.
Van Nostrand, 1960), p. 165.
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The denial of consciousness and will that Rothbard describes places
scientism in opposition to Platonism.
Historicism,

one of the ideologies broadly characterized by

Hayek and Rothbard as scientistic, is an ideology that is unusually
opposed to the methods

of Platonic economics.

Historicists would

have economists induce significant cultural patterns and trends from
the

empirical

written

in

his

theoretical
school
in

its

facts

presented

early

economics,

years

by
in

Gunnar

historical

data.

economics, before

Myrdal

described

form,

there

is no

knowledge

he

an essay
abandoned

historicism

of thought devoid of a priori reasoning.^
extreme

In

as

a

In historicism,

apart from history.

Generalizations concerning human nature, made without regard for a
historical

sense

of

time

and place,

are considered inappropriate.

This method contrasts sharply with Plato's attempt to discover the
underlying logos that explains human behavior.
existence

of an essentially immutable

implications
its

qualities

Plato believed in the

form of human nature.

The

of his argument are that human nature, which derives
from

the unchanging Forms,

compels men to

respond

consistently and predictably to the circumstances in which they find
themselves
empirical

throughout history.
knowledge— really

the

Moreover,

Plato would

perception

of

the

insist that

senses— is

an

imperfect form of knowledge when compared with a priori knowledge.
Plato's social science is, like the historicist's, inductive; yet the

^Gunnar Myrdal, "Ends and Means in Political Economy," in
his Value in Social Theory, ed. Paul Streeten (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1958), p. 228.
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basis for induction,

for Plato,

is the experience of introspection

and dialectical reasoning, rather than the perception of historical
data.

Plato’s
Of

the

social

science

ideologies

is

incompatible

with

that discredit Platonism,

historicism.
none

is more

clearly destructive by design than the philosophy developed in the
twentieth century by Karl
toward

Platonic philosophy

Popper.

Popper's

led philosopher John Wild to describe

Popper as being Plato's chief modern enemy.^
nominalism.

unmitigated hostility

Popper's philosophy is

It is devoted to answering the question "What does a

thing do for man?" rather than the Platonic question "Ti esti?" or
"What is it?"

Popper dismisses Plato's inquiry as being unproductive

and unimportant,

inasmuch as it places a heavy emphasis upon dis-

£
covering the essences of things.
definition.

Plato's science is the science of

To use Popper's term it is "essentialism."

Acceptance

of the relative importance for the social sciences of answering the
nominalist's question,

"What can this do for man?" over "Ti esti?"

precludes serious consideration of the work of Plato.
In the
little

room

in

light of Voegelin's "ismology" there appears to be
modern

economics

validity of human virtues.

for

adherence

to

the

objective

The purpose of the chapter, however, is

to demonstrate that Plato maintained just this sort of adherence to
normative concepts, and that his analysis of them can be considered

^John Wild, Plato's Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural
Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. 10.

6Ibid., p. 35.
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scientific within the perspective of ancient social science.

Under

stood from this perspective Plato's political economy is intended to
be

consistent

Schumpeter's

with

Schumpeterean

classification

of

economic

the

analysis,

Platonic

in spite of

corpus

as

economic

thought.
To the
this

chapter

first,

the

analytical

end of establishing this claim the organization of

is given over to the
reader

is

method.

given

This

a

method

following

detailed
derives

knowledge and from his theory of being.
contribution to Western thought.
contrasted
Finally,

with

the

form of exposition:

description
from

of

Plato's

Plato's

theory

of

These theories are Plato's

Second, this method of inquiry is

methodologies

of

the

anti-Platonic

"isms."

I attempt to justify the use of Plato's method of inquiry

into the proper ends of economic action as being important for the
social sciences today.

I.

Plato's Epistemology and Scientific Method
Plato

attempted

to

analyze

normative

issues

of

economic

importance with an eye to obtaining scientific knowledge— episteme
— concerning man's natural
economic activity.

tendencies

and the proper ends of his

Plato's belief in the social scientist's ability

to transform opinion into knowledge--to reason scientific fact out of
subjective
Plato's

value

theory

of

judgment— is
knowledge

reasoning into four categories.

consistent
separates

with

the

his

products

epistemology.
of

cognitive

At the lowest level of consciousness

people are aware of opinions, the Greek doxa.

Doxa is an uncritical,

untested opinion concerning some object of sensory experience, i.e.,
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aisthesis.

More refined than doxa and, yet, less sophisticated than

scientific knowledge is belief or pistis.

Pistis is obtained after

preliminary reflection upon some opinion held by the investigator.
Reasoned

analysis

of some

issue

in the abstract can yield noetic

thought or noesis. Noetic thought is attained through introspection.
Finally, the highest level of knowledge envisioned by Plato is true
episteme, or scientific truth.
Associated with this hierarchy of knowledge are the mental
faculties that render the level of knowledge accessible to the con
scious mind.

Doxa is attained through uncritical speculation.

characterizes it as the product of imagination.

Plato

Pistis is a type of

knowledge not unlike that which an apprentice accepts as appropriate
for his craft from his mentor.
carpentry,

the

applied

products of pistis.
the

mind

through

Techne, or the arts (e.g., weaving,

fields

of

empirical

social

science)

are

The higher forms of knowledge are accessible to
intellection.

Moreover,

true

episteme

can

be

acquired, according to Plato, only through an especially arduous form
of intellection— the dialectic.
Plato's epistemology can be clearly seen in several of the
dialogues.
evidence,
Plato's

but

is

not

yet

formally

hierarchy of knowledge

knowledge
references.
Noesis

In the early dialogues Plato's theory of knowledge is in

and

intellectual

developed.

into two

knowledge,

One

can separate

distinct parts,
based

upon

sensible

these

early

Doxa and pistis are products of sensation— aisthesis.

and episteme

are

known only to the reasoning mind.

Plato

establishes metaphysical forms of being as being accessible through
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introspective

reasoning

between Socrates

in

and Cebes,

the

Phaedo.

Plato argues

Here,
that

in a conversation
the eidoi

are the

formal causes of the qualities of sensible things, as the following
passage shows:
Well, said Socrates, what I mean is this, and there is
nothing new about it. I have always said it; in fact I have
never stopped saying it, especially in the earlier part of
this discussion. As I am going to try to explain it to you
the theory of causation which I have worked out myself, I
propose to make a fresh start from those principles of mine
which you know so well— that is, I am assuming the existence
of absolute beauty and goodness and magnitude and all the
rest of them. If you grant my assumption and admit that they
exist, I hope with their help to explain causation to you,
and to find a proof that the soul is immortal.
Certainly I grant it, said Cebes.
in drawing your conclusion.

You need lose no time

Then consider the next step, and see whether you share my
opinion.
It seems to me that whatever else is beautiful
apart from absolute beauty is beautiful because it partakes
of that absolute beauty, and for no other reason.
Do you
accept this kind of causality?
Yes, I do.7
In this passage Plato presents the reader with two important ideas.
First,

he

believes

reality— virtue.
sensibles

in

Next,

the

existence

Plato

argues

of

a

that

transcendent
the

qualities

form
of

of
the

are attributable to the refined qualities of the eidoi,

which are only known to the mind.
One finds this concept elaborated again, in a playful manner
so characteristic of Plato's sense of drama, in the Symposium.

In a

conversation between Socrates and his friend Alcibiades, Plato echoes

Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected
Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton:
Press, 1961), p. 81.

Dialogues, ed. Edith
Princeton University
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the distinction between qualities of being and our knowledge of these
qualities, found in the Phaedo:
if you're right in thinking that I have some kind of power
that would make a better man of you, because in that case you
must find me so extraordinarily beautiful that your own
attractions must be quite eclipsed. And if you're trying to
barter your own beauty for the beauty you have found in me,
you're trying to exchange the semblance of beauty for the
thing itself— like Diomede and Glaucus swapping bronze for
gold.
But you know, my dear fellow, you really must be
careful. Suppose you're making a mistake, and I'm not worth
anything at all. The mind's eye begins to see clearly when
the outer eyes grow dim--and I fancy yours are still pretty
keen.
Socrates
point

is teasing Alcibiades.

of

nature.
ness

extreme

importance

At the same time he is making a

for

the

Platonic

inquiry

Socrates is both old and ugly, yet he possesses some aware

of beauty

itself,

the

formal cause of mere physical beauty.

This should render Socrates irresistible to Alcibiades.
is young and handsome.
not

into true

yet

become

Alcibiades

His eyes see clearly, but his mind's eye has

sufficiently

developed

to

"see"

Socrates'

inner

beauty.
The point of the

story in the Symposium is that sensible

beauty pales in comparison to beauty that is intellected, both in
terms of the sensations of delight it stirs in the soul and in terms
of relation to truth itself.
into

Plato's

theory

of

These distinctions provide an insight

knowledge

and

into his

theory of being.

Typically, however, they prove foreign to the reader unfamiliar with
the philosophy of Socrates.

Plato must have assumed this knowledge

g
Plato,

"Symposium,"

in

The

Collected Dialogues, p.

570.
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in the memory of his audience when he penned these dialogues.

Fortu

nately, the epistemological significance of inner versus outer beauty
is made clear in one of Plato's most intellectually mature dialogues,
the Republic. His theory of knowledge is thoroughly described in the
middle
passage

books

of the

dialogue,

and

can be

seen

in the

following

from Book VI, a conversation between Socrates and Plato's

brother Glaucon:
(Socrates) "Well, then," I said, "conceive that, as we say,
these two things are, and that the
one is king of the
intelligible class and region, while the other is king of the
visible.
I don't say 'of the heaven' so as to not seem to
you to be playing the sophist with the name.
Now, do you
have these two forms, visible and intelligible?"
(Glaucon) "I do."
"Then, take a line cut in two unequal segments, one for
the class that is seen, the other for the class that is
intellected— and go on and cut each segment in the same
proportion. Now in terms of relative clarity and obscurity,
you'll have one segment in the visible part for images.
I
mean by images first shadows, then appearances produced in
water and in all close-grained, smooth, bright things, and
everything of the sort, if you understand."
"I do understand."
"Then in the other segment put that of which this first
is the likeness— the animals around us, and everything that
grows, and the whole class of artifacts."
"I put them there," he said.
"And would you also be willing," I said, "to say that
with respect to truth or lack of it, as the opinable is
distinguished from the knowable,so the likeness is
dis
tinguished from that of which it is the likeness?"
"I would indeed," he
"Now, in its turn,
section should be cut."
"How?"

said.
consider also

how the intelligible

"Like this:
in one part of it a soul, using as images
the things that were previously imitated, is compelled to
investigate on the basis of hypotheses and makes its way not
to a beginning but to an end; while the other part it makes
its way to a beginning that is free from hypotheses; starting
out from hypothesis and without the images used in the other
part, by means of forms themselves it makes its inquiry
through them."
"I don't,"
mean here."

he

said,

"sufficiently understand what you

"Let's try again," I said.
"You'll understand more
easily after this introduction.
I suppose you know that the
men who work in geometry, calculation, and the like treat as
known the odd and the even, the figures, three forms of
angles, and other things akin to these in each kind of
inquiry.
These things they make hypotheses and don't think
it worthwhile to give any further account of them to them
selves or others, as though they were clear to all.
Beginning from them, they go ahead with their exposition of
what remains and end consistently at the objects toward which
their investigation was directed."
"Most certainly, I know that," he said.
"Don't you also know that they use visible forms besides
and make their arguments about them, not thinking about them
but about those others that they are like? They make the
arguments for the sake of the square itself and the diagonal
itself, not for the sake of the diagonal they draw, of which
they are shadows and images in water, they now use as images,
seeking to see those things themselves, that one can see in
no other way than with thought."
"What you say is true," he said.
"Well, then, this is the form I said was intelligible.
However, a soul in investigating it is compelled to use
hypotheses, and does not go to a beginning because it is
unable to step out above the hypotheses.
And it uses as
images those very things of which images are made by the
things below, and in comparison with which they are opined to
be clear and are given honor."
"I understand," he said, "that you mean what falls under
geometry and its kindred arts."
"Well, then, go to understand that by the other segment
of the intelligible I mean that which argument itself grasps
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with the power of dialectic, making the hypotheses not
beginnings but really hypotheses— that is, steppingstones and
springboards— in order to reach what is free from hypothesis
at the beginning of the whole.
When it has grasped this,
argument now depends on that which depends on this beginning
and in such fashion goes back down again to an end— making no
use of anything sensed in any way, but using forms them
selves, going through forms to forms, it ends in forms too."
"I understand," he said, "although not adequately— for in
my opinion it's an enormous task you speak of— that you wish
to distinguish that part of what is and is intelligible
contemplated by the knowledge of dialectic as being clearer
than that part contemplated by what are called the arts. The
beginnings in the arts are hypotheses; and although those who
behold their objects are compelled to do so with the thought
and not the senses, these men--because they don't consider
them by going up to a beginning, but rather on the basis of
hypotheses— these
men,
in my
opinion,
don't
possess
intelligence with respect to the objects, even though they
are, given a beginning, intelligible; and you seem to me to
call the habit of geometers and their likes thought and not
intelligence, indicating that thought is something between
opinion and intelligence."
"You have made a most adequate exposition," I said.
"And, along with me, take these four affections arising in
the soul in relation to the four segments:
intellection in
relation to the highest one, and thought in relation to the
second; to the third assign trust, and to the last imagina
tion. Arrange them in a proportion, and believe that as the
segments to which they correspond participate in truth, so
they participate in clarity."
"I undei^tand," he said.
as you say."
Plato's

"And I agree and arrange them

analogy of an unequally bisected

line having

its

segments similarly bisected is a familiar one to students of Western
thought.

It

serves

as

Platonic

epistemology.

sensibles

and the

a

compact

and

concise

statement

of

the

Ontologically,

reality

consists

of

the

intellectibles.

While the sensibles are easily

^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan
Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 190-92.
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discovered, they are but imperfect imitations of the intellectibles.
The intellectibles are known to the mind when the mind reasons upward
from hypotheses to a beginning.

Knowledge of true Forms, or eidoi,

is a priori, whereas knowledge of the sensibles is deductible from
sensory experience.
as

the basis

This ontology and resulting epistemology serves

for all

of Plato's

inquiries

into the questions of

social science.
Plato's most fetching exposition of his theory of knowledge
can be

found

Republic. ^

in his

allegory of the

cave,

This well-known story is

from Book VII of the

important not only for its

elucidation of the Platonic hierarchy of knowledge, but also for the
moving quality of its dramatic analogy.

The story of the cave is

told in the form of a myth.

While the use of myth in science would

be

today,

considered

inappropriate

it was especially suitable for

Plato as a vehicle for conveying truths about subjects that are not
capable

of being

dogmatically explained,

by virtue

of the soul's

inability to step out above them.
Opinion on the philosophical use of the myth by Plato varies
considerably,

from

highly

Plato-scholar

Constantin

philosophical

criticism,

critical
Ritter,

to highly supportive.
in

considers

the
the

Hegelian
Platonic

German

tradition
myths

to

of
be

" Phantasiegemalde; they were not meant by their author to be taken
seriously.

Ritter warns

the modern reader against "the common

10Ibid., pp. 193-97.
"^Arthur 0. Lovejoy, The Great Chain of Being (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1936), p. 36.
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but gross fallacy of treating them as of equal significance with the
results methodically reached...through scientific inquiry."
famous

lectures

on

the

"Chain

of

Being,"

Arthur

12

In his

Lovejoy argues

against the German positivistic interpretation of the Platonic myth.
Lovejoy provides the reader with a different interpretation of the
Platonic myth when he says that,
It is true that Plato himself warns us that myths are not to
be taken literally; but this is not equivalent to saying that
they are not to be taken seriously, that they are not figura
tive intimations of theses which Plato regards as both true
and important, but difficult to convey "in matter-moulded
forms of speech."
It is— especially in the Republic—
precisely when he reaches the height of his argument, the
conceptions which for him are plainly the most certain and
the most momentous, that he begins to speak in parables. He
does so, as he there also explains, because in these ultimate
reaches of his thought the terms of common language fail him;
the truth can only be shadoYed forth through sensible
analogues, as in a glass darkly.
In his book Participation:

A Platonic Inquiry, philosopher

Charles Bigger insists that "cosmological myth is meant to reveal the
grounds of order and the way it comes to be the form of fact."^
Bigger suggests that a true insight into the intentions of Plato for
the use of myth can be found in Eric Voegelin's explanation of the
use of myth in antiquity.

In Plato and Aristotle Voegelin describes

an intellectual problem faced by Plato in his quest for knowledge of

12Ibid.
13Ibid., p. 37.
14

(Baton

Charles P. Bigger, Participation:
A Platonic Inquiry
Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1968), p ~ 163.
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the

intelligibles, and

shows the myth to be one solution to this

problem:
...the cosmos is not a datum of immanent experience; the
philosopher, as a consequence, cannot advance verifiable
propositions concerning the psychic nature of its order.
That is the difficulty which Plato solves by means of the
myth...On this conception of a cosmic omphalos of the soul in
the depth of the unconscious rests Plato's acceptance of the
myth as a medium of symbolic expression, endowed with an
authority of its own, independent of, and prior to, the
universe of empirical knowledge constituted by consciousness
in attention to its objects.
Plato consciously resorted to the use of myth when investi
gating

the nature

experience.

of subjects

that

are not

the data of immanent

These subjects are those that Plato insisted the soul

could not step outside of.
the use of the intellect.

Investigation of these subjects requires
Moreover, the language of formal discourse

could prove too dogmatic for hypothesizing the nature of metaphysical
concepts.

In these instances, Plato would resort to the use of the

metaphorical myth to point the investigator of truth in the direction
of knowledge.
In the myth of the cave Plato tells of a group of people
chained together on the floor of a cave in such a manner as to be
facing its deepest recesses.
path,

sided by a wall.

Closer to the neck of the cave is a

The wall is just tall enough to hide from

view the people that walk along the path, so that only the pots they
carry on their heads are visible from inside the cave.

History
p . 184.

Opposite the

Eric Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, Vol. Ill of Order and
(Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1957),
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pathway from the prisoners a fire is maintained, which illuminates
the carried pots and casts shadows of these objects onto the back
wall

of the

cave.

Having no experience of any other images than

these shadows, the prisoners imagine them to be real objects.

Their

knowledge of clay pots is, of course, uncritical and untested.

It

corresponds to doxa, the lowest level of knowledge in the Platonic
hierarchy.

Plato characterized the problem of holding such knowledge

in the following way:
(Glaucon) "It's a strange image,"
prisoners you're telling of."

he

said,

"and

strange

(Socrates) "They're like us," I said.
"For in the first
place, do you suppose such men would have seen anything of
themselves and one another than the shadow cast by the fire
on the side of the cave facing them?"
"How could they," he said, "if they had been compelled to
keep their heads motionless throughout life."
"And what about the things that are carried by?
the same with them?"

Isn't it

"Of course."
"If they were able to discuss things with one another,
don't you believe they would hold that they are naming these
things going by before them that they see?"
"Necessarily."
"And what if the prison also had an echo from the side
facing them? Whenever one of the men passing by happens to
utter a sound, do you suppose they would believe that any
thing other than the passing shadow was uttering the sound?"
"No, by Zeus," he said.

"I don't."

"Then most certainly," I said, "such men would hold that
the truth- is nothing other than the shadows of artificial
things."ib

■^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, pp. 193-94.
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The problem Plato refers to here is that people who hold mere opinion
concerning some observation are apt to be as fervent in their belief
as if it were reasoned truth that they possessed.

It will be seen

that the means of sorting out opinion from reason is the dialectic.
Next Plato considers what would happen if suddenly one of the
prisoners were to be unchained.
periagoge— literally

He would, Plato claims, experience a

a turning-around.

To

see for the first time

that the images on the cave wall were mere shadows, when he turns
into the light, would prove unsettling.
epistemological hierarchy,
through

from mere

In connection with Plato's

the periagoge corresponds to a breaking-

opinion to

the

level

of techne,

for which the

corresponding knowledge is belief or pistis.
Plato tells of a more profound experience that occurs when
the prisoner

is

Annoyed by being

dragged

out of the

dragged,

cave

into

the

light of day.

and physically in pain from the sudden

transition from the dark cave to the light of day, the prisoner would
be

at a loss to explain his experience.

accustomed

to the new surroundings

And yet, after becoming

the prisoner would come to an

understanding of the relationship between the natural objects outside
the cave, their manufactured imitation in the form of the pots, and
the vague images of the pots— reality twice imitated— that appear as
shadows on the cave wall.^7
The
serves

as

allegory

is

a heuristic

17Ibid., p. 195.

an analogy to

device

the

segmented line.

Each

to explain the nature of being and
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knowledge
helps

of being

explain the

as it is understood by Plato.
reference

The cave story

to the clarity of different types of

knowledge made in the explanation of the segmented line.

The theory

conveyed here serves as the basis for all Platonic science.

It gives

rise to Plato's systematic inquiry into normative issues of political
economy,

in search of the

objective knowledge of human values he

expects to find.
Plato intended the acquisition
phenomena

to be

of knowledge of intelligible

a scientific pursuit.

That this pursuit is con

sidered by many today to be unscientific is likely the result of a
shift in modernity away from the ontology of antiquity to one that is
more purely phenomenological— one
These

changes

science.

in ontology

In its purest

that

limits being to aisthesis.

correspond to changes in the nature of

form science

is a systematic pursuit

generalized knowledge of objectively verifiable truths or facts.
Plato,

a

believer

Aristotelian formal

in

the

causes,

existence

of

metaphysical

the dialectic was

the

objective truths concerning objects of intellection.

Forms

of
For
or

science of the
To appreciate

the scientific nature of Plato's political economy one must keep in
mind

the

theories

philosophy.
science.
logical

of

knowledge

and

being

that

underlie

Plato's

These theories are not the foundations of modern social

Failure to be cognizant of the ontological and epistemodifferences between modern economics and Plato's economics

results in the superficial charges that Plato is pre-scientific, that
one finds in the literary criticism of Plato's economics.
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Almost all of Plato's writing is dialectical and is intended
to be scientific.

That is, the dialogues are written testimony to

the possibility of scientific knowledge of virtues.

The dialogues

are intended to systematically point toward objective truth.

Dis

covery of truth occurs through a process of recollection, which is
fostered through the dialectic.
Plato's theory of learning is a theory of recollection.
idea

that

knowledge

is

developed in the Phaedo.

acquired

through

recollection

is

The
first

This theory is described by the character

Cebes, who summarizes an argument often made by Socrates.

It appears

as follows:
Besides, Socrates, rejoined Cebes, there is that theory
which you have often described to us— that what we call
learning is really just recollection.
If that is true, then
surely what we recollect now we must have learned at some
time before, which is impossible unless our souls existed
somewhere before they entered this human shape. So in that
way too it seems likely that the soul is immortal.
How did the proofs of that theory go, Cebes? broke in
Simmias.
Remind me, because at the moment I can't quite
remember.
One very good argument, said Cebes, is that when people
are asked questions, if the question is put in the right way
they can give a perfectly correct answer, which they could
not possibly do unless they had some knowledge and a proper
grasp of the subject. And then if you confront people with a
diagram or anything like that, the way in which tljLgy react is
an unmistakable proof that the theory is correct.
Plato

provides

Cebes

speaks

to

of

the

reader

with

in the Meno.

convince Meno,

a

demonstration

of

the argument

In this dialogue Socrates attempts

an acquaintance,

of the fact that knowledge is

IO

Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 55.
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recollected by proving that an untutored slave-boy knows the prin
ciples of geometry."^
Acquisition of knowledge by recollection occurs in stages.
Classicist Norman Gulley characterizes these stages in his study of
Plato's theory of knowledge.

20

Gulley claims that

One feature of the theory [of recollection] which must be
considered before its metaphysical implications are discussed
is Plato's division of the process of recollection into three
main stages. The first stage, illustrated in the first part
of [the Meno], is the process of disillusionment, a negative
stage which elicits the recognition that propositions which
at first are believed to be true are in fact false.
The
significance of this is that by explicitly affirming that
this process is the first stage in the process of recollec
tion, and assuming that, if the questioning is systematically
continued, knowledge will eventually be acquired, Plato makes
quite clear that the theory of recollection is introduced as
a foundation for the Socratic dialectic. With this basis the
method can pass beyond the^merely 'purgative' stage and lead
to the discovery of truth.
The stages of recollection correspond to the acquisition of succes
sively higher levels of knowledge, as described in the analogy of the
segmented

line.

The

sense

of disillusionment--that opinions pre

viously thought to be true are now known to be false— is an important
step in the discovery of truth in the dialectic.
the dialogues are aporetic.

By design, many of

That is, they systematically divorce the

investigator from opinions that can be shown to be false, producing a
sense of aporia— a sense of being painted into a corner, or a sense

^Plato, "Meno," The Collected Dialogues, p. 354.

20
Norman Gulley,
Methuen, 1962), p. 13.
Ibid.

Plato's

Theory

of

Knowledge

(London:
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of being without resources.

The early dialogues, which essentially

focus

some particular virtue,

on

the

discovery of

are generally

aporetic.
Lysis, for instance, inquires into the nature of friendship,
without actually reaching a conclusion as to what exactly friendship
is.

Rather, by pointing out what opinions concerning friendship are

demonstrably false, it produces aporia. Euthyphro provides a similar
vehicle for a discussion of the nature of piety or holiness, to an
aporetic end.

Other well known aporetic inquiries are the Laches,

which centers around the development of knowledge of courage itself,
and

the

Charmides, which

deals with the nature of temperance,

or

sophrosyne.
In each of the aporetic dialogues Plato strives to foster a
sense of Socratic ignorance.

The act of cutting away by layers mere

opinion concerning some value judgment produces the sense of aporia
sought

in

the

dialectic.

Aporia

is,

for

Plato,

an

important

scientific springboard that prepares one to make a move upward into
the realm of reasoned knowledge, and to inquire into the true nature
of the Form that lies behind a value concept.
Beyond a sense of aporia, however,

the early dialogues are

designed to point the reader in the direction of truth.

An awareness

of Socratic ignorance by the investigator prepares him to reason out
some objective insight into the nature of those concepts that serve
as the ultimate ends— telea— of political and economic action.
Not all of the early dialogues end aporetically.

Some move

on to arrive at the second-stage level of knowledge, pistis.

The
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Meno, for instance, succeeds in instilling right opinion in the mind
of the slave-boy,

although the boy is not prepared to explain the

higher principles that lend truth to his sense of trust.

In his more

mature work Plato moves the dialectic to a stage of recollection that
provides insight into true definition, which is the telos of dialec
tical inquiry.

According to Plato, happiness requires knowledge of

happiness itself.

He makes this point clear in the Meno, where he

argues that no one voluntarily desires evil:
(Socrates) When you speak
of a man desiring fine things, do
you mean it is good things he desires?
(Meno) Certainly.
Then, do you think some men desire evil and others good?
Doesn't everyone, in your opinion, desire good things?
No.
And would you say that the others suppose evils to be
good, or do they still desire them although they recognize
them as evil?
Both, I should say.
What?
Do you really
think that anyone whorecognizes
evils for what they are, nevertheless desires them?
Yes.
Desires in what way?

To possess them?

Of course.
In the belief that evil things bring advantage to their
possessor, of harm?
Some in the first belief, but some also in the second.
And do you believe that those who suppose evil things
bring advantage understand that they are evil?
No, that I can't really believe.
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Isn't it clear then that this
evils for what they are, don't
think is good, though in fact it
ignorance mistake bad things for
good?

class, who don't recognize
desire evil but what they
is evil; those who through
good obviously desire the

For them I suppose that is true.
Now as for those whom you speak of as desiring evils in
the belief that they do harm to their possessor, these pre
sumably know that they will be injured by them?
They must.
And don't they believe that whoever is injured is, in so
far as he is injured, unhappy?
That too they must believe.
And unfortunate?
Yes.
Well, does anybody want to be unhappy and unfortunate?
I suppose not.
Then, if not, nobody desires what is evil, for what e l ^
is unhappiness but desiring evil things and getting them?
To know what happiness is, therefore,

is to be happy.

The end of

social science, which must be to make men happy, requires some knowl
edge

of what happiness

individual,

what

the

is.

In modernity,

individual

opines

happiness

happiness

is,

to be.

for the
Plato's

dialectic produces, on the other hand, knowledge of happiness out of
opinions of happiness.
Transformation of opinion to knowledge is a rational process.
In

Plato's

terminology

reason

goes

to

a beginning;

it explains

Forms by using Forms, rather than the objects of sensation.

Gulley

oo

Plato,

"Meno,"

in The

Collected Dialogues, pp.

360-61.
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states that the important feature of Plato's theory of recollection
is that
it appeals to a transcendent source of knowledge and implies
a transcendent reality as the object of knowledge, tran
scendent in the sense that it is superior to and different in
kind from the 'reality' which belongs to the objects of the
incarnate experience of this life. But no attempt is made to
analyze this latter experience or to specify the nature of
its objects; in particular no attempt is made to associate it
with specifically sensible experience.
When the mind grasps at concepts of transcendent reality it must,
according to Plato, adopt as a technique of investigation a method
that does not rely upon sensory observation for verification of an
hypothesis.

The

dialectic

is

the rational process that satisfies

this criterion.
The importance of the dialectic as a method of inquiry into
the true nature of intelligible, rather than sensible, phenomena can
be seen in Plato's characterization of the problem confronting the
investigator of metaphysical concepts.
when

investigating

hypotheses,
eses,"

24

because

Plato insists that a soul,

intelligible phenomena,
it "is unable

to go to a beginning.

to

step

therefore,

consciousness.
the

is unable

Whereas

the

compelled

out above

to employ

the hypoth-

By nature metaphysical Forms, if they

exist, exist outside the conscious mind.
concepts,

is

to hold

The investigator of these
them as

laboratory

an object of his

scientist

is

afforded

luxury of ordinarily being able to observe the object of his

^Gulley, p. 19.

24
Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 191.
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investigation,

the

philosopher

cannot

see

that

which

he

seeks.

Rather, the philosopher qua investigator of virtue must infer quali
ties of metaphysical Forms, based upon glimpses perceived through the
mind's eye.

The soul's perception of virtue, according to Plato's

epistemology,

is

not

unlike

the

dimensional model of a hypercube.
hypercube

can

dimensional
hypercube

see

figure.

from the

only

three

experience

of

seeing

a

three-

At any moment the observer of the
of

the

dimensions

of

this

four

One does glimpse the fourth dimension of the
shadows

cast by the fourth dimension onto the

three that are visible.

So, too, the observer of an ideal virtue

glimpses with the mind's

eye the metaphysical qualities of that Form

as they become visible to the soul.
The problem of verifying the existence of the invisible Forms
of reality described in the dialogues has long perplexed the serious
scholar.
Forms,

Aristotle had much to say about Plato's theory of Ideal
almost

none

of

it

flattering.

Although Aristotle

shared

Plato's belief in the existence of objective virtues, he had little
patience for Plato's preoccupation with acquiring knowledge of forms.
The peripatetic was quite concerned that people do good, but he was
not interested in whether or not they know goodness itself.

25

Aristotle understood the agathon to be the ultimate telos, or
final cause, of human action.

This can be seen in his

introduction

to Nicomachean Ethics, in which Aristotle states that

25
Aristotle,
315.

Aristotle,
"Nicomachean Ethics,"
in
Introduction
to
ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Modern Library, 1947), p.
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Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action
and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good; and for this
reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which
all things aim...If, then, there is some end of the things we
do, which we desire for its own sake (everything else being
desired for the sake of this), and if we do not choose every
thing for the sake of something else (for at that rate the
process would go on to infinity, so that our desire would be
empty2^and vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief
good.
Ontologically, however, Aristotle was not sympathetic to his mentor's
notion of Forms of Ideas.

He did not disapprove of Plato's inquiry

into the nature of fixed and objective virtues; rather, Aristotle did
not accept the theory of Forms at rest that generate the qualities
found

in

the

sensibles.

In

particular,

Aristotle

saw objective

virtues existing as separate entities, rather than as qualities of a
single Form.

This departure from Plato's theory of Forms can also be

found in Nicomachean Ethics, and appears below:
An objection to what we have said, however, may be dis
cerned in the fact that the Platonists have not been speaking
about all goods, and that the goods that are pursued and
loved for themselves are called good by reference to a single
Form, while those which tend to produce or to preserve these
somehow or to prevent their contraries are called so by
reference to these in a secondary sense...Let us separate,
then, things good in themselves from things useful, and
consider whether the former are called good by reference to a
single Idea.
What sort of goods would one call good in
themselves? Is it those that are pursued
even whenisolated
from others,
such as
intelligence,
sight, and
certain
pleasures and honours?
Certainly, if we pursue these also
for the sake of something else, yet one would place them
among things good in themselves.
Or is nothing other than
the Idea of good good in itself? In that case the Form will
be empty.
But if the things we have named are also things
good in themselves, the account of the good will have to
appear as something identical in snow and in white lead. But

26Ibid., p. 308.
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of honour, wisdom, and pleasure, just in respect of their
goodness, the accounts are distinct and diverse. The good,
there|yre, is not some common element answering to one
Idea.
The
validity

existence

to

problematic

of

statements

transcendent
of

moral

being that

principle

has

lends
proved

objective
far

to modern scientists than it did to Aristotle.

more
Today

there is hardly any mention of idealistic realism beyond statements
that

relegate

it

to

some

defunct philosophy from the past.

In

economics, for example, we have seen that leading methodologists are
confident
term.

in their claims that normative science is an oxymoronic

Friedman, after all, has said that "fundamental differences in

basic values
fight."

are

differences

about which men can ultimately only

Moral principles are all treated as value judgments, i.e.,

doxa, none of which can have any basis in facts.
The

reasons

that

modern

social

scientists

resist

the

absolutism of Plato, and, thus, label the dialogues pre-scientific,
are several.

Science inquires into the nature of objective truth.

The methods of science depend upon two critical perceptions of the
mind:

(1) what is the nature of being, and (2) what is the nature of

knowledge

of being and how

is it obtained?

Clearly,

the radical

differences between the science of antiquity and of modernity must
have their roots in changes in the ontologies and epistemologies of
Western thought.

^Ibid., pp. 314-15.
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II.

The Epistemologies of Contemporary Economics
The statements of Friedman, Lange, and others concerning the

unscientific nature of normative prescription and value judgment can
be

traced

earlier.
and

to

intellectual

roots

from the eighteenth century and

The methodological distinction between "is" and "ought,"

between

"fact"

Friedman and others

and

"value"

is Hume's.

prominent

in

the

methodology of

In his book A Treatise of Human

Nature, Hume displays a clearly modern sense of science.

In this

thesis Hume explains that virtue can never be derived from reason;
rather,

it is the perception of emotion.

Hume curiously applies a

Platonic measurement to the validity of thought when comparing reason
and emotion, yet he arrives at a conclusion concerning virtue that is
the antithesis of Plato's.

Hume writes that,

...It has been observed, that nothing is ever present to
the mind but its perceptions; and that all the actions of
seeing, hearing, judging, loving, hating, and thinking, fall
under this denomination. The mind can never exert itself in
any action which we may not comprehend under the term percep
tion; and consequently that term is no less applicable to
those judgments by which we distinguish moral good and evil,
than to every other operation of the mind. To approve of one
character, to condemn another, are only so many different
perceptions.
Now, as perceptions resolve themselves into two kinds,
viz. impressions and ideas, this distinction gives rise to a
question, with which we shall open up our present inquiry
concerning morals, whether it is by means of our ideas or
impressions we distinguish betwixt vice and virtue, and
pronounce an action blamable or praiseworthy? This will
immediately cut off all loose discourses and declamations,
and reduce us to something precise and exact of the present
subject.
Those who affirm that virtue is nothing but a conformity
to reason; that there are eternal fitnesses and unfitnesses
of things, which are the same to every rational being that
considers them; that the immutable measure of right and wrong
impose an obligation, not only in human creatures, but
also on the Deity himself: all these systems concur in the
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opinion, that morality, like truth, is discerned merely by
ideas, and by their juxtaposition and comparison. In order,
therefore, to judge of these systems, we need only consider
whether it be possible from reason alone, to distinguish
betwixt moral good and evil, or whether there must concur
some other principles to enable us to make that distinction.
If morality had naturally no influence on human passions
and actions, it were in vain to take such pains to inculcate
it; and nothing would be more fruitless than that multitude
of rules and precepts with which all moralists abound.
Philosophy is commonly divided into speculative and prac
tical; and as morality is always comprehended under the
latter division, it is supposed to influence our passions and
actions, and to go beyond the calm and indolent judgments of
the
understanding.
And this
is confirmed by common
experience, which informs us, that men are often governed by
their duties, and are deterred from actions by the opinion of
injustice, and impelled to others by that of obligation.
Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions
and affections, it follows, that they cannot be derived from
reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already
proved, can never have any such influence.
Morals excite
passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself
is utterly impotent in this particular.
The rules
morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
Hume makes the Platonic distinction of knowledge seen in the analogy
of

the

ideas.

segmented
However,

line.
he

He

distinguishes between

relegates morals

impressions

and

and moral principles to the

status of impressions— i.e., the Platonic doxa.

Hume's argument is

too simplistic.

It is based upon the idea that reason is indolent,

whereas passion

is

active--that

His argument proves nothing.
with by Plato
virtuously.

in his

action derives from the passions.

In fact it is anticipated and dealt

argument

that

to know virtue

is to behave

Nevertheless, Hume's proof neatly summarizes the modern

distinction between facts and values.

ed.

28
David Hume, "A Treatise of Human Nature," in Value and Man,
Louis Z. Hammer (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 164-65.
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Hume, Friedman, and Lange seem to share an ontology, popular
since

the

Enlightenment,

that

does

not

immutable Forms which engender virtues.

admit

the

experience

of

The possible reasons that

explain the differences between this ontology and Plato's are many,
but a few stand out as plausible.

It is possible that Hume and

others did indeed experience or "see" virtues as clearly as Plato
did,

but they saw them to be

absolute.
become

demonstrably relative,

rather than

Or, in modernity the "mind's eye," like the appendix, has

a vestigial

organ.

In this case the soul would no longer

perceive virtue in the way that Plato's did.

Finally, it is possible

that Hume and others did experience the Platonic periagoge, but, not
recognizing
decision

the

to

experience,

reject

they elected to

"almost

immediately verifiable as true.
Of
between

the

Platonic

believable.
argument
respect

three

false"

modern

of the ontological

thought,

in support of an immutable
to

that

was

not

29

explanations

and

anything

the

first

is

differences
the

least

A relativist would be inconsistent in putting forward an

virtues.

absolute

doctrine.

captures

the

being.

as

invoke the Cartesian

Relativism
It

is

underlying

also

existence

cannot

logically

unlikely

difference

of relativity with

that

between

admit

the

the

two

second

of

any

reason

theories

of

Psychologically we must be capable of seeing what Plato saw,

which is not to say, however, that we accept his interpretation of

29
Rene Descartes,
Merrill, 1950), p. 7.

Discourse

on

Method

(New York:

Bobbs-
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that perception.

Rather, it is more likely that the third explana

tion characterizes Hume's belief that values are distinct from facts.
With the development of the scientific method during the Enlighten
ment, the normative philosophies of antiquity must have appeared as
magnificent

castles built upon sand.

Hume, like Descartes before

him, understands science in a way that foreshadows modern positivism.
Plato would be intrigued by Hume's epistemology.

He would,

no doubt, agree with Hume on the point that moral principles excite
the

passions.

Moreover,

he

would

insist that

the majority

of

opinions held by people concerning moral and ethical principles have
no basis in truth at all.

He would, however, strongly disagree with

Hume concerning the issue of the impotence of reason.

We have seen

that he did not separate knowledge of virtue from virtuous behavior.
In both the Protagoras and the Meno Plato insists that no one would
voluntarily behave in a way inconsistent with virtue, assuming that
that person possessed some knowledge of virtue.

30

For Plato, the

mind is not indolent in directing the will to act upon reason.
know what

is good

is to

do what

acquired by the reasoning

mind.

speculative and practical

spheres

is

good, and

To

this knowledge is

Plato would admit the existence of
ofphilosophy,

but would insist

that the speculative branch serves as the sighting device with which
one aims the practical.
It is clear that contemporary social scientists, like Aris
totle before them, have a tough time making sense out of the theory

^0

Plato,

"Protagoras," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 338.
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of Forms.
clearly.

The

outer

eyes

of the

social

scientist still see too

Nevertheless, the rejection of ancient epistemology by Hume

and others has profoundly altered the nature of scientific inquiry,
with the predictable result that Plato's inquiry has been ruled out
of court.

III.

Rhapsody, Sophistry, and Modern Relativism
Even in his own day Plato had a difficult time convincing his

contemporaries.

The Athenian culture was steeped in a long tradition

of moral relativism— a tradition that Plato's mentor Socrates sought
to overturn through his teaching.

The popularity of relativism in

Plato's day can be seen in the dialogues, in Plato's account of the
sophists, the
dialogues

the

itinerant teachers of persuasion and rhetoric. In
sophists

malleability of virtue.
of it.

appear

as

advertisers

of a belief in

the
the

To the sophist virtue is what you would make

The sophistic position is summarized in the famous maxim of

Protagoras,

the greatest of all sophists.

In the Cratylus and the

Theaetetus we are reminded by Plato that Protagoras lived by the rule
that

" Panton

31
krematon metron einai anthropon."

This translates

literally as, Of all things the measure is man."
The popularity of the sophist in the Athenian polis can be
attributed to

the long romance that existed between the Athenians and

the powers of

verbal persuasion and demonstration. The polis fairly

teemed with all sorts of artisans whose principal trade was wit and

■^Plato, "Cratylus," p. 424, and "Theatetus," p. 856 in The
Collected Dialogues.
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persuasion.

In an early dialogue, Ion, Plato tells of a conversation

between Socrates and Ion, a celebrated rhapsode.

Ion makes a living,

we are told, by telling the tales of Homer in the most exciting and
persuasive

way

that

he

can

muster.

In

the

dialogue

Socrates

systematically discredits Ion as being a peddler of an essentially
useless product.
the Homeric
citizens.

Socrates argues that Ion, by creatively reciting

legends, is not delivering the truth to the Athenian

Moreover, Ion pretends, by virtue of his mastery of verse,

to have mastered the crafts mentioned in the Homeric epic poems.
Rhapsody,

the

creative

craft of the relativist.

recitation of ancient verse,

is a

Rather than convey the "truths" of the poet

in their original form, the rhapsode would make them his own.
and

legends

handed

down from antiquity would be

otherwise

modified

listener.

To Plato the rhapsode was a nuisance.

to be
tales,

the master
Plato

knowledge

so

32

as

to

flatter

and

catch

Tales

exaggerated
the

ear

of

and
the

Although Ion claims

of the many crafts that are the subject of his

demonstrates

that

of these subjects.

Ion

actually

possesses

not

true

The rhapsode is merely a flatterer.

Plato reserves his intellectual strength to do combat with
the

sophists.

The

sophists

were

widely

regarded

as

excellent

teachers and, as in the case of Protagoras, received handsome fees
for their lectures.
with

long-winded

persuading his

Like the rhapsode, the sophist would hold forth

speeches

and

demonstrations, with

audience with the

sweetness

an eye

toward

of his rhetoric.

■^Plato, "Ion," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 225.

The
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sophist was

the grand

flatterer of the polis.

In the Theaetetus

Plato characterizes the sophist as a "skirmishing mercenary in the
war of words."

33

He says that the sophist

might lie in wait for you armed with a thousand such
questions, once you have identified knowledge and perception.
He would make his assaults upon hearing and smelling and
suchlike senses and put you to confusion, sustaining his
attack until your admiration of his inestimable skill
betrayed you
into his toils, and
thereupon, leading you
captive and bound, he would hold,you to ransom for such a sum
as you and he might agree upon.
In the Theaetetus we are told that knowledge is simply per
ception,

in

appearance.
basis

for

the

minds

of the

many.

The unity of knowledge
the

sophistic moral

By

perception

and appearance

relativism.

Plato

means

serves as the

Socrates

accuses

Theaetetus, the issuer of the statement that knowledge is perception,
of arguing like the great Protagoras.

The Protagorean position with

respect to moral values is that what one perceives as virtuous is
virtue for that individual.
of the many.

Social virtues become the shared beliefs

The sophist considers virtue to be egoistically deter

mined.
Plato was prepared to do battle with the moral relativists of
his day.

He devoted the Theaetetus to the issue of whether or not

knowledge conforms to the notion of perception.

In the dialogue the

sophistic

that

position

centers

around the

perception are indistinguishable.
beliefs

of his

interlocutors,

belief

knowledge

and

Plato proceeds to hack away at the

showing that knowledge, whatever it

•5"3

Plato,

"Theaetetus," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 871.
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truly

is,

cannot be perception.

constantly

changing.

It

Perception is demonstrated to be

cannot

be

classified

ontology as among ta onta— the things that are.

in

the

Knowledge, as under

stood in the Platonic epistemology, is knowledge of Forms.
ta onta.

Platonic

Forms are

Perceptions, however, are either objects of doxa or claims

pistis.

Although

Plato provides

the

reader with no

dogmatic

definition of knowledge in the Theaetetus, he shows that it would be
epistemologically inconsistent for it to be perception, at least with
respect to his understanding of reality.

35

To the modern reader Plato's argument in the Theaetetus is
unconvincing.

Plato intended this.

Indeed, he chastises his inter

locutors for accepting his argument uncritically.

Plato understands

that knowledge of Forms cannot be demonstrated to be a product of
rational

discourse.

relative

or

Neither

perceptual.

can knowledge be

Nevertheless,

demonstrated to be

the modern

relativist

can

dismiss Plato on grounds that his mind does not admit the existence
of

metaphysical

forms,

and

that

knowledge

must

consequently

be

treated as mere perception.
Protagorean relativism has been nearly universally accepted
in the sciences today.
the

forms

that

The science of Plato— i.e., investigation of

engender

moral

values— is

scientist a kind of proto-science.

for

the

modern social

The Delphic charges "know thy

self" and "nothing too much" have been replaced by the maxim found
over the entrance to the NBER that "science is measurement."

35Ibid., p. 857.
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important that measurement
form of analysis.

is a sensible rather than intellectual

As botanist Conway Zirkle has suggested,

Today almost every scientist whose interests extend
beyond the range of his technical researches is a relativist
of one kind or another.
To a professional scientist, this
needs no explanation; it is only what he would expect. When
we view the phases through which our expanding sciences are
passing, we find that they contain a vast amount of informa
tion and that this information is still growing exponentially
just as it has been growing for the past three hundred years.
While we have not yet learned to know ourselves, we are
getting a better idea as to what sort of creatures we
actually are. And this knowledge helps to explain what might
otherwise be a paradox.
The more our knowledge increases-the greater the achievements in which our species can take
legitimate pride— the greater becomes the modesty of the
scientists who are responsible for the increase. Today our
better scientists know so much about themselves that they
have
become^ acutely
aware
of
their
many
limiting
deficiencies.
In

economicsthe acceptance of

in

the physic il

sciences.

relativism seems as complete as it is

In discussing relativism Mises has said

that "Weber gave the deathblow to the methods applied by the schools
of Schmoller and Brentano by demonstrating the unscientific character
of

judgments

of

value."

37

In

a

statement

that

recapitulates

Protagoras, Mises claims that
With regard to ultimate ends, all that a mortal man can
assert is approval or disapproval from the point of view of
his own judgments of value.
With regard to means there is
only one question, v i z ™ whether or not they are fitted to
attain the ends sought.

36

Conway Zirkle, "Human Evolution and Relativism," in Rela
tivism and the Study of Man, p. 23.
37
Sciences
p. 119.

Ludwig Von Mises,
"Epistemological Relativism in the
of Human Action," in Relativism and the Study of Man,

38Ibid., p. 127.
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The epistemology of modern relativism is the very antithesis
of Plato's.

There exists a basic agreement upon the role of science

between Plato and the relativists, but disagreement exists concerning
the order of being.

Mises, for instance, says, in Platonic fashion,

that "All human wisdom,
segment

science, and knowledge deal only with the

of the universe that can be perceived and studied by the

human mind."

39

Ideal forms, however, would not be capable of being

scientifically analyzed by the human mind, according to Mises.

He

goes on to say that the "promulgation of judgments of value is not
the business of a man in his capacity as a praxeologist, economist,
or historian.

It is rather the task of religion, metaphysics,

or

ethics .49
In its purest form modern relativism recaptures the zeal of
the

sophistic

spirit.

The

sophistic implications of a completely

relativistic position can be seen in the following quotation from an
essay on relativism by former Secretary of the Smithsonian Institu
tion, Leonard Carmichael:
One who adopts a completely relativistic approach to ethical
or esthetic questions either accepts his own feelings as law
or may come to assert that a statistically analyzed poll of
the beliefs of a well-selected sample of individual is to be
taken as a temporary norm.
Or such relativists may assert
that a complete and adequate statistical study of the actual
behavior of other individual selected by some "sampling
technique" in a given society at a specific time may indicate
not only what people now do, but amazingly enough, what they
ought to do. Relativism thus all too easily substitutes what

39Ibid., p. 129.
40Ibid., p. 128.
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statisticians call "measures of central tendency" for old
discovered and establ^jhed absolutes of what people "ought to
do" in social living.
The popularity of relativism in modernity can be attributed,
atleast in part, to the

development in modern science of tolerance

among scientists for theories and opinions different from one's own.
Today it is a sign of intelligence and an enlightened character to
outwardly espouse a kind of philosophical individualism.

That is, it

is chic to imagine that each individual is the best judge of his own
values,

and that all values can be treated as equal.

states,

interpersonal comparisons of value have no validity.

relativism,

Or, as Lange
Value

developed from a sense of individualism, breeds modern

liberalism.
Liberalism is the belief that each man is the measure of all
things

pertaining to him, and that, consequently,

each man deserves

the highest degree of personal freedom in order to exercise his will
over his self-determined values.

Liberalism is the logical extension

of

truths

value

relativism.

Because

are

imagined

to

be

self-

determined, it is argued by many that the individual in society must
enjoy some freedom from having the values of others imposed on him.
Although the liberal understanding of ethics is quite popular
today,
derived

it

is

from

plagued by one
value

serious

relativism,

rational

depends

upon

the dogmatic claim that values are subjective.

flaw.
an

Liberalism,

absolute— i.e.,

It seems that the

^Leonard
Carmichael,
"Absolutes,
Relativism,
and
the
Scientific Psychology of Human Nature," in Relativism and the Study
of Man, p. 13.

relativist who

so dearly values freedom to pursue subjective ends

depends upon an acceptance by society of the absolute claim that the
telea

of

human

action

are

subjectively

rather

than

objectively

engendered.
In his essay "Relativism,” political philosopher Leo Strauss
describes the intellectual problems that arise from the acceptance of
a

liberalism

describing

that

is

based

relativistic

upon

value

liberalism,

relativism.

distinguishes

freedom upon which liberalism can be based.
Berlin,

two

Strauss,

in

senses

of

Borrowing from Isaiah

Strauss describes freedom as either being "positive," i.e.,

"freedom for," or "negative," i.e., freedom from.

Negative freedom

is

In the positive

freedom

from interference and social control.

sense freedom is freedom to "be one's own master:

or to participate
/Q
in the social control to which the individual is subject."
Accord
ing to Strauss liberalism most often relies upon a negative sense of
freedom— because each individual determines his own telos he ought to
be free from interference from others when he pursues that telos.
Strauss
tivistic

cuts

liberalism

to the heart of the problem underlying rela
when

he

states

that

"'Relativism,'

or

the

assertion that all ends are relative to the chooser and hence equal,
seems to require some kind of

'absolutism.'

The relativist, in

/0

Leo Strauss,
Man, p. 135.

"Relativism," in Relativism and the Study of
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asserting that values are subjective, must embrace an absolute.

As

Strauss sees it, "Liberalism...cannot live without an absolute basis
and cannot live with an absolute basis.
Plato was probably the

first philosopher to recognize the

absolutely made assertion of subjectivity that is implicit to value
relativism.

In

the

Theaetetus

Plato

considers

the philosophical

problems that are associated with the dogmatic pronouncement made by
Protagoras
dialogue

that,

the

"Of

all

things

man

is

the

measure."

In

this

sophistic maxim is worded to emphasize this problem.

Whereas in the Cratylus Protagoras'

statement is quoted as "Panton

krematon metron einai anthropon," in the Theaetetus it appears as "
Panton krematon metron anthropon einai."

By placing einai, the verb

"to

Plato

be,"

at the

end

of

the

statement,

dogmatic quality of the Protagorean method.

is emphasizing the

Protagoras' statement,

as it appears in the Theaetetus, reads, "Of all things the measure
man

i^s."

Plato

arranges

Protagoras'

statement

this

way

in the

Theaetetus for effect— the topic of the dialogue is whether or not
knowledge is perception, and the proof that it is not is based upon a
distinction in being between
is,

the

sensible

come

sensibles

into being--they

intelligibles actually are.

and

46
intelligibles.

are becoming--whereas

That
the

It would be more consistent with true

45Ibid., p. 138.
46

The subtleties of phrasing in the dialogues are often lost
upon the reader of Plato in translation.
I am indebted to James A.
Arieti, Associate Professor of Classical Languages, Hampden-Sydney
College, for pointing out Plato's meaning when he changes Protagoras'
"einai anthropon" to "anthropon einai."

relativism for Protagoras to have said that "Of all things man may be
the

measure."

Political

scientist

and

relativist

Arnold

Brecht

states that "Scientific Value Relativism may...be too humble to offer
a scientific decision."

47

Protagoras,

however,

is famous for his

absolute claim that man is the measure of all things.

The relativist

does indeed require an absolute as an anchor for his methodology.
In spite of the popularity of

relativism,

it is no more

capable of proving the absolutist's vision of truth defunct than is
absolutism capable of dogmatically demonstrating the impossibility of
the relativist's position.

As Zirkle states, "That truth exists, of

course, is a hitherto unprovable postulate, but the proposition that
it does not exist cannot be established on relativistic grounds.
The rational human mind, however, always searches for truth.

"Scien

tists," Zirkle says, "must assume that somewhere and at some time
there is something very like the 'truth.'

Otherwise there would be

no difference between science and quackery."
Plato believed in truth.

49

Although he could not hold the Form

itself as an object of his consciousness, he could infer its quali
ties

from

the

imperfect

manifestations

engendered in the sensibles.
reasoning

of

truth

that

the

Form

He could then refine these images by

them through hypotheses.

Images would thus give way to

^Arnold Brecht, Political Theory, quoted in Strauss, "Rela
tivism," p. 143.

^Zirkle, p. 25.
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knowledge.

Plato's

theory

of

Forms

is,

epistemologically,

ordering principle from which science can arise.
Spengler

introduces

his

work,

Origins

of

an

Economist Joseph

Economic

Thought

and

Justice, with an appeal to the notion that without order there is no
science.

He quotes Whitehead,

saying that "There can be no living

science unless there is a widespread instinctive conviction in the
existence of an order of things, and in particular, of an order of
50
nature."

The relativist's Protagorean liberalism reduces science

to the art of demonstration or rhetoric.

Science is incompatible

with relativism, which is not to say that science does not benefit
from

the

scientist's

Socratic

skepticism.

Socrates'

distrust of

appearances, however, was restricted to the science of the sensibles.
Plato recognized that without Forms nothing is.

In the absence of an

underlying ontological order to the universe everything is becoming.
Without Forms

there

is no

science,

only history and historicism.

Plato may, or may not have uncovered scientific truth.

His investi

gation, however, is truly scientific.

IV.

Historicism
Value

toricism.

relativism

taken

to

its

conclusion

leads

to

his

Historicism stresses the uniqueness of historical events.

Once all vestiges of a priori knowledge are eliminated through value
relativism, history becomes the moving force behind human action.

In

^ A . N. Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 3, quoted
in Joseph J. Spengler, Origins of Economic Thought and Justice
(Carbondale, Illinois:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1980),
p. xi.
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the absence of belief in common tendencies and common values among
men it is difficult to maintain a belief in the existence of human
nature.
all

Relativism clears the way for historicism— under relativism

values

are equal,

thus

explain human behavior.

no objective

logos

can be

evoked to

The elimination of logos through relativism

leaves only nomos— conventional wisdom— to explain social phenomena.
Nomos, unlike logos, is subject to change over time.

Therefore, the

historicist is free, in the wake created by relativism, to hypothe
size

some

importance

to

history

itself.

In

the

mind

of

the

historicist events are determined not by human nature, but by history
itself.

Once

the

tarnished by the

theories

relativist,

of

the

absolutist

philosopher

are

the historicist is free to create a

purely empirical science.
Historicism opposes Platonism by virtue of its denial of the
possibility of a priori knowledge.
ceases to exist.

Presumably,

Under historicism, human nature

there is nothing to be gained by an

inquiry into the nature of virtue, because virtue does not exist.
Rather, the term virtue is applied, if at all, to an ever-changing
body

of

societies.

subjective

beliefs

that

are

extolled

by

ever-changing

Plato, with his ideas concerning the existence of Forms

that engender values, threatens the historicist.
Historicism in economics comes through the influence of the
German

historical

theory

is obtained

Plato's.

Platonic

school.

At the hands

of the German economist

through a different process

of induction than

induction— reaching intelligible generalizations

from intelligible hypotheses— has no meaning to the German economist.
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The historical school insisted that laws of economic action, insofar
as they exist,

must be theorized on the basis of empirical fact.

German economics becomes an attempt to explain a historical evolution
toward an eschaton.

Mises succinctly describes the condition that

gives rise to historicism when he points out:
Epistemologically the distinctive mark of what we call
nature is to be seen in the ascertainable and inevitable
regularity in the concatenation and sequence of phenomena.
On the other hand the distinctive mark of what we call the
human sphere or history, or, better, the realm of human
action is the absence of such a universally prevailing
regularity.
Under identical conditions stones always react
to the same stimuli in the same way; we can learn something
about these regular patterns of reacting, and we can make use
of this knowledge in directing our actions toward definite
goals.
Our classification of natural objects and our
assigning names to these classes is an outcome of this cogni
tion. A stone is a thing that reacts in a definite way. Men
react to the same stimuli in different ways, and the same man
at different instants of time may react in ways different
from his previous or later conduct.
It is impossible to
group-, men into classes whose members always react in the same
way.
The

historicist's

conviction that men,

unlike

things,

react dif

ferently to the same stimuli causes the historicist to turn a deaf
ear to the theories of Plato, which depend upon a commonality of
human

action,

through

participation

in the Form of virtue.

The

German school, in this way, is insensitive to the Platonic inquiry.
The supposed uniqueness of each human act, which results in
the abolition of human nature from the framework of social science,
is a conviction of the historicist.

Historicism is incapable of

proving that human action is unique, or that human nature does not

^Ludwig Von Mises, Theory and History (New Haven:
versity Press, 1957), pp. 4-5.

Yale Uni
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exist.
this

Nevertheless,

popularity

historicism

can

be

remains popular today.

attributed to the

century individualism upon the Western mind.
premium upon the notion that

the

self

influence

Perhaps

of twentieth

Individualism places a

is singularly unique— each

individual represents a distinct collection of thoughts and values
that cannot be duplicated in history.

The individualist savors the

differences between people, and not the shared traits.

The message

of individualism can be heard in the sweetest tones in the egoism of
Ayn Rand.

The appealing image of the human self hawked in her books

is irresistible, or nearly so.

Western individualism all but pre

cludes the possibility of social science, leaving behind only history
to explain the meaning of man's acts.
Plato
have been
century.

understood the pull

surprised

of individualism,

and would not

at the popularity of egoism in the twentieth

In the Republic Plato describes the historical deteriora

tion of society, moving from aristocracy to tyranny, in a way that
foretells

the

individualism.

excesses

of

twentieth

century

liberalism

and

In Book VIII Plato traces the historical progression

of regimes through forms that mirror the stages of development of the
soul itself.

In ancient times, Plato relates, men lived in a true

aristocracy,

i.e., rule by the best or most excellent citizens— the

aristoi.

From aristocracy society steadily moves toward both public

and private tyranny.

Tyranny is a condition that results from an

extreme imbalance of the parts of the psyche, or soul, that Plato
describes

earlier

in

the

Republic.

rational, spirited, and appetitive parts.

The

soul

consists

of

the

When properly ordered, the
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soul is ruled by reason, with spirit serving as reason's watchdog
checking the passions.

Plato recognized the tendency among men to

permit the appetitive urges and desires to dominate the soul.

The

degrees of psychological imbalance that ensue determine the character
of the man within the polis, and consequently, the character of the
regime that surfaces in the polis.
Timocracy

results

when

52

reason gives way to honor as

the

steward of the psyche. Once reason is displaced, however, Plato sees
it as all but inevitable that the passions take over as the proximate
cause of human action.

Timocracy is soon eclipsed by oligarchy in

the state, as lovers of honor lose ground against lovers of money,.
53
making.
Oligarchy reflects a condition in the soul in which passion
displaces both reason and spirit.

This regime, Plato says, "is the

first to admit of the greatest of all evils."

54

Extreme poverty,

that

results whenever a man sells all of his possessions

with

nothing, is, for Plato, the greatest social evil.

and is left

Born into a society in which a fundamental imbalance of the
soul

is permitted, the sons of the oligarchs become the

democracy.
fairness,

Democracy,
and justice

for
as

Plato,

does

not

it does in modernity.

connote

founders of
goodness,

Plato sees demo

cracy as the regime that flourishes under conditions of psychological

■^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 223.
53Ibid.

54Ibid., p. 228.
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imbalance

that

replace

economic action.
freedom is
wants.

wealth with licentiousness

as the aim of

Plato describes democracy as the regime in which

corrupted

to mean

freedom to pursue whatever end one

The Platonic democrat, in a way characteristic of the modern

individualist,
doesn’t admit true speech or let it pass into the guardhouse,
if someone says that there are some pleasures belonging to
fine and good desires and some belonging to bad desires, and
that the ones must be practiced and honored and the others
checked and enslaved. Rather, he shakes his head at all this
and says that all are alike and must be honored on an equal
basis.
According to Plato, democracy is the fairest regime.

That

is, Plato imagines that democracy would be heralded by the many as
fairest and most just.

Again, Plato would not be surprised at our

love of freedom and democracy in the twentieth century.

Democracy,

in Plato's estimation does not flourish, but gives way to a regime
that reflects the final state of deterioration of the soul— tyranny.
Tyranny results from the excesses of passion exercised over
the

democratic

soul,

in an atmosphere

of

complete freedom.

The

freedom cherished by the democratic relativist becomes the enslaver
of

passion

under

tyranny.

Modern

concepts

of

tyranny

do

not

completely convey the idea of Plato, when he speaks of the genesis of
tyranny.

Whereas in modernity we view tyranny as the condition in

which a faction malignantly rules over an enslaved majority, Plato
viewed tyranny as being a private affair.

The tyrannical mind is so

infused with the notion of primacy of the passions, that it develops

55Ibid., p. 239.
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a sense of paranoia toward others, who would,
tyrant,

in the mind of the

interfere with the tyrant's attempt to satisfy his desires.

Oligarchic money-making replaces the agathon as the telos of human
action.

In an environment of

democracy,

avarice

generates

interprets

Plato's

vision

desire."

57

The

fatal

licentiousness

that

tyranny of the

of

the

tyrant

soul.

as

is fostered in
56

being

Allan Bloom
" the

man

of

flaw of tyranny is that by depending upon

desires it depends upon that "which, when emancipated, [is] infinite
CO

and make[s] man's needs infinite."
Modern historicism is the science of tyranny.
goals are treated as equal by the historicist.

All values and

Moreover, no theory

of human nature can be applied to history to organize human action
around a few compelling points.

Rather, historicism is the science

that

the

describes,

using

history,

quest

of the

tyrannical

soul

after the infinite ends of an insatiable appetite.
The existence of Platonic philosophy is predicated upon the
perceived existence of an order of nature, such as that described by
Whitehead.

Man, moreover, is a part of nature.

inevitable

unfolding

of

historical

events,

While Plato sees an

these

events

can

be

attributed to the existence of human nature, which is incapable of
resisting, ordinarily, the magnetic pull of the passions.

56Ibid., p. 242.

57Ibid., p. 421.
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If Plato feared anything, he feared the persuasiveness of the
moral relativist, who would turn people away from truth.
fear

the

instead.

historicist,

however,

Plato,

no

doubt,

Rather than

would

pity him

Whereas relativism may be seen as the product of a sinister

mind that would replace justice with the opinion held by the powerful
man, historicism is the product of a mind insensitive to the natural
order

of

things

historicist.

seen

His

by

Plato.

theories

cannot

Plato

was

survive

in

the
an

supreme

anti-

environment

of

Historicism rises from an acceptance of value relativism.

It

historicism.

paradigmatically competes
Positivism,

with Platonism to explain human action.

on the other hand,

social

scientist's

shying

merits

of absolutism versus

can be seen as the result of the

away from consideration of the relative
relativism.

The development of posi

tivism in the nineteenth century, out of the fact-value distinction
made by Hume (primarily) and others in the eighteenth century, arises
from

the

desire

to

avoid

seemingly irreconcilable

the

complications

split between the

tivist's visions of order.

for

science

absolutist's

of

the

and rela

While it is true that some positivists,

because of their implicit acceptance of value relativism, approach
the fact-value and the is-ought distinctions with the dogmatic zeal
of

Protagoras,

many

positivists

simply

abstain

from

normative

speculation from a sense of uncertainty concerning the validity of
the notion that proper values are grounded in virtue itself.
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V.

Positivism
Positivism has

social

sciences

historicism,

or

in

a methodological
general,

even

that

relativism.

lock on economics and the

far

exceeds

the

The

positivists

impact

of

claim— that

description of what is is scientific and speculation as to what ought
to be

is unscientific— is

boast

(that differences

as widely accepted today as Friedman's

among economists

are

only differences

in

subjective preferences) suggests.
Positivism began as a movement in the nineteenth century to
retheorize the social sciences.

Implicit in this movement was the

desire on the part of some social scientists to adopt the methods of
the

natural

sciences

as

relevant criteria for judging

The

culmination ofpositivism for

hypotheses.

social science is the development

of wertfreiheit, called for by Weber.

59

Positivism as a methodology for the social sciences is rooted
in an epistemology in which the existence of metaphysical Forms is
not

accepted.

The

positivist does

not accept as validthe Platonic

claim that men can possess knowledge, true episteme, or
tenets of positivism,

Forms.

The

as well as their implications for economics,

can be seen in the work of Mises, especially in Theory and History.
Mises notes:
Propositions asserting existence (affirmative existential
propositions) or nonexistence (negative existential proposi
tions) are descriptive.
They assert something about the
state of the whole universe or parts of the universe. With
regard to them questions of truth and falsity are significant.
They must not be confounded with judgments of value.

SQ
Leoni, p. 159.
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Judgments of value are
voluntaristic. They express
feelings, tastes, or preferences of the individual who utters
them.
With regard to them there cannot be any question of
truth or falsity, ^ h e y are ultimate and not subject to any
proof or evidence.
In the statement above Mises clearly expresses the fact-value dis
tinction that is integral to positivism.

Concerning the nature of

value judgments Mises goes on to note:
All judgments of value are personal and subjective.
There
are no judgments of value other than those asserting 1^
prefer, I like better, 1^ wish.
It cannot be denied by anybody that various individuals
disagree widely with regard to their feelings, tastes, and
preferences and that even the same individual at various
instants of their lives value the same things in a different
way.
In view of this fact it is useless to talk about
absolute and eternal values.
...What the theorem of
the subjectivity of valuation
means is that there is no standard available which would
enable us to reject any ultimate judgment of value as wrong,
false, or erroneous in the way grj can reject an existential
proposition as manifestly false.
What Mises means by the above is that science is not possible for the
realm of subjective valuation in the way that it is for existential
propositions.
relativism.

Mises' positivism

thus betrays

an underlying value

Mises' regard for valuation can be seen below:

Value is not intrinsic.
It is not in
tions but in the valuing subject.
It
ascribe value to one thing or state
Valuation invariably compass one thing
another thing or condition.
does

Mises dismiss

the possibility

things and condi
is impossible to
of affairs only.
or condition with

Not

only

but,

in the statement above he also denies the existence of Forms,

^Mises, Theory and History, p. 19.
61Ibid., p. 22.
62Ibid., p. 23.

of intrinsic value,
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preferring to consider virtues
subject.

(values) as existing in the valuing

In establishing positivism as the methodological criterion

for judging the scientific qualities of an hypothesis, Mises, like
Weber before him, denies the possibility of conducting a scientific
inquiry into values as endorsed by Plato.
Legal theorist Hans Kelsen echoes the positivism of Mises in
What is Justice?

Describing the problems associated with the con

struction of a normative discipline Kelsen notes:
It is impossible to decide between...two conflicting
judgments of value in a rational scientific way.
It is, in
the last instance, our feeling, our will, and not our reason;
the emotional, and not the rational ^element of our con
sciousness which decided this conflict.
Apparently, Kelsen and other positivists accept the distinction made
by Hume that values are not judged by the rational part of the mind.
Kelsen expands on this notion:
If a man has been made a slave or a prisoner in a Nazi
concentration camp, and if it is impossible to escape, the
question of whether suicide is justifiable in such a
situation arises...The decision depends on the answer to the
question of which is the higher value: life or freedom. If
life is the higher value, then suicide is not justifiable; if
freedom is the higher value, if life without freedom is
worthless, suicide is morally justified...Only a subjective
answer is possible to this question, an answer valid only for
judging subject; no objective statement, valid for everybody,
as for,instance the statement that heat expands metallic
bodies.
Positivism,
of modern economics.

as Friedman argues, is the standard methodology
The validity of this statement can be seen in

Hans Kelsen, What is Justice?
California Press, 1957), p. 5.
64t. .j
Ibid.

(Berkeley:

University of
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the

survey of the

literature

of Platonic economics,

in which the

Platonic corpus is routinely dismissed as normative, and, therefore,
unimportant.

In the social sciences, however,

dissatisfaction with wertfreiheit.
science, Polanyi
and Crandall

there is a growing

Strauss and Voegelin in political

and Kuhn in the philosophy of

in psychology and

science, and Diener

sociology haveall questioned the

wertfrei nature of social science, and found that value-free social
science is impossible.
the

validity

Economics, however, has been slow to question

of the positivistic epistemology.

neoclassical paradigm has its critics.
fervor of the
this.

To be sure,

the

One need witness only the

institutionalist or the Marxist to be convinced of

These departures from orthodoxy, however, all retain a posi

tivistic methodology.
In Ethics in Social and Behavioral Research, Edward Diener
and

Rick

Crandall

social science.
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characterize

the

positivistic

image

of modern

They note:

The traditional image of science has been one of
dedicated individuals seeking objective truth. When the term
"value free" was applied to the social sciences it reflected
the belief that scientists' values and personal opinions
should not influence their scientific inquiry...The only
values that were supposed to influence research were the
scientific values placed on truth, objective methodology, and
the open distribution of knowledge.
...Largely on the basis of philosophies such as logical
positivism, scientists assumed that there was a material
world "out there" with properties independent of the
observers, and that the true properties of this world could
be discovered by careful empirical research...Indeed, the
logical positivists went even further in claiming that value
statements were meaningless and therefore could not possibly

f.C

Edward Diener and Rick Crandall, Ethics in Social and
Behavioral Research (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1978).
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be a part of science...In conducting research and presenting
findings, the c^dinal rule was, "Thou shalt not commit a
value judgment."
The positivist's notion that all values are equal and, there
fore, meaningless is fraught with intellectual problems.

Plato was

certainly aware of the logical problems that accompany an attempt to
make science wertfrei— i.e., an attempt based upon the acceptance of
value relativism.

He argues against a value-free methodology in the

Theaetetus where, as I have shown, Plato hypothesizes the existence
of objective

knowledge

of values which is not mere perception.^

A few social scientists have picked-up on Plato's argument in
an attempt to
basis.

Perhaps

retheorize
the most

social

science away from a positivistic

successful

attempt to

retheorize

68
science is Voegelin's The New Science of Politics.

social

In this work

Voegelin characterizes the error of positivism saying:
The destruction worked by positivism is the consequence of
two fundamental assumptions.
In the first place, the
splendid unfolding of the natural sciences was co-responsible
with other factors for the assumption that the methods used
in the mathematizing sciences of the external world were
possessed of some inherent virtue and that all other sciences
would achieve comparable success if they followed the example
and accepted these methods.
This belief by itself was a
harmless idiosyncracy that would have died out when the
enthusiastic admirers of the model method set to work in
their own science and did not achieve the expected successes.
It became dangerous because it combined with the second
assumption that the methods of the natural sciences were a
criterion for theoretical relevance in general.
From the

66Ibid., pp. 181-182.
^Plato,

"Theaetetus," in The Collected Dialogues, pp. 856-

870.

68

Eric Voegelin, The New
University of Chicago Press, 1952).

Science

of

Politics

(Chicago:
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combination of the two assumptions followed the well-known
series of assertions that a study of reality could qualify as
scientific only if
it used the methods of the natural
sciences, that problems couched in other terms were illusionary problems, that in particular metaphysical questions
which do not admit of answers by the methods of the sciences
of phenomena should not be asked, that realms of being which
are not accessible to exploration by the model methods were
irrelevantggand in the extreme, that such realms of being did
not exist.
Voegelin sees the culmination of the positivist movement in
the

work of Max Weber.According

methodology...ran to the

to Voegelin,

"The movement

of

end of its immanent logic in the person and

work of Max W e b e r . I n Weber's work is also to be found the funda
mental problem with positivism, as Voegelin sees it.

Voegelin notes:

...Weber's work was ambiguous.
He had reduced the
principle of a value-free science ad absurdum. The idea of a
value-free science whose object would be constituted by
"reference to a value" could be realized only under the
condition that a scientist was willing to decide on a "value"
for reference.
If the scientist refused to decide on a
"value," if he treated all "values" as equal (as Max Weber
did), if, moreover, he treated them as social facts among
others— then there were no "values" left which could con
stitute the object of science, because they had become part
of the object itself.
This abolition of the "values" as the
constituents of science led to a theoretically impossible
situation because the object of science has a "constitution"
after all, that is, the essence toward which we are moving in
our search for truth.
Since the positivistic hangover,
however, did not permit the admission of a science of
essence, of a true episteme, the principles of order had to
be introduced as historical facts.
When Weber built the
great edifice of his "sociology" (i.e., the positivistic
escape from the science of order), he did not seriously
consider all "values" as equal.
He did not indulge in a
worthless trash collection but displayed quite sensible
preferences for phenomena that were "important" in the
history of mankind; he could distinsuigh quite well between

^^Ibid., p. 4.
70Ibid., p. 13.
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major civilizations and less important side developments and
equally well between ’’world religions" and unimportant
religious phenomena.
In the absence of a reasoned principle
of theoretization he let himself be guided not by "values"
but by the -,^uctoritas majorum and his own sensitiveness for
excellence.
Positivism, it seems, is undone by its systematic denial of "values"
as a point of reference.

Like relativism, positivism seems unable to

survive with an absolute and unable to survive without an absolute.
Positivism, historicism, and relativism all fail to irrefuta
bly disprove the possibility of ontology, which serves as the basis
for

Platonic

absolutism.

Relativism,

without an absolute reference,
such

an

absolute.

knowledge
proven.

and of

we

have

seen,

cannot

live

and it cannot admit the validity of

Historicism denies

the existence

of a priori

logos, each of which the nonexistence cannot be

Positivism fails for the reason that social science cannot

be made wertfrei.

Weber,

the greatest spokesman for wertfreiheit,

could not construct a social science without recourse to "values" as
a reference.

In spite of their popularity none of these ideologies

succeeds in demonstrating that Platonic science is invalid by virtue
of subjectivity.

VI.

Nominalism
In the twentieth century, however, nominalism,

that poses
Karl

a serious

Popper,

the

an ideology

threat to Plato's work, has become popular.

leading

proponent

of

nominalism,

has

openly

condemned the work of Plato as being unimportant for modern social

71Ibid., pp. 20-21.
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science.

Unlike positivism,

historicism,

or relativism nominalism

does not deny the existence of Platonic Forms.
opposes

Platonism

on

essentially

Instead, nominalism

Aristotelean

grounds.

The

nominalist, like the Aristotelean, may or may not doubt the existence
of Forms, but, in any case, would not find an inquiry into the nature
of Forms interesting.
So
philosophy,

72

openly hostile
that

Wild

is Popperian nominalism toward Platonic

claims

Popper's

The

Open

Society

and Its

Enemies to be the "most extreme and pretentious anti-Platonic tract
to be penned in recent times."
historicist.

He

elevates

73

Popper accuses Plato of being an

Plato's

theory

of

the

development

of

tyranny, from the gradual decay and deterioration of aristocracy, to
make it Plato's chief contribution to social science.
tionary

theory

historicist.

of

regimes

is,

Popper

claims,

the

This evolu
mark

of

an

Popper regards historicists with an attitude of "frank

hostility.
Popper

is an anti-Platonist.

He

accuses

Plato

of having

subverted the teachings of Socrates, who was, in Popper's opinion,
the first positivist.
not Plato,

According to Popper, Socrates' successor was

but Antisthenes.

the least faithful.

Plato,

he

says,

"was

soon to prove

He betrayed Socrates, just as his uncles had

72
K. R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 131-32.
73Wild, pp. 9-10.

7^Popper, p. 34.
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done."7'*

Popper refers to Plato's uncles Critias, the leader of the

Thirty Tyrants of Athens, and Charmides, Critias1 chief lieutenant.
Popper's intention in writing about Plato is to undo the "spell of
Plato."

He says:

Although I admire much in Plato's philosophy, far beyond
those parts which I believe to be Socratic, I do not take it
as my task to add to the countless tributes to his genius. I
am, rather, bent on destroying what is in my opinion mis
chievous in his philosophy.
To understand Popper's hostility toward Plato one must under
stand Popper's own philosophy and its positivistic and historicist
roots.

Like Friedman, Mises,

and others Popper holds fast to the

central theme of modern social science— the belief that values are
not the subject of science.
Popper

rivals

Friedman

in

In a statement supporting positivism,
the

conviction

of

his

endorsement of

positivism when he notes:
it is impossible to derive a
decision or, say, a proposal
stating a fact; that is only
is impossible to derive norms
facts.

sentence stating a norm or a
for a policy from a sentence
another way of saying that it
or decisions or proposals from

By adopting nominalism as the proper methodology for social science,
Popper
tivists

accepts
and

the

fact-value distinction commonly made by rela

historicists.

is nature and its objects.

75Ibid., p. 194.
76Ibid., p. 34.
77Ibid., p. 64.

The

subject

of

science,

Popper

says,

"The standards," Popper says, of human
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virtues "are not to

be found in nature."

virtues into the natural

world.

Men introducemorals and

Popper notes:

Nature consists
of facts and or regularities, and is in
itself neither moral nor immoral.
It is we who impose our
standards upon nature, and who in this way introduce morals
into the natural world, in spite of the fact that we are part
of this world.
Popper,

unlike

the historicists, believes

underlying order to the things of nature.
toricists,
belief

however,

precludes

in the existence of an
He shares with the his

the belief that virtue

ontology as

is unnatural.

conceived by Plato.

Such

a

Since Platonic

science is grounded in the possibility of ontology, Popper's denial
of the participation of Platonic Forms or Ideas in nature rejects the
validity of Plato's social science.
Popper's attack on Plato goes beyond Plato's supposed his
toricism.

Popper is one of the most articulate defenders of modern

liberalism.

He

supports

regime, contrary to Plato.
says

Plato

attacks.

the

notion

that

democracy

is

the best

He thus defends the open society which he

According to Popper,

Plato would

restore

a

closed society— a regime that perpetuates inequality and takes from
individuals the right to make meaningful decisions about their lives.
Popper sees Protagoras, Socrates' nemesis, as the great defender of
the open, or democratic society.
defenders
liberty

of
to

This places him in the long line of

liberalism who, as Berlin and Strauss claim,

be

negative

freedom

or

"freedom

from."

observe

Plato was

a

liberal in the sense that he believed in liberty as a "freedom for"

78Ibid., p. 61.
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something— specifically freedom for the ability to choose happiness
over unhappiness.

The claim made by Popper that Plato, by virtue of

his advocacy of aristocracy, was a totalitarian and, thus, an enemy
of the open society does not do justice to Plato's liberalism.
Plato endorsed liberty as a virtue.

Liberty in this sense

was not freedom to do what one pleases.

That type of freedom Plato

associates

Plato

Popper's
liberty

with

licentiousness.

liberalism,
was

not

however,

synonymous

That

derives

with virtue

from

would
Plato's

itself.

not

endorse

belief

that

For Plato moral

virtues like liberty, honor, and liberality are subordinate to the
Form of goodness itself— the agathon.

Plato's criticism of democracy

as an undesirable regime is due to his understanding that "freedom
from" coercion, which breeds freedom to follow the pull of appetitive
urges,

is inconsistent with true happiness.

This belief, moreover,

is the result of Plato's investigation of virtue; it is not intended
to be interpreted as equal to common opinion, which is the product of
sensation rather than intellection.
Wild

criticizes

Popper

for his interpretation of Plato as

being a totalitarian historicist.

Unlike Popper, Wild views Plato's

philosophy to be grounded in the science of nature.

He says:

Plato leaves us in no doubt as to where he stands as a
moral thinker.
Not only does he develop a clearly articu
lated system of moral principles based upon a coherent view
of the nature of man, but he also gives us a moving picture
of
Socrates,
the
concrete embodiment of his
ethical
principles, the moral man in action.
In contrast to
influential modern views which base moral values on arbitrary
preferences or self-imposed maxims, Plato's ethics is founded
on the nature of men and the nature of things.
Modern
ethical discussion is abstract and theoretical, remaining
aloof from any concrete consideration of the moral virtues
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and the exigencies of everyday life. Plato's ethics embraces
a description of the human virtues in the concrete, as well
as a more abstract attempt to found them on the laws of human
nature.
Wild next points out the modern reader's dissatisfaction with Plato's
theory of human nature, noting:
To the modern mind this conveys an impression of over
weening dogmatism, one of the commonest charges made against
Plato by almost all of his modern enemies.
Thus Popper
believes that Plato's ethical system, with its anthro
pological
and
metaphysical
substratum,
is a dogmatic
authoriggrianism which blasphemes the memory of his doubting
master.
Plato's theory of human nature is the product of what Plato
thought to be scientific investigation.
science

should

understanding

not
of

attempt
science.

Popper, who believes that

to uncover essences,
Like

other

modern

has

a different

thinkers

Popper

restricts science to exclude "any attempt to gain clarity about the
meaning
explains

of...'knowledge,'
the

'good,'

'man,'

difference between Plato's

'virtue,'

etc."

and Popper's

81

Wild

concepts

science noting:
By science Plato means not merely what Popper means, but
philosophic science as well— the science of knowledge,
ethics, and being. By reason he means not merely the logical
and experimental processes by which the different restricted
sciences gain control over, and a certain amount of theoreti
cal insight into, the processes of ^vjbhuman nature, but
philosophical and moral insight as well.

79Wild, p. 10.
80Ibid..
81Ibid., p. 35.
8^Ibid., pp. 36-37.
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The difference between Plato's and Popper's science to which
Wild

refers

can

be traced

to

the fundamental

ontological

and

epistemological changes in Western thought that have occurred since
the Englightenment, which culminate in the widespread acceptance of
the

fact-value

Wild,

too,

distinction

emphasizes these

in

twentieth century

changes

and focuses

social

science.

on problems

social science created by the fact-value distinction.

for

He claims that

Plato's epistemology was based upon an ancient notion of natural law
that is not supported today.

Wild notes:

The theory of natural law...presupposes certain realistic
epistemological principles.
It implies that nature is an
ordered set of traits possessed in common by every human
individual and essential to his being. This is inconsistent
with nominalism.
It also implies the capacity of human
reason to apprehend this essential common structure and the
perfective tendencies characteristic of the human species.
When so understood and expressed in universal propositions,
these tendencies are norms or moral laws.
This realistic
doctrine is inconsistent with any view which would regard
norms as separated frogi^ existent fact or as arbitrary con
structions made by man.
Wild

goes

on

to

clearly

recapitulate the

characteristics

of the

modern fact-value distinction, noting:
Such a separation of fact from value has dominated the
whole course of modern ethical theory.
Being has been
thought of as the realm of fully actual atomic fact with
value as an extraneous realm of norms. The is is not what
ought to be, the ought jjs not the is, and there is no natural
bridge between the two.

^ I b i d . , p. 66.
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Within the context of the fact-value distinction that is fundamental
to

positivism,

relativism,

historicism,

and

nominalism,

Platonic

investigation of virtues is deemed unscientific.
Acceptance

of

the

fact-value

distinction by modern econ

omists, which is rooted in a sense of doubt as to the verifiability
of the existence of Forms, does not preclude the validity of Platonic
science.
proven,

Plato's theory of Forms is not susceptible to being disby virtue

of the

immanent experience.

It

that Forms are not the objects of

Man, in Plato's theory of being, lives in the

realm of an "in-between"
not.

fact

reality— the metaxy; he neither is nor is

is not possible,

if this theory is correct,

for man to

empirically investigate the things that are— ta onta. Forms are the
object of intellection.

For the conscious mind that is not attuned

to the existence of Forms,

i.e., has not undergone the periagoge,

Plato's ontology must always be met with skepticism.
Socratic

skepticism

need

not,

however,

be

taken

to

the

extreme of the Cartesian maxim that things that are not immediately
verifiable must be rejected almost as false.

Descartes' rejection of

classical

enabled

philosophy

was

hypothetical— it

him

to

begin

science anew; it was not intended as a methodological validation of
modern positivism and nominalism.
verted, however.
first assumption

Instead of building a scientific theory from the
that

immediately verifiable
modern
false.

social

Descartes' "razor" has been per

it is safer to treat concepts that are not
as false, than to tacitly accept them,

scientist vigorously proclaims

such concepts

the

to be
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The "isms" of modern social science all suffer from the same
tendency to modify a guideline— Cartesian doubt— and make it into an
absolute.

Protagoras,

who could not prove the superiority of one

virtue over another, responded by making absolute the statement that
all values are equal, which follows from "Of all things man is the
measure."

Historicists, who do not see the logos claimed by Plato to

underlie human action, give history itself a theoretical significance
by default.

Positivists approach the uncertainty that surrounds any

theory

subject

the

of

which

is

not

the

province

of

immanent

experience by restricting science to only objective description.

Not

content

they then hold forth with the absolute pronouncement that

virtues

are unscientific.

when

confronted

theory,

claim

with

that

the

Finally,

Popper

Cartesian

definition

is

problem

and other nominalists,
of verifying ethical

unimportant

when

compared with

nominalistic concepts because, presumably, a physical scientist would
not ask the question "ti esti?"
This is scientism.

Moreover, it is a misapplication of the

procedures of physical science to refrain from the question "what is
it?"

Physical

scientists

surely

ask

this

question

with

great

frequency.

It is understandable, however, that social scientists shy

away

theories

from

inequipped to judge.
such theories

for

which

the

modern

scientific

method

is

Yet, it is inexcusable to arbitrarily pronounce

invalid.

Economist

Sidney S. Alexander lodges this

complaint in his essay "Human Values and Economists' Values."
that "economics is not almost as

Noting

'value-free' as its practitioners

can make it," Alexander argues that one " can talk about values in a
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Or

sensible,

hardheaded

way."

Unlike

most

economists

Alexander

believes in the possibility of normative science.
Alexander

terms

the

tendency for the modern economist

to

accept that values are indisputable for Fallacy of Misplaced Values.
He notes:
As Professor Friedman's remarks have illustrated, econ
omists generally regard value judgments as essentially
personal and irreconcilable...among social scientists there
is widespread acceptance of the belief that values are
indiscutable (sic).
Non disputandum has, in the social
studies, been raised to the position of a first principle.
The pernicious effects of this belief, or in my opinion, this
error, are seriously compounded by a widespread mistake that
may be called the Fallacy of Misplaced Values.
By misplaced values Alexander means the acceptance within methodology
of some values and the rejection of others by economists.
points out that economics has not been made wertfrei.

Alexander

According to

him norms still exist in economics, although they are frequently not
recognized as such.

He notes:

The one first-level norm, as distinguished from such
higher level, methodological, norms as the exclusion of value
judgments, that still survives in economics is regarded as so
obvious as hardly to be normative at all, and so it is exempt
from the test of operational verification.
That norm is
sometimes referred to as the pig principle, that if you like
something, more is better.
Its corollary is the ethical
value of efficiency— the only first-level ethical value
normally admitted into economic discourse.
Whatever you
want, it is argued, you can have more of it if you respect
the dictates of efficiency.
As Professor Boulding says,
even the heroic must come to terms with economic scarcity,

OC

Sidney S. Alexander, "Human Values and Economists' Values,"
in Human Values and Economic Policy, ed. Sidney Hook (New York: New
York University Press, 1967), p. 102.

86Ibid., p. 105.
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so to the Kwakiutl the
Edwin Cannan's precis
house ifR^you want to,
matches."

economist can say, in the spirit of
of Lionel Robbins, "Burn down your
but mind you, don't use too many

Alexander argues that it is naive of economists to uncriti
cally

accept

these

norms

as

dispute the validity of others.

scientifically

objective while they

In a gesture uncharacteristic of the

modern economist Alexander suggests that questions involving judg
ments

of

interpersonal

scientifically.

validity

of

values

can

be

resolved

He claims:

The best way we have of settling such questions...still seems
to be the Socratic dialectic, the bringing to bear on the
issue whatever we believe that appears to be relevant, and
considering the joint implication for this question of those
things we believe. This procedure can claim to be rational,
even though not operational, and beliefs that emerge from
this process are worthy of being designated as knowledge
achieved by rational inquiry.
No argument to the contrary
can reasonably be based on other than normative principles,
and it is hard to see how that higher-level argument could
reasonably be conducted except within the framework of the
dialectic.
The Socratic notion that men can sensibly discuss norma
tive issues, that they can devise impersonal means, if not of
verification, at least of evaluation of normative judgments,
that they can cooperate in progressive rational inquiry
directed toward making those judgments soundly, is still
worthy
°fgg consideration
even
by
hardheaded
social
scientists.
Plato's

normative

concept

of

economics

is

scientific,

especially within the context of ancient ontology and epistemology.
Plato's economics is an attempt to answer the question "What can be
done economically that can make men happy?"

His discussions of the

best organization of markets, of restrictions on foreign trade, and

87Ibid., pp. 107-08.
88Ibid., p. 114.
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of the division of labor are all theories that hypothesize how men
might be made happy.

This science uncovers objective truth, although

it does not do so objectively— the dialectic is personal and does not
demonstrate truth to the many in the manner of a persuasive speech.
Schumpeter defines science as "any kind of knowledge that has
been the object of conscious efforts to improve it."

He expands upon

this notion, saying that "science is refined common sense; science is
tooled knowledge."

Finally, he notes:

"a science is any field of

knowledge that has developed specialized techniques of fact-finding
and of interpretation or inference

(analysis)."

89

Plato's inquiry

into virtue as it applies to questions of economy satisfies all of
Schumpeter's criteria
conscious

attempts

for
by

science.

Plato

to

The
improve

virtue; they represent tooled knowledge.
discourse

was

technique.

It

specifically
is,

as

developed

Alexander

dialogues are
upon

opinion

clearly

concerning

The dialectic technique of
as

a

points

special fact-finding

out,

the fact-finding

technique appropriate for questions about normative concepts.
Schumpeter warns the economist against excluding from science
examples

of

standards.

tooled

knowledge

that do

not

obtain

from

modern

He says, "The exclusion of any kind of tooled knowledge

would amount to declaring our own standards to be absolutely valid
for all times and places.

89

York:

But this we cannot do."

90

In this spirit

Joseph A. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis
Oxford University Press, 1954), p . 7.

90Ibid., p. 8.

(New
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the modern economist should not overlook, as Schumpeter himself does,
the contributions to economics made by Plato.

Political philosopher

Hans Jonas claims that ancient normative science does not appeal to
the

modern

mind

because

of

an

"ontological

occurred since the seventeenth century.
to which he
Forms,

refers

consists

which are not

the

91

reduction"

The ontological reduction

of the abandonment

subject

that has

of the theory of

of empirical verification.

The

modern denial of the validity of ancient ontology is an attempt to
declare our own standards to be absolutely valid for all times and
places.

This declaration cannot philosophically be made on the basis

of

of

any

economics

the

"isms"

cannot

be

that

motivate

arbitrarily

modern

relegated

to

economists;
the

realm

Platonic
of mere

thought.
Plato's conception of economics, to which this dissertation
now turns, can be explained simply enough.
men desire to be happy.

Plato reasoned that all

Further, he judged that men can be truly

happy only insofar as their temperaments will permit them to know
what happiness truly is; thus, some men will be happier than others.
Based upon his theories of being and knowledge Plato next reasoned
that men must strive to know what happiness itself is.

Pending the

definition

attempt

of

happiness,

according

to

Plato,

is

the

to

identify how it may be fostered through economic means.

91

Hans Jonas, "The Practical Uses of Theory," in Philosophy
of the Social Sciences, ed. Maurice Natanson (New York:
Random
House, 1963), p. 132.
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Plato's welfare analysis can be demonstrated to be consistent
with his definition of happiness and with his understanding of human
nature, each of which Plato investigated scientifically.

That this

analysis is not the product of application of the pig principle to
Plato's

given

analysis

in

ends

the

of

modern

economic

action— that

sense— is not grounds

it

is

not

standard

for its dismissal.

Rather, Plato's welfare economics is a competing theory with Pareto
optimality.

This claim will be examined in the following chapter.

CHAPTER 3

PLATONIC ECONOMIC THEORY:

Plato aimed,

THE VIRTUE OF MODERATION

I have argued, at the discovery of objective,

positive knowledge concerning the happiness of men.
is

subjective— that

temporary

it

scientific

does

not

That his inquiry

conform to the methods

investigation— is

reason for labelling it pre-scientific.

not,

I

claim,

of con

sufficient

Plato's method of investiga

tion, the dialectic, was never intended by Plato to have the broad
appeal of the sophistic demonstration, which was the popular form of
argumentation in Plato's

day.

Demonstration— the attempt to sway

public opinion through the public presentation of persuasive speeches
that argue the speakers point of view— is incompatible with Plato's
epistemology, which holds that knowledge is attained through active
introspection,

not through passive listening.

discovery of knowledge

of

real,

intelligible phenomena— ta onta—

requires noetic reasoning of the student.
in

demonstration— it

did

not

According to Plato,

extract

the

necessary for the discovery of knowledge.

This process was lacking
level

of participation

The dialectic was used by

Plato to analyze intelligible rather than sensible phenomena.

Since

the intelligibles are reasoned rather than sensed the dialectic must
necessarily be

subjective.

It is, nevertheless,

Platonic scientific investigation.
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the basis of all
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Plato's

interest

in

economics,

like

his

interest

in all

social science, evolved from his desire to understand the nature and
causes

of happiness.

The

reorganization of the Hellenic economy

called for in his dialogues logically obtains from Plato's investiga
tion

of

happiness

and

its

fulfillment

in

the

human

soul.

The

economic prescriptions that one finds in the dialogues, especially in
the Laws, are propositions of welfare economics— they are designed to
promote welfare by making men happy.

Of his legal prescriptions

Plato says "[t]hey are correct laws, laws that make those who use
them happy.

I.

A Review of Welfare Theory
The normative content of Plato's welfare theory is seemingly

inconsistent
economic

with

welfare.

developed

the

development

Contemporary

to a point where

of

welfare

a

contemporary
economics,

theory

however,

the necessity of merging

of
has

a normative

analysis of distribution with the positive analysis of production is
generally conceded.

In order to appreciate the usefulness of Plato's

welfare

today

theory

for

it

is

useful

to

recall

the

stages

of

development of welfare economics that have emerged during the last
two hundred years.
Welfare economics has come full cycle in the two centuries
since the first printing of Bentham's Principles of Morals and Legis
lation.

In its infancy welfare economics was neither value-free nor

■'"Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, trans. Thomas L. Pangle
(New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 10.
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capable of being generalized.

The welfare theory of the Classical

period gave way to the "new" welfare theory, which originated with
the writings of Pareto and the economists of the Cambridge school.
During this phase of development welfare economics was envisioned as
a value-free theory deduced from propositions of production.
was

correct,

school

welfare

judgments
function.
lines

however,

2

in pointing out that Paretian and Cambridge

analyses

concerning

Bergson

require

the

that

the

characteristics

economist
of

a

make

social

value
utility

More recently, welfare economics has developed along the

suggested by Bergson— it is now a mixture

of the positive

analysis of production with the normative analysis of distribution.
Bentham's Principles is generally accepted as being the first
formal

treatise

Bentham's

value

on

welfare

assumptions

economics.

It is heavily laden with

concerning

the principle

of utility,

which recognizes the sensations pleasure and plain as the proximate
causes

of

human

action.

Principles

also

relies

on the presumed

validity of Bentham's value assumptions concerning the maximization
of social welfare.

The following passage from Principles of Morals

and Legislation illustrates Bentham's principle of utility:
To a number of persons, with reference to each whom the value
of a pleasure or a pain is considered, it will be greater or
less, according to seven circumstances: to wit...
1. Its intensity.
2. Its duration.
3. Its certainty or uncertainty.

2

Abram Bergson, "A Reformulation of Certain Aspects of
Welfare Economics," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 52 (1938),
310-334; reprinted in A.E.A. Readings in Welfare Economics, ed.
Kenneth J. Arrow and Tibor Scitovsky (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D.
Irwin, 1969), pp. 7-25.
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4. Its
5. Its
6. Its
And one
7. Its
extends; or

propinquity or remoteness.
fecundity.
purity.
other; to wit:
extent; that is, the number ofpersons to whom it
(in other words) who areaffected byit.

The seven qualities of pleasures and pains mentioned above, Bentham
thought, governed a society's welfare.
welfare,

Bentham

suggested,

could

Measurement of that society's
be

achieved

by

following

the

following guidelines:
To take an exact account then of the general tendency of any
act, by which the interests of a community are affected,
proceed as follows. Begin with any one person of those whose
interests seem most immediately to be affected by it: and
take an account,
1.
Of the value of each distinguishable pleasure which
appears to be produced by it in the first instance.
2.
Of the value of each pain which appears to be pro
duced by it in the first instance.
3.
Of the value of each pleasure which appears to be
produced by it after the first.
This constitutes the
fecundity of the first pleasure and the impurity of the first

Eiin4. Of the value of each pain which appears to be pro
duced by it after the first. This constitutes the fecundity
of the first pain, and the impurity of the first pleasure.
5. Sum up all the values of all the pleasures on the one
side, and those of all the pains on the other. The balance,
if it be on the side of pleasure, will give the good tendency
of the act upon the whole, with respect to the interests of
that individual person; if on the side of the pain, the bad
tendency of it upon the whole.
6. Take an account of the number of persons whose
interests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above pro
cess with respect to each. Sum up the numbers expressive of
the degrees of good tendency, which the act has, with respect
to each individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is
good upon the whole:
do this again with respect to each
individual, in regard to whom the tendency of it is good upon
the whole: do this again with respect to each individual, in

3
Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals
and Legislation, in The Utilitarians (1789; rpt. Garden City: Anchor
Press, 1973), p. 38.
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regard to whom the tendency of it is bad upon the whole.
Take the balance; which, if on the side of pleasure, will
give the general good tendency of the act, with respect to
the total number of community of individuals concerned; if on
the side of pain, ^he general evil tendency, with respect to
the same community.
The value judgments implicit in Bentham's claims are obvious.
Bentham

equates

pleasure

with

the

Second,

Bentham

suggests

that all

good

and

pain

individuals

equal affinities for pleasure and pain.

with

First,

the

bad.

in an economy have

This point is clear from

Bentham's claim that social welfare is equal to the unweighted sum of
individual levels of welfare.

It is an egalitarian's view of social

welfare,

which avoids

welfare.

Bentham's welfare theory is not wertfrei.
Mill

judgments

also

into

the problem of interpersonal comparisons of

recognized

the

the

necessity

of

introducing

value

discussion of the theory of distribution.

In

Principles of Political Economy Mill distinguishes between the posi
tive theory of production and the normative theory of distribution.^
The structure of Principles illustrates this distinction:

Books I

through III, which many economists consider an example of nineteenth
century positive analysis, analyze the science of efficient produc
tion, whereas Books IV and V, long considered to be normative, are
devoted to, amongst other things, an analysis of the stationary state.
In

spite

distribution,

of

modern

attempts
welfare

to

develop

theory— the

a

positive

so-called

analysis
'new'

of

welfare

^Ibid., pp. 38-39.
^John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, 2 vols.,
Revised ed. (New York: The Colonial Press, 1899), I, p. 22.
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economics— remains subjective.

The

origins in the writings of Pareto.
tions

necessary

economic

agents

Pareto's

welfare

'new' welfare economics has its
Pareto first theorized the condi

for

equilibrium

resulting

from exchange betweeen
£
Political Economy.
Although

in

his

Manual

of

theory

is not

subjective,

it is not

conclusive

either; and, it established the tack of the subjective analyses that
followed its publication.
Pareto hypothesized that two individuals would trade freely
so long as they experienced different rates of weighted elementary
ophelimity

(the term

corresponds

to the

ratio

of an individual's

marginal utility from a commodity divided by the commodity's price—
and so long as neither party would be injured, i.e., lose ophelimity,
by trade).

These equilibrium conditions are those associated with the

now-famous Paretian equilibrium.
trade

commodities

rates

of

exchanged.

and

substitution

comparisons of utility,

maximized.
one

of an

were

until

equal

the

ratio of their marginal

to price

ratios

for the

goods

While this notion of an exchange equilibrium is useful,

it remains ambiguous.

Paretian

services

Pareto suggested that people will

equilibrium

Because Pareto refused to make interpersonal
one cannot determine by the existence of a
whether

or

not

social

welfare

is

being

Pareto simply defined an exchange equilibrium which is
infinite number of possible, non-comparable equilibrium

^Vilfredo Pareto, Manual of Political Economy, trans. Ann A.
Schwier (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, Publishers, 1971).
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points.

These points are associated with F. Y. Edgeworth's exchange

line or contract curved
Much of the 'new' welfare theory is devoted to extending the
range of usefulness of the Paretian concepts of exchange equilibrium.
The works of Barone, Bergson, Lerner, Hicks, Kaldor, Scitovsky, and
Little attempt, to various degrees, to come to grips with the problem
of comparability of exchange equilibria.

As early as 1908 Barone

suggested the principle of compensation as a method of comparing
g
exchange equilibria.
Later, Hicks and Kaldor rediscovered the
compensation principle in separate articles.

9

Under the principle of compensation movement from one equi
librium

point

to

another

distribution

would

be

acclaimed

an

improvement in welfare if individuals gaining under the change could
compensate

losers

adequately

for

accepting

change.

None

of the

writers suggested that compensation actually be paid— a redistribu
tion of wealth would

improve welfare so long as the compensation

could be made.
Blaug
compensation

points
rule.

out
If

the

primary

compensation

is

weakness
not

of

the

potential

actually paid,

Blaug

^Ibid., p. 262.
g
Mark
Blaug,
Economic Theory in Retrospect, 3rd ed.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 621.
Q
Nicholas Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions in Economics and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," Economic Journal, 49 (1939),
549-552, reprinted in A.E.A. Readings in Welfare Economics, pp.
387-389; J. R. Hicks, "The Foundations of Welfare Economics," Eco
nomic Journal, 49 (1939), pp. 696-712.
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contends,

one

implicitly

accepts

the

prevailing

distribution

of

income as
a measure of the relative strength of feeling of gainers and
losers...[one] presum[es] to know something about the indi
vidual preference pattersn ( sic) without observing the
behaviour that corresponds to^it, and this is an inter
personal comparison of utility.
Blaug continues:
If we seriously believe that principles of income distribu
tion cannot be deduced from the utility calculus by rules of
logic, we must confess ourselves agnostic about situations in
which compensation is only potentially feasible. It may well
be that a good case can be made for failing to pay compensa
tion, but such a case must rest on a 'normative' choice about
income distribution, -^-pot on the 'positive' grounds of
allocative efficiency.
Scitovsky attempted to overcome the limits of the compensa
tion method by adding to

it a second

criterion.

In "A Note on

Welfare Propositions in Economics," Scitovsky argues that the com
pensation principle
"attributes

undue

is

"asymmetrical."

importance

to

the

The principle,
particular

welfare obtaining before the contemplated change."
the

following

illustration

of

the

pitfalls

12

of

he claims,

distribution

of

Scitovsky gives
the

compensation

principle:

"^Blaug, p. 622.
11Ibid.
12

^

Tibor Scitovsky, "A Note on Welfare Propositions in Eco
nomics," The Review of Economic Studies, 9 (1941), 77-88, reprinted
in A.E.A. Readings in Welfare Economics, p. 400.
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...imagine a change, say the imposition of a duty on imports,
that brings the welfare of A and B from P-^ [Figure 1] on the
contract curve of diagram 1 onto TL on the contract curve of
diagram 2.
According to Mr. Kaldor's test this change is
desirable, because by redistributing income we could travel
from n2 along the TUI curve to lip which is superior to P p

FIGURE 1
Diagram 1
Y

Diagram 2
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But once the tariff has been imposed and situation n„
established,
it will be free trade and the resulting
(original) situation
that will appear preferable by the
same test, because starting from P,, income could be so
redistributed (travelling along the PP curve in the first
diagram this time) as to reach P2 , which is superior to
Because the two situations shown in Scitovsky's example are shown, by
the same test, to be preferable, Scitovsky appropriately rules the
test invalid.

He improves on the welfare test by adding a second

test:
We must first see whether it is possible in the new situation
so to redistribute income so as to make everybody better off
than he was in the initial situation; secondly, we must see
whether starting from the initial situation it is not
possible by a mere redistribution of income to reach a posi
tion superior ^ o the new situation, again from everybody's
point of view.
What Scitovsky requires is that a movement from one distribution to a
second distribution constitutes an improvement in welfare according
to the

Hicks-Kaldor rule, while movement back to the first point is

not an

improvement, according to the sametest.
Even Scitovsky's double-criterion fails to produce a positive

theoryof distribution.

In his

Blaug

clearly points

out the

test.

"It is," says Blaug,

critique

of

the double-criterion

chief disadvantage

of the Scitovsky

...that the Hicks-Kaldor criterion, whether applied once or
twice, accepts A's and B's estimates of the amount of the
compensation payments, and this is tantamount to accepting
the distribution of income that produced these estimates.
But acceptance of the status quo is just as much a normative

13Ibid., pp. 400-401.
l4Ibid., p. 399.
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judment ( sic) as the ^demand
distribution of income.

for a radical change in

the

Blaug contends that this normative judgment is the strongest of all
interpersonal comparisons of utility.
More recently, Little, Samuelson, and Harsanyi are reconciled
to the fact that the analysis of distribution is inherently norma
tive.

They restate Bergson's critique of the early efforts in the

'new' welfare economics.

Bergson's criticism follows:

In my opinion the utility calculus introduced by the
Cambridge economists is not a useful tool for welfare econ
omies.
The approach does not provide an alternative to the
introduction of value judgments...[T]he comparison of the
utilities of different individuals must involve an evaluation
of the relative economic positions of these individuals. No
extension of the methods of measuring utilities will dispense
with the necessity for the introduction of Y§^ue propositions
to give these utilities a common dimension.

Theory.

Little

also

He

claims

notes

the ethical nature of

that"Economists

have

used

the New Welfare
no

methods

of

scientific research in arriving at their conclusions about economic
welfare;

and

since

there

are no

methods

involved there can be no methodology."

17

of scientific

research

Little continues:

Welfare economics and ethics cannot, then, be separated.
They are inseparable because the welfare terminology is a
value terminology.
It may be suggested that welfare econ
omists could be purged by the strict use of
a technical
terminology, which,
in ordinary speech, had not value
implications. The answer is that it could be, but it would
no longer be welfare economics.
It would then consist of an

■^Blaug, pp. 624-625.
■^Bergson, p. 20.

(London:

17I. M. D. Little, A Critique of Welfare Economics, 2nd ed.
Oxford University Press, 1957J7 P- 1*
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uninterpreted system of logical deductions, which would not
be about anything at all, let alone welfare...Getting rid of
value judgments would be throwing the baby away with the
bathwater.
Samuelson
welfare economics.

not

only

recognizes

the

value-laden

nature

of

He defends, in limited fashion, the co-mingling

of ethics and economics in welfare theory, noting:
It is a legitimate exercise of economic analysis to examine
the consequences of various value judgments, whether or not
they are shared by the theorist, just as the study of com
parative ethics is itself a science like any other branch of
anthropology...In saying this, I do not mean to imply that
the field of welfare economics has scientific content because
a number of its theorems do not require inter-personal com
parisons of utility; this after all is a mere detail. That
part which does involve inter-personal comparisons of utility
also has real content and interest for the scientific
analyst, even though the scientist does not consider it any
part of his tack to reduce or verify (except on the anthro
pological ]j&vel) the value judgments whose implications he
grinds out.
Unlike

other

economists

of

the

'new'

school

of

welfare

economics, Harsanyi recognizes and embraces the subjective-normative
nature of the analysis of distribution.
Little

and

Blaug

that

distribution

He accepts the claims of

analysis

cannot

produce

an

unambiguous welfare maximum without resorting to interpersonal com
parisons of individual levels of wellbeing.

Harsanyi's addition to

the theory of distribution is his endorsement of such comparisons.
He contends that economic agents routinely engage in making inter
personal

comparisons

decision-making

of

utility

involving economic

during
choices.

the

course

of

routine

So long as the value

18Ibid., pp. 79-80.
19

Paul Anthony Samuelson, Foundations of Economic Analysis
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), p. 220.
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judgments concerning interpersonal comparisons are based upon common
standards of ethics, Harsanyi argues, they are not out of place in
modern distribution analysis.

20

Unless one is content to limit welfare economics to questions
concerning efficient production,

it seems that it is necessary to

introduce to welfare theory some method of systematically analyzing
normative issues.
from

analyzing

encouraged

this

Of course,
distribution
practice.

21

some economists would indeed refrain
altogether.
More

Pigou,

recently,

Kaldor

Kaldor

himself

endorsed limiting welfare theory to the theory of production.
has

argued that only the analysis

of production

is

argues,
has

Kaldor

important

in

modern welfare analysis— that it is "far the more important part,"
and

"should

include

all

those propositions

for increasing

social

welfare which relate to the increase in aggregate production..."
Koopmans

has

also

argued

that

welfare

economics

can

be

22

divided

according to Mill's and Pigou's schemes, with the efficient alloca
tion of resources in production assuming the role of importance in
the economist's analysis.

23

20

J. C. Harsanyi, "Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics
and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility," in Economic Justice, ed.
Edmund S. Phelps (Baltimore:
Penguin Education, 1973Tj P*~ 267.
^Kaldor, p. 389.

22t , . ,
Ibid.
OO

Tjalling C. Koopmans, "Efficient Allocation of Resources,"
Econometrica, 21 (1951), 455-465, reprinted in Readings in Micro
economics , ed. William Breit and Harold M. Hochman (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 414-422.
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If

one

assumes

that

Little,

Samuelson,

and Harsanyi

are

correct in encouraging economists to analyze the problem of finding
the

welfare

maximizing

distribution

of

wealth,

it

then

becomes

necessary

to resort to subjective analysis.

developed

to

qualities

of subjectively perceived intelligible phenomena.

enable

distribution
concerning

the

analysis
the

scientist

requires

that

welfare-promoting

to

Plato's methodology was

investigate rationally

the
Since

the economist make judgments

tendencies

of

economic

changes,

welfare economics must contain propositions that are reasoned rather
than sensed.
concept.

The notion of social welfare

is

itself a rational

Plato used the dialectic to systematically test proposi

tions concerning intelligible, rational phenomena.

II.

Plato's Welfare Theory
Plato's welfare theory, which has heretofore been treated as

proto-science,

can be understood as a dialectical inquiry into the

nature and causes of happiness.
man

desires

happiness.

2A

In

Plato assumed as self-evident that
order

that

one

might

discover

the

organization of the economy which best promotes social welfare qua
happiness,

Plato

would

must

knowledge

of the nature

principal

goal of Platonic welfare analysis.
happiness

and

in

of

one

of

of

nature

that

knowledge

definition

the

insist

happiness

first

possess

itself. Acquisition

some
of

causes of happiness thus becomes the

hand

does

Only with a working

Plato

proceed

to

the

interesting questions of which organizations of productive factors

0A

Plato,

"Symposium," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 557.
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and

distributions

of

wealth

within

an

economy

promote

welfare.

Plato's methodology, constructed along the lines of ancient science,
is

useful

for

today

because

it enables

the

social

scientist

to

consider not only productive efficiency, which comprises the efforts
made under the aegis of the "new" welfare theory, but also to analyze
desirable distributions of wealth.
Plato's

investigation of the nature of welfare led him to

conclude that the best economic state is one in which each individual
would be encouraged to work and behave in a virtuous manner, and in a
way consistent with the requirements of his temperament.
this view can be found in the Republic.
"more things are produced,

Evidence of

In Book II Plato writes,

and better and more easily when one man

performs one task according to his nature at the right moment, and at
leisure from other occupations."

25

From Book IV:

citizens...must be sent to the task for which their natures
were fitted, one man to one work, in order that each of them
fulfilling his own function may be not many men, but one, and
so the^entire city may come to be not a multiplicity but a
unity.
Plato's theory of welfare is not limited to a discussion of a
psychological division of labor, however.

His theory, as it appears

in the Laws and elsewhere, can be divided into four areas of investi
gation:

(1) the analysis of the Good,

(2) the investigation of the

happy, virtuous life, in which the individual possesses knowledge of
the Good, (3) the effects of a psychological division of labor, and

2^Plato,

"Republic,"

26Ibid., p. 665.

in The

Collected Dialogues, p.

616.
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(4)

the description of the organization of the economy that best

fosters virtue and happiness.

Plato's conclusions from these areas

of research are captured in the following theory of welfare:

men can

be truly happy only if they possess knowledge of the Good and behave
in

a

just,

virtuous

way.

Virtuous

behavior

requires

that

the

individual behave in a just, honest, truthful, and temperate fashion,
and that the individual uses wealth liberally.
This
society
Plato

does not

marching

understood

in

imply that Plato
lockstep

that

the

to

the

concept

envisioned all members of

same psychological

of

virtuous

behavior

cadence.
for the

individual depends upon which part of the soul dominates a person's
character.

The souls of men are, according to Plato, fashioned in

varying proportions.

In some, the rational part dominates the honor-

loving and appetitive parts of the soul.

More frequently, however,

the appetitive part of the soul rules one's consciousness.

Plato's

welfare theory is conditioned by his theory of the soul— he believed
that the degree of a man's happiness depended upon his soul's ability
to discover knowledge of happiness.
by passions
virtuous

and appetites,

life which

For the many, ruled as they are

happiness

is defined

as

would obtain from leading a

a temperate

or moderate

life.

According to Plato, the ordinary man is most likely to be happy if he
works at a job which best suits his temperament and if he behaves
temperately.

The best

state would

thus be one in which virtuous

behavior, and especially moderation of appetities, is best achieved.
Welfare
economics.

economics

is a controversial

area

of

research

in

The ethical and psychological roots of welfare analysis
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no doubt account for much of this controversy.
not

That economists have

generally agreed upon a definition of welfare economics--some

claim

it

to

be

the

analysis

of

the

efficiency

attained

with

alternative organizations of productive factors, while others argue
that

it

is

the

analysis

of

social

utility maximization— attests

to the extent of this controversy.
Welfare
economic
munity.

economics

conditions

that

has

as

its

aim the discovery of those

affect or promote the welfare of a com

It is the investigation of the economic causes of happiness,

and, in particular, the ways in which the production and exchange of
commodities, services, and money in markets affect the welfare of the
agents

of

the

economy.

Also

important

to the

study of welfare

economics is the investigation of the labor versus leisure decisions
of economic

agents

and the

effects

of

changes

in work effort on

social welfare.

III.

Plato's Analysis of the Good
Plato's welfare analysis comprises all the areas of topical

coverage that are mentioned above.

It begins with a detailed inquiry

of the nature of happiness (eudaemonia), which is closely related to
the Good (agathon). This inquiry leads to the development of Plato's
theory of knowledge (episteme), and culminates in the economical and
political prescriptions

of his mature works, especially the Laws.

Although some controversy still exists concerning the aim of Plato's
dialogues— some interpreters emphasize Plato's systematic philosophy,
while

others

make

more

of

his

playful

literary

style— philoso

phers and classicists agree, in the main, that Plato was a practical
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philosopher and that in his written work he never lost sight of the
need to improve the human condition.
Plato's myth of the

cave

This point is consistent with

in which the enlightened philosopher is

obligated to return to the cave in order to inform his fellow men of
his discovery of the nature of the Good, rather than to bask in the
light of his newly found knowledge.
Classicist Werner Jaeger advances a convincing argument in
support of the belief that all of Plato's written work aims at dis
covery of knowledge
Culture.

Describing

of the Good in Paideia:
a

group

of

early,

the Ideals of Greek

aporetic

dialogues— the

dialogues often referred to as the "Socratic" dialogues, in which the
dialectic is thought to follow most closely the pattern of conversa
tion established by Socrates— Jaeger says, "At first glance, Plato's
early dialogues seem to be separate investigations of moral concepts
such as courage, piety, and self control."

27

Jaeger contends, how

ever, that
These conversations are all attempts to find out the
nature of one virtue; and they all lead to the admission that
this virtue, whichever it is, must be some kind of knowledge.
If we ask 'knowledge of what?' we discover that it is
knowledge of the good.
We recognize this for Socrates'
well-known paradox:
Virtue is Knowledge.
But at the same
time we feel that a new force is at work in Plato's Socratic
dialogues, not merely to re-create the master himself, but
also to take up his problem and go further with it.
The
attentive reader will see the workings of this force in the
fact that Plato's Socrates is exclusively concerned with the
problem of virtue.
From the Apology we know that the real
Socrates tried above everything else to exhort his fellow-men
to practise 'virtue' and 'the care of the soul'; and that the

27

Werner Jaeger, In Search of a Divine Centre, Vol. II of
Paideia: the Ideals of Greek Culture, trans. Gilbert Highet (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1943), p. 89.
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cross-examination which went along with his exhortation and
convinced his interlocutor of his own ignorance was just
as much a part of that protreptic mission.
Its aim was to
disquiet men and move them to do something for themselves.
But in Plato's other books of this early period, the pro
treptic preaching is far less important than the elenctic
cross-examination.
Clearly Plato wants to push his readers
forward to the knowledge of virtue, without letting them stop
at the consciousness of their own ignorance. This helpless
ness ( aporia) which was Socrates' perpetual state was for
Plato a challenge to solve the problem and escape. He tries
to find a positive answer to the question: what is virtue?
It is clear that he is following a well-planned course: for
in these dialogues he takes up first one virtue, and then
another.
Apparently he does not go beyond Socrates' con
fession of ignorance; but only apparently. For each of these
attempts to define this or that special virtue culminates in
the acknowledgment that it must be knowledge of the good.
This concentrated advance shows clearly that the strategy of
its guide is directed wholly towards one problem: what is
the nature of that knowledge which Socrates vainly sought
among men— which must nevertheless lie buried somewhere in
the soul, because without it man cannot reach true perfect
tion? and what is the nature of its object, the 'good'?
The unified theme of the dialogues is the pursuit of happi
ness or the Good for Men.

Moreover, the recurring messages of the

early dialogues devoted to the definition of special virtues are that
(1) all virtues are a form of the Good, and (2) that men can be truly
happy only if they possess knowledge of the Good.

This second theme

is made clear in the Symposium, in which Socrates recalls having been
taught

the

virtue

prophetess Diotima.

of

knowledge

of

the

Good

by

the

Mantinean

Plato writes:

Well then, she went on, suppose that, instead of the
beautiful, you were being asked about the good. I put it to
you, Socrates.
What is it that the lover of the good is
longing for?
To make the good his own.

28Ibid., pp. 91-92.

Then what will he gain by making it his own?
I can make a better
He'll gain happiness.

shot at answering

that,

I said.

Right, said she, for the happy are happy inasmuch as they
possess the good, and since there's no need for us to ask
why men should want to be happy, I think your answer is
conclusive.
Absolutely, I agreed.
Plato's
ontology.

first

29

point

can

be

understood

in

light

of

his

Plato, as I have demonstrated, assigns to universals or

Forms a position of ontological priority over observable phenomena.
That is, causes are seen to be ontologically prior to their effects.
The Forms are the causes of the qualities of observable phenomena.
The beauty of a face, for instance, is caused by its participation in
beauty itself.

A face can be beautiful, but it cannot be beauty,

according to Plato's ontology.
The Good, for Plato, is the first and continuing cause of the
qualities

of sensible natural phenomena.

Knowledge

of the Good,

therefore, becomes the most important type of knowledge in Plato's
scheme of things.

W. K. C. Guthrie expresses the central position of

the Good in Plato's system of knowledge in his A History of Greek
Philosophy. He notes:
The Good, then, is in Plato's words (505 3, trans. Lee
from the Republic), 'the end of all endeavour, the object on
which every heart is set, whose existence it divines, though
it finds it difficult to grasp just what it is; and because
it can't handle it with the same assurance as other things,
it misses any value those other things have'. Whatever a man
desires to strongly that he would put it before everything
else is for him the good, and if you believe, as Socrates and

29

Plato,

"Symposium,"

in The Collected Dialogues, p. 557.
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Plato did, that there is an absolute good, 'man's chief end',
then obviously no other knowledge can be so important as the
knowledge of what this is. S[ocrates] believed that not only
man, but everything in the world, had a function to perform,
its fitness to perform it was its 'virtue', and the per
formance was the good for it. For human beings it was the
key to happiness. So far Plato is Socratic, but in the light
of his theory of Forms he went further. A cause is prior to
its effects, and since, for particular enterprises or life as
a whole, the Good was the cause of their goodness, it was in
itself not only an eternal, changeless Form 'by which' good
particulars are good (as just acts are dependent on the Form
of Ju&tice) but stood at the head of the hierarchy of
Forms.
We have already seen the method whereby, according to Plato,
one. acquires knowledge of Forms— the dialectic.

One makes a state

ment concerning a belief (pistis) or opinion (doxa) about some virtue
or goal of human action.

One then searches with his or her inter

locutors for any obviously unsound quality concerning the statement.
Should the statement be refuted it would be reformulated.

The pro

cess of stating, refuting and reformulating hypotheses would continue
until agreement was reached.
participants

would be

At this point, Plato would argue, the

closer to possessing knowledge than before.

The dialectic is the basis of all science according to Plato.
All of Plato's dialogues, it has been argued, dialectically
push the reader toward the discovery of knowledge of the Good.
can

see

a progression in the dialogues

One

of the early and middle

periods of Plato's writing toward definition of the Good.

The early

dialogues, as Jaeger argues, all point in the direction of the Good
by attempting to define the qualities of the individual virtues which

^0

W. K. C. Guthrie, Plato The Man and His Dialogues: Earlier
Period, Vol. IV of A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 50^!
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the Good comprises.
dialogues
nature

Also,

several of the early and middle period

deal directly with the

of

the

Good.

The

general question of what is the

Protagoras, as

was

mentioned

before,

inquires into the nature of the Good, and rejects as inadequate or
false the notion that

it

is, as Protagoras defines it, pleasure.

The nominal subject of the Protagoras, in which Socrates is
pitted against the great sophistic teacher of his day, Protagoras, is
whether or not knowledge can be taught.

Protagoras claims in the

dialogues that students coming to him can be assured of the following
gain:
the

"The very day you join me, you will go home a better man, and

same the next day.

better state."

31

Each day you will make progress toward a

Socrates disputes this claim by having Protagoras

admit that a teacher must possess knowledge if he is to impart it to
others.

Socrates

inquiring

into

proceeds

the

nature

to

test

Protagoras

of the Good.

for

knowledge

When Protagoras

by

equates

goodness with pleasure Socrates refutes this premise by pointing out
that

there

exist

good

pleasures

as

well

as bad

ones,

to which

Protagoras responds in agreement.
The Protagoras rejects the notion that pleasure is the Good.
If the hedonist accepts that some pleasures are "bad" then he must
reformulate

his

pleasures."

As Terrence Irwin points out in Plato1s Moral Theory:

^Plato,

definition

of

the

Good,

perhaps

to

read

"good

"Protagoras," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 316.
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The Early and Middle Dialogues, the hedonist must still give some
account of what the Good is.

32

The nature of the Good is taken up again in the Euthydemus, a
dialogue

which

is

devoted

principally

to

and useless

showing

the difference

between the useful

(earnest)

(pedantic)

forms of the

dialectic— Socrates'

dialectical inquiry is held to be the earnest

form, while that practiced by the eristic interlocutors Euthydemus
and Dionysodorus is shown to be pedantic and nonproductive.
course

of

the

dialogue

Socrates shows, however,

knowledge

is

suggested

to

be

the

In the
Good.

that knowledge itself is not always good;

knowledge of things that do not benefit the knower are not good, and
knowledge of things that do benefit the knower are not good without
corequisite knowledge of how to use such knowledge.

Socrates claims,

for instance, that knowledge of how to become immortal is not of use
to the individual without some knowledge of how to beneficially use
immortality.
The

33
Phaedo

and

the

Gorgias

repeat

Euthydemus and the Protagoras, respectively.
are

two popular definitions

extensive

inquiry

into

the

however, until the Republic.

of the
nature

the

arguments

Knowledge and pleasure

Good that Plato
of the

of the

Good

rejects.

An

is not provided,

In Book VI, which analyzes the Good,

oo
Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory: The Early and Middle
Dialogues (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 224.

^Plato,

"Euthydemus," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 394.
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pleasure and knowledge are, once more, rejected as candidate defini
tions of the agathon.

Prudence, too, is ruled out, as the following

passage shows:
[Socrates:] "And, further, you also know that in the opinion
of the many the good is pleasure, while in that of the more
refined it is prudence."
[Adeimantus:] "Of course."
"And, my friend, that those who believe this can't point
out what kind of prudence it is, but are finally compelled to
say 'about the good.'"
Plato's

rejections of knowledge, pleasure,

and prudence as

definitions of the Good hinge upon his assertion that such defini
tions require the speaker to speak of good pleasures, good knowledge,
and good prudence.

This still requires that the Good be defined.

In

describing the Good Plato relies on his theory of Forms or Ideas.

In

Book VI of the Republic Plato notes:
"And we also assert that there is a fair itself, a good
itself, and so on for all the things that we then set down as
many.
Now, again, we refer them to one idea of each as
though the idea were one; and we address it as that which
really jls ."
"That's so."
"And, moreover, we say that the former are seen but not
intellected, while the ideas are intellected but not seen."
"That's entirely certain."33
An Idea "is," while the things that participate in Ideas "come into
and go out of being."

Using the analogy of the sun as that which

3^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 185.
35Ibid., p. 187.
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illuminates things that are seen by the eyes, Plato establishes the
central

importance

of the Idea of the Good in the following way:

[Socrates:]
"You know," I said, "that eyes, when one no
longer turns them to those things over whose colors the light
of day extends but to those over which the gleams of night
extend, are dimmed and appear nearly blind as though pure
sight were not in them."
[Glaucon:]

"Quite so," he said.

"But, I suppose, when one turns them on those things
illuminated by the sun, theysee
clearly and sight shows
itself to be in these same eyes."
"Surely."
"Well, then, think that the soul is also characterized in
this way. When it fixes itself on that which is illuminated
by truth and that which ijs, it intellects, knows, and appears
to possess intelligence.
But when it fixes itself on that
which is mixed with darkness, on coming into being and
passing away, it opines and is dimmed, changing opinions up
and
down,
and seems
at such times not to possess
intelligence."
"Yes, that's the way it seems."
"Therefore, say that what provides the truth to the
things known and gives the power to the one who knows, is the
idea of the good.
And, as the cause of
the knowledge and
truth, you can understand it to be a thing known; but, as
fair as these two are— knowledge and truth— if you believe
that it is something different from them and still fairer
than they, your belief will be right. As
for knowledge and
truth, just as in the other region it is right to hold light
and sight sunlike, but to believe them to be the sun is not
right; so, too, here, to holdthesetwo to be like the good
is right, but to believe that either of them is the good is
not right.
The condition w h ^ h characterizes the good must
receive still greater honor."

36Ibid., pp. 188-189.
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Using the analogies of the segmented line and the Cave Plato goes on
to describe the Good as the highest level of being; it is, even,
beyond "being" in its fairness.

Plato writes:

"Therefore, say that not only being known is present in
the things known as a consequence of the good, but also
existence and being are in them besides as a result of it,
although the good isn't being but., is still beyond being,
exceeding it in dignity and power."
In Book VII Plato, in writing the Cave analogy says the following of
the Idea of the Good:
At all events, this is the way the phenomena look to me: in
the knowable the last thing to be seen, and that with con
siderable effort, is the idea of the good; but once seen, it
must be concluded that this is in fact the cause of all that
is right and fair in everything— in the visible it gave birth
to light and its sovereign; in the intelligible, itself
sovereign, it provided truth and intelligence— and that the
man who is £$ing to act prudently in private or in public
must see it.
Guthrie summarizes Plato's concept of the Good, noting:
In the Good, then, Plato combines three conceptions: the
end of life, supreme object of desire and aspiration; the
condition of knowledge, which makes the world intelligible
and the human mind intelligent; and the sustaining cause of
the Forms, which are in their timji the creative causes of
natural objects and human actions.
In a later passage Guthrie says:
Through all the... ontological and epistemological mysteries
(Plato would not reject the word), which have so fascinated
and puzzled philosophers down the centuries, one is apt
to lose sight of the fact that the ultimate goal, the selfauthenticating source of being and knowledge, is simple

38Ibid., p. 196.
QQ

Guthrie, p. 506.
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Goodness (Agathon), tl^ unfailingly and universally advan
tageous and beneficial.
The Good, as the analogies of the segmented line and the cave
suggest,
action.

is supreme— it is the first and sustaining cause of human
Knowledge of Good is, according to Plato, the final cause of

human action.

All men, we have seen, desire to be happy.

The happy

life requires that one possess knowledge of happiness (eudaimonia),
which

is virtue

that originates

in Goodness.

For Plato, the end

result of analyzing human welfare with an eye toward its improvement
is

the

establishment

of

the

good

life— the

happy

life— for the

citizens of the polis.
It might be suggested that by describing the Good as that
which is "last to be seen, and that with considerable effort," Plato
disables the economist from developing a theory of welfare— if one
must know the Good in order to describe the happy life, and if the
Good is the last known of the virtues, then how does one write of the
happy life with any
Socratic profession

confidence?
of

ignorance

Plato,

however,

went beyond the

in his philosophy.

The Socratic

position on all this was that the virtues, which participate in the
Good, are indescribable without some knowledge of the Good.
however,

allows

that

the virtues

possesses knowledge of Goodness.
epistemology is not

that

Plato,

can be glimpsed even before one
The point of Plato's ontology and

of

his

the

us

to know virtue, but rather that the Good is that which causes

the virtues to possess their qualities.

40Ibid., p. 518.

Good

is that which enables

Plato asks that the reader
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accept the ontological priority of the Good; he does not insist that
the reader stop at the aporetic conclusion of the Socratic arguments.
Thus in the early dialogues Plato is content to describe individual
virtues prior to taking up the formal task of analyzing the role of
the Good.

IV.

The Life of Virtue and Well-Ordered Soul
If the Good is the cause of the virtuous qualities that can

be found associated with the happy life, then what are the natures
of the virtues themselves?

Plato attempts to answer this question in

several of the dialectical investigations of the individual virtues.
In these dialogues, as well as in the more comprehensive dialogues of
the middle period of Plato's writing, one arrives at the conclusion
that the happy life is one in which the individual lives virtuously.
The virtuous life, for Plato, requires that the individual partici
pate

in

the

qualities

of

the virtues

themselves.

That

is,

the

individual must strive to possess knowledge; he must be fair and just
in his dealings with his fellow citizens; he must be temperate in his
desire to accumulate wealth; and he must be liberal with the wealth
that he accumulates.
In order that an individual might possess the virtues that
are

associated above with the happy life it is necessary for the

individual

to have a well-ordered soul.

Recall that according to

Plato the soul is the bodily organ responsible for discerning the
existence and qualities of the intelligibles.

Remember,

too, that

the soul comprises three distinct parts— the rational, spirited, and
appetitive divisions.

The soul, when it is well-ordered, pursues the
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Good, and is characterized by the possession of the virtues described
above.
Plato discusses the well-ordered soul in several places in
the dialogues.
the Phaedo,
paints

The most notable instances, however, can be found in

the Phaedrus, and

the Republic.

In the Phaedo Plato

a picture of the soul as being the most divine and intel

ligible part of the body:
The soul is most like that which is divine, immortal, intel
ligible, uniform, indissoluble, and ever self-consistent and
invariable, whereas body is most like that which is human,
mortal, multifo^iji, unintelligible, dissoluble, and never
self-consistent.
When the soul investigates itself, Plato writes,
it passes into the realm of the pure and everlasting and
immortal and changeless, and being of a kindred nature, when
it is once independent and free from interference, consorts
with it always and strays no longer, but remains, in that
realm of the absolute, constant and invariable, through
contact with beings of a s^njilar nature. And this condition
of the soul we call wisdom.
As

I have mentioned before,

the well-ordered soul must be one in

which the reasoning faculty yokes the spirited and appetitive parts
into its service.

Reason,

that part of the soul which partakes of

virtue itself, must guide the individual in his or her search for
happiness.
In the Phaedrus, Plato

gives

the reader a picture of the

well-ordered soul through the use of the analogy of the charioteer
and the two steeds.

Plato likens the rational part of the soul to a

^Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 63.
42Ibid., pp. 62-63.
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charioteer, who must somehow control his team of horses which con
stantly tried to pull the chariot its own way.

The spirited part of

the soul is like the horse "that is..."
upright and clean-limbed, carrying his neck high, with some
thing of a hooked nose; in color he is white, with black
eyes; a lover of glory, but with temperance and modesty; one
that consorts with genuine renown, and needs no whip, being
driven by the work of command alone.
The appetitive part of the soul is likened to a horse that is
crooked of frame, a massive jumble of a creature, with thick
short neck, snub nose, black skin, and gray eyes; hotblooded, consorting with wantonness and vainglory^shaggy of
ear, deaf, and hard to control with whip and goad.
The charioteer must find a way to control the unruly steed, in the
fashion in which

reason must master appetite.

In so doing,

the

driver must enlist the aid of the honor-loving, temperate horse in
directing the progress of the team.
of the

So, too, the honor-loving part

soul must assist reason in checking the passions.

If the

higher elements of the soul are successful in guiding it into the
ordered rule of the contemplative, philosophical life, Plato says,
their days on earth will be blessed with happiness and con
cord, for the power of evil in the soul has been subjected,
and the power of goodness Iterated; they [will have] won
self-mastery and inward peace.
The

Phaedrus

recapitulates

the

argument of the Phaedo

which Plato claims the soul to be immortal and imperishable.

4^Plato,
44

"Phaedrus,"

Ibid.

45Ibid., p. 501.

in

The

Collected Dialogues, p.

in
The

499.
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soul participates in virtue, which is immortal, and in its participa
tion

it

possesses

itself.

something of the

immortal

qualities

of virtue

Plato's belief in

an immortal soul is consistent withhis

theory of learning as being

a process of recollection— anamnesis. If

the soul possesses knowledge of virtue already, Plato argues in the
Phaedo, it must exist prior to the coming into being of the body.

46

Plato's psychology, i.e., his theory of the soul, is insepara
ble

from

his

characterizes

welfare
those

theory.

individuals

Happinessis

the

condition

that

in whom the soul is well-ordered.

Happy people seek wisdom, and in so doing lead a contemplative life.
Only a
is

true philosopher qua lover of wisdom can be truly happy.

the

habit

refrain

from

passions.

of the philosopher to lead a moderate life,
partaking

Plato

excessively

describes

the

of

the

objects

and

It
to

of appetitive

psychologyof the truephilosopher

saying:
Now the soul of the true philosopher feels that it must not
reject this opportunity for release, and so it abstains as
far as possible from pleasures and desires and griefs,
because it reflects that the result of giving way to pleasure
or fear or desire is not as might be supposed the trivial
misfortune of becoming ill or wasting money through selfindulgence but the last and worst calamity of all, which the
sufferer does not recognize.
What is that, Socrates? asked Cebes.
When anyone's soul feels a keen pleasure or pain it
cannot help supposing that whatever causes the most violent
emot^yn is the plainest and truest reality, which it is
not.

4^Plato,

"Phaedo,"

47Ibid., p. 66.

in The

Collected Dialogues, pp. 58-59.
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Rather than fall into the trap of interpreting the sensibles to be
most real, Plato says that the true philosopher
secures immunity from its desires by following reason and
abiding always in her company, and by contemplating the true
and divine and unconjecturable, and drawing inspiration from
it, because such a soul believes that this is the right way
to live while life endures, and that after death it reaches a
place which is kindred and similargto its own nature, and
there is rid forever of human ills.
It is

clear that for Plato the happy man is the rational

man— he who manages to yoke the spirited and appetitive urges of the
soul

into

subservience

to

the

soul's

charioteer,

reason.

Such

individuals, if they are serious (spoudaioi) will be attuned to the
inner beauty of the
passions.
refined

It

intelligibles, rather

is also

characters

clear that Plato

as his

developing in society.

than be

slaves

to the

did not think that

true philosophers

such

stood much chance of

Indeed, he described the ideal state designed

in his Republic as likely the realm of the children of gods, not of
ordinary men.

How then is happiness secured,

if at all, for the

many?
One
individual

will
would

recall
glimpse

that

Plato

virtue

thought

itself

it

early

unlikely
in

life.

that an
Rather,

knowledge of virtue, although the truest and clearest knowledge, is
last seen, and only after the outer eyes have grown dim.

In order

that the polis might produce true philosophers, Plato designed in the
Republic a rigorous system of education that would last thirty-five

^Ibid., p. 67.
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years.

After

such

an

education

a

few

individuals

might become

virtuous and truly happy.
Plato has been thoroughly criticized for his contention that
only the few become truly happy, and that the many are given over to
indulgence
appetites.

in

inferior

pleasures

that

are

associated

with

the

In this century Plato has even been labelled fascist.

For all this, however, Plato was not despotic or tyrannical in his
desire

to

see his vision of virtue realized in society.

Indeed,

Plato would claim just the opposite— that the individual who would
let the stronger, appetitive urges dominate the soul, and who would
argue that of all things man is the measure is the tyrant.

Plato

defined tyranny as the condition where one considers himself "to be
at

liberty to do what

[one]

please[s]

in the state— to kill,

to

exile, and to follow [ones] own pleasurefs] in every act."^
The happy life can be characterized by its opposition to the
qualities
Plato,

of the unhappy

life— tyranny.

The tyrant, according to

is the supremely unhappy individual.

The tyrant listens to

the message of the appetitive part of the soul in every action that
he contemplates.

The tyrant trusts no one; he assumes that everybody

follows the commands of the passions, and, is as a consequence not
worthy of trust any more than the tyrant is himself.

The tyrant

exists, Plato says, in a dream state in which the appetitive urges of
the subconscious mind are awakened while the spirited and rational
parts of the soul slumber.

49

Plato,

"Gorgias,"

in The

Collected

Dialogues, p.

252.
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The
tyrannical

"acme of misery"
individual

in human

life

seeks public office.

50

is attained
An

when the

"actual tyrant,"

i.e., an irrational individual in public office, is
really enslaved to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a
flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding
even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of
most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent
if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety. And
throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of
convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition
of the city which he rules, and he is like it...
...And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all
that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and,
by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was,
envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel
and nurse of all inquiry, and so in qnnsequence be himself
most unhappy and make all about him so.
Plato's

tyrant

shares

an

Platonic vision of the happy man.
is the erotic urge.

attributein

common

with the

This common psychological element

Plato of course distinguished between different

types of love— agape, philia, and eros— and erotic love did not carry
for him the connotations that it evokes today.

Rather, erotic love,

as Plato makes clear in his masterful Symposium, is a longing for
something that the soul lacks.
eloquently points

In the Symposium and Phaedrus Plato

out that the philosopher is erotically drawn to

knowledge of the Good.

Knowledge, Socrates pointed out, is something

that the soul typically lacks.

The soul, which is in Plato's words

"that which moves itself," aches with longing at the sight of the

^Plato,

"Republic,"

51Ibid., p. 806.

in The

Collected Dialogues, p.

805.
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object of its desire.

52

In this fashion the soul of the philosopher

compels him to seek wisdom, while that of the tyrant, unbalanced as
it is, seeks the objects of passion.
souls

is

sustains

that

in

their

The difference between the two

longing one

and nourishes happiness,

soul desires

i.e.,

something that

it longs for knowledge of

virtue, while the other desires something that will always leave it
unsatisfied— appetitive pleasures.
So man, who is "besouled," is driven by an erotic urge to
seek the object of psychological vision.

The happy man will seek

that which the well-ordered soul desires— to possess the virtue that
it glimpses with the inner eyes.

The tyrant, however, will involun

tarily seek misery by forever hankering for the objects of passion
which the unbalanced soul fixes on.
When the soul fixes on the "upward path" toward knowledge of
intelligible

reality,

it

discovers

in time

the qualities

of the

particular virtues that, when known, enable the knower to be truly
happy.

In the ethical dialogues culminating with the Republic one

sees what Plato's vision of these virtues is.

Foremost in the soul

of the happy man, according to Plato's investigation, is the desire
for knowledge.

Learning is for Plato the only endeavor that people

should undertake without moderation.

One can never know too much.

The besouled man seeks ta onta with all vigor that can be mustered.
In order that man may discover knowledge, it is necessary for
him to secure the necessities of physical and emotional sustenance.

*^Plato,

"Phaedrus,"

in The

Collected Dialogues, p.

493.
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Plato was no ascetic.

He accepted the fact that the well-ordered

soul exists within a body that must be nourished and otherwise main
tained.

With

respect

to

the

regulation of acquisition of those

things that nurture the body, Plato argues that the inquiring mind
would discover the virtues of justice, moderation, and liberality,
which would cause the individual to turn away from acquisition of
more than is necessary.
Justice, which is the nominal topic of the Republic, involves
doing one's own business, according to Plato.

This understanding of

justice is arrived at after a lengthy dialectical refutation of other
concepts of justice.

Cephalus’ argument in Book I, that justice is

paying back what is owed, is refuted on the grounds that one would
not,

for instance,

be just

in returning weapons

lender who had subsequently gone mad.

borrowed

from a

Polemarchus' reformulation of

Cephalus' concept--that justice is helping one's friends and hurting
one's enemies— is also shown, within the guidelines of the dialectic
to be

inadequate.

This formulation of justice is abandoned after

Socrates argues to the satisfaction of all but one of the partici
pants in the dialogue, Thrasymachus, that doing harm to one's enemies
does not make them more just; rather, it makes them more unjust.
must not be just,
Thrasymachus'
ful man--a

Socrates argues,

claim

sophistic

that

justice

to further injustice.
is the advantage

It

Finally,

of the power

concept of the Protagorean example of value
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relativism— is

refuted

at

abandoned the conversation.

length,

even

after

Thrasymachus

has

53

Instead of these concepts Plato shows justice to be doing
good, which, in the case of labor and commerce, means doing what is
right with
wisdom,

respect to one's temperament.

guardians would

cultivate

courage

Philosophers would seek
and obedience,

and the

third class, the many, would strive to be temperate in their func
tions as acquisitive beings.

From Book IV of the Republic:

[Socrates]
"All right," I said.
"Three of them have been
spied out in our city, at least sufficiently to form some
opinion.
Now what would be the remaining form thanks to
which the city would further partake in virtue?
For,
plainly, this is justice."
[Glaucon]

"Plainly."

"So then, Glaucon, we must, like hunters, now station
ourselves in a circle around the thicket and pay attention so
that justice doesn't slip through somewhere hereabouts. Look
to it and make every effort to catch sight of it; you might
somehow see it before me and could tell me."
"...Listen whether after all I make any sense," I said.
"That rule we set down at the beginning as to what must be
done in everything when we were founding the city— this, or a
certain form of it, is, in my opinion, justice. Surely we
set down and
often said, if you remember,thateach one must
practice one
of the functions in the city,thatone for which
his nature made him naturally most fit."
"Yes, we were saying that."
"And further, that justice is the minding of one's own
business and
not being a busybody, thiswe have both heard
from many others and have often said ourselves."
"Yes, we have."

*^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 15.

"Well, then, my friend," I said, "this— the practice of
minding one's own business— when it comes into being in a
certain way, is probably justice.
Do you know how I infer
this?"
"No," he said, "tell me."
"In my opinion," I said, "after having considered modera
tion, courage, and prudence, this is what's left over in the
city; it provided the power by which all these others came
into being; and, once having come into being, it provides
them with preservation as long as it's in the city. And yet
we were saying that justice would be what's left over from
the three if we found them."
"Yes, we did," he said, "and it'snecessarily so."
"Moreover," I said, "if one had to judge which of them by
coming to be will do our city the most good, it would be a
difficult judgment.
Is it the unity of opinion among rulers
and ruled? Or is it the coming into being in the soldiers of
that preserving of the lawful opinion as to which things are
terrible
and which are not? Or is it the prudence and
guardianship present in the rulers? Or is the city done the
most good by the fact that— in the case of child, woman,
slave, freeman, craftsman, ruler and ruled— each one minded
his own business and wasn't a busybody?"
"It would,
ment."

of course," he said, "be a difficult judg

"Then, as it seems, with respect to a city's virtue, this
power that consists in each man's minding his own business in
the city is a rival to wisdom, moderation and courage."
"Very much so," he said.
"Wouldn't you name justice that which is the rival of
these others in contributing to a city's virtue?"
"That's entirely certain."
"Now consider if it will seem the same from this view
point too.
Will you assign the judging of lawsuits in the
city to the rulers?"
"Of course."
"Will they have any other aim in their judging than that
no one have what belongs to others, nor be deprived of what
belongs to him?"
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"None other than this."
"Because that's just?"
"Yes."
"And therefore, from this point of view too, the having
and doing of one's qwn and what belongs to one would be
agreed to be justice."
This justice that Plato writes about forms the basis of his wellknown psychological

division of labor.

Justice, defined as doing

what is one's own business, is the key to understanding this division
for what it is.

Some economists have, I have shown, argued it to be

a crude precursor to the more nearly scientific division made famous
by

Smith.

This

understanding

seems

incorrect.

The

fact of the

matter is that Plato's division of labor is logically consistent with
the premise that it is justice, rather than efficiency, which should
be promoted in an economy.

Smith's division addresses an underlying

question of how efficiency can be best served.

One cannot, from the

basis of positive science, suggest that one proposal for a division
is more

or less adequate than another.

attaining different things.

They are simply aimed at

With respect to the aim of each each is

logically consistent.
Besides behaving justly and always striving to know the truth
of all matters, the happy man, according to Plato, behaves both with
courage and temperance.

The courage of which Plato writes has to do

with being able to discern the Good in a situation and upholding it

54Ibid., pp. 110-112.
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even at great odds.

It is not enough for people to know the Good;

they must have the conviction— the courage— to do the Good as well.
Plato's initial examination of courage appears in the Laches.
Here Plato
bravely.

shows
Bravery,

battlefield,

that

courage

the

same thing as behaving

such as that which one might encounter on the

is inferior if it does not originate in knowledge of

what it means to be brave.
behavior

is not

is

like

As always, Plato insists that virtuous

some virtue

itself

insofar

intimate and reasoned knowledge of virtue.
around

as

it stems from an

The Laches is centered

a discussion of courage between three individuals who were

well-known for their courageous behavior in battle— Laches, Nicias,
and Socrates.
cerned

with

As an aporetic dialogue the Laches is primarily con
establishing

the

claim

that

while

these

men

are

courageous, they do not themselves yet possess knowledge of courage.
This situation is deemed lamentable by Socrates who admonishes Nicias
and Laches to seek an education in the area of virtue.

The dialogue,

without defining courage, attempts to convince the reader that action
based

upon

knowledge.

right

opinion

is inferior to

action originating

from

The three men in the dialogue are courageous, but they do

not know what courage is.
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In the Republic Plato resumes his discussion of courage.

In

this dialogue he describes it as being a "kind of p r e s e r v i n g . I n
a conversation between Socrates and Glaucon Plato writes:

^Plato, "Laches," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 144.
^^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 107.

"So a city is also courageous by a part of itself, thanks
to that part's having in it a power that through everything
will preserve the opinion about which things are terrible—
that they are the same ones and of the same sort as those the
lawgiver transmitted in the education.
Or don't you call
that courage?"
"I didn't quite understand what you said," he said.
it again."
"I mean,"
preserving."

I said,

"that

"Say

courage is a certain kind of

"Just what sort of preserving?"
"The preserving of the opinion produced by law through
education about what— and what sort of thing— is terrible.
And by preserving through everything I meant preserving that
opinion and not casting it out in pains and pleasures and
desires and fears..."
Courage is here defined to be the willingness to uphold a standard
that is known to be good.

Standards must often be upheld against

overwhelming opposition and,

at times,

at

great peril.

The con

viction among the guardians of a regime that the laws are worthy of
being upheld because they are good is a requirement in a state for
enabling its citizens to pursue happiness.
Moderation is the last virtue that is ordinarily referred to
by Plato when he describes the happy life.

For the many, whose souls

Plato says are dominated by the appetitive urges, moderation (sophrosyne) is the principal virtue to be attained in pursuit of happiness.
One

cannot

become

happy

if

one

is

enslaved

by

the

uncritical,

passionate part of the soul, i.e., if one becomes a tyrant.
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It

is, perhaps,

somewhat difficult to appreciate the prom

inence that Plato gives the virtue of sophrosyne in his investigation
of welfare.

A temperate life is not, after all, necessarily a good

one.

obviously

thought

that true happiness

the

of

individual

Plato

realized

in

philosopher.

soul

Such

an

the

individual,

whom he

Plato

argues,

could

only be

describes
possesses

as a
the

qualities of soul in the proper proportion— the rational part of the
soul dominates the appetites, with spirit serving as its guardian.
Plato

also argues

that very

few true philosophers will likely be

generated in society.

This leads one to conclude that Plato did not

think

individuals

that very many
The

life

lies

in society could ever be happy.

key to understanding Plato's description of the happy
in understanding his theory of participation in virtue.

From Plato's theory of Forms we know that the soul does not possess
virtue itself; rather, if attuned properly to the intelligibles the
soul partakes of the qualities of virtue itself.

Knowledge for Plato

is a type of participation in the type of reality that he describes
as being "beyond being."

These "things that are" (ta onta)— intel

ligible virtues--are the causes of the qualities of the things that
"come into and go out of being."
soul

Plato understands man to have a

that is capable of following an upward path that leads to a

sublime level of participation in virtue.

This is what he means when

he describes philosophy as being the habit of practicing death, which
he does

58
in the Phaedo.

Not

all

souls will participate in the

^Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 50.
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qualities of virtue itself in the same degree.
vidual

spoudaious, will

not veer

The serious indi

from the upward path, and will,

therefore partake more fully of the virtues than the many will.

The

average man would not be temperamentally suited, Plato thought, for
the life of philosophy.

Although the average man could not volun

tarily do evil or seek anything other than happiness, he would not
likely possess the seriousness of the desire to know things as they
are to attain true knowledge of intelligible virtues.
would

never

likely

attain

retically attainable,

the

level of happiness

Thus the many
that

is theo

according to Plato's system, by philosophers.

This is not to say that the many are incapable of happiness.
Should they master their passions and thereby attain moderation, the
many will be happy.

By being happy Plato suggests not that the many

are happy, but, rather, that they partake of happiness to the extent
commensurate with their powers of intellection.
It is important to realize that by the many Plato referred to
nearly everyone.
could

not

Plato's

be

The

ideal

state,

expected to produce

observation that

proportions— that

the

as described

in the Republic,

great numbers

of philosophers.

souls

of men are made

in different

some individuals do not, by temperament, possess

the seriousness to fully cultivate reason--led him to conclude that
happiness

for the many

Happiness

for

the

many,

is

different

endowed

as

from happiness
they

for the

few.

are with a surplus

of

appetite, would arise principally from the mastery of the tyrannical
self, and, thus, the attainment of sophrosyne.
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According to Plato's epistemology moderation is, like other
intelligible

virtues,

undefinable

in

the

strictest

sense.

Since

moderation can be counted in Plato's system among the things that
are, ta onta, it is not a concept that is sensibly demonstrable— it
exists in the region of things that are beyond being and, thus, is
known only to the soul.
virtues,

one can partake of moderation and even ultimately possess

knowledge of it.
virtue

As is the case with the other particular

defines

according

to

Because moderation is a virtue, however,
human

Plato's

existence;

the

epistemology,

human
to

mind

define

Voegelin's interpretation of intelligible phenomena:

is

it qua

powerless,

it.

Recalling

Forms cannot be

held as objects of consciousness.
That moderation itself is an intelligible, and, thus, is not
easily known is the subject of the dialogue Charmides.

In the usual

dialectical fashion this dialogue centers around a structured series
of hypotheses,

refutations,

and

reformulations

of hypotheses that

lead to the aporetic stage of awareness on behalf of the participants
of their lack of knowledge on the subject of sophrosyne.

The first

approximation of moderation is uttered by the youth Charmides, who
has been extolled to Socrates as being the most moderate youth in
Athens.
ness."

Charmides
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defines moderation as being

"a kind of quiet-

Plato writes:

to

Plato,

"Charmides," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 105.
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...he said that he thought temperance was doing all things
orderly and quietly— for example, walking in the streets, and
talking, and indeed doing everything in that way.
This opinion is quickly abandoned in favor of the notion that modera
tion is the same thing as modesty.

This definition is soon replaced

with the idea that moderation is defined as doing one's own business.
This definition is agreed to be unsatisfactory and is replaced with
the notion that moderation is the science of self-knowledge, arising
from the twin Delphic commands "Know thyself," and "Be temperate."
Ultimately, the group rejects the idea of defining moderation as, in
effect, the science of science itself, or the knowledge of knowledge
itself, which is what the last definition implies.

The dialogue ends

on an aporetic note.
By whittling away from the notion of moderation those things
that can be agreed that it is not, Plato undoubtedly moved closer to
understanding the truth about this concept.

As a result he freely

uses the term moderation to describe a part of the virtuous behavior
that corresponds with the happy life.

He has arrived at the point of

knowledge of what moderation is like, without actually being able to
define

it.

He recognizes it as some kind of good, and, thus, as

something associated with happiness.

In the Republic Plato uses this

knowledge of qualities of moderation when describing the well-ordered
soul, the educational process

(paideia) that produces well-ordered

souls, and the constitution of the ideal state which is composed of
citizens with well-ordered souls.

60

Ibid.
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In Book III of the Republic Plato discusses the educational
needs of youngsters, claiming that they include the need for modera
tion.

Describing this moderation Plato

says

"the most important

elements of moderation for the multitude" are: "being obedient to the
rulers, and being themselves rulers of the pleasures of drink, sex,
and eating...
In

Book

IV Plato

continues

his

discussion of moderation,

claiming through Socrates that it "is surely a certain kind of order
and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires..."

62

With

respect to the constitution of the ideal city Plato reasons that "any
city ought to be designated stronger than pleasures,
itself."

63

Moreover,

all

its

ought to behave moderately.

desires, and

citizens— rulers as well as ruled—
Moderation, he concludes,

is "like a

kind of harmony,"
...[b]ecause it's unlike courage and wisdom, each of which
resides in a part, the one making the city wise and the other
courageous.
Moderation doesn't work that way, hut actually
stretches throughout the whole, from top to bottom of the
entire scale, making the weaker, the stronger and those in
the middle— whether you wish to view them as such in terms of
prudence, or, if you wish, in terms of strength, or multi
tude, money or anything else whatsoever of the sort— sing the
same chant together.
So we would quite rightly claim that
this unanimity is moderation, an accord of worse and better,
according^Jjo nature, as to which must rule in the city and in
each one.

^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 67.
62Ibid., p. 109.
63Ibid., p. 110.
64TK.
j
Ibid.
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Moderation is required of the citizens of a polis if the polis is to
be expected to operate smoothly in its economic and political under
takings .
Plato

discusses

the virtue of the temperate life over the

intemperate life in the Gorgias.

In this dialogue Socrates questions

Callicles on the matter of pleasure.
says,

The life of pleasure, Callicles

requires the fullest influx of experiences and sensations.

Callicles

thus

other hand,

claims

possible evils.
to master

champions

66

the

intemperate

intemperance

to be

life.

65

Socrates,

on the

among the greatest

of all

He associates intemperance with tyranny.

Failure

the erotic yearning of the passions for the objects of

sensation results in the generation

of the tyrannical soul, which,

Socrates says, "indulges in the greatest injustice and yet contrives
to escape admonition, correction, or punishment..."
Callicles,
hedonist.

in

the

Gorgias,exemplifies

67
the life

of

the

Having already reduced virtue and happiness to the status

of what is pleasurable and agreeable, Callicles argues that knowledge
is cultivated by indulging to the fullest extent in the appetites.
How else could one come to judge which are pleasant from those that
are

miserable?

Plato

Callicles with the life

compares

the intemperate

life extolled

of moderation in the analogy of the jars.

by
He

writes:

^Plato,

"Gorgias,"

66Ibid., p. 263.
67Ibid., p. 262.

in The

Collected

Dialogues, p.

274.
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SOCRATES: Come then, let me offer you another image from
the same school as the last. Consider whether you would say
this of each type of life, the temperate and the undis
ciplined. Imagine that each of the two men has several jars,
in the one case in sound condition and filled, one with wine,
another with honey, another with milk, and many others with a
variety of liquids, but that the sources of these liquids are
scanty and hard to come by, procured only with much hard
labor.
Imagine then that the one after filling his vessels
does not trouble himself to draw in further supplies but as
far as the jars are concerned is free from worry; in the case
of the other man the sources, as in the first instance are
procurable but difficult to come by, but his vessels are
perforated and unsound and he is ever compelled to spend day
and night in replenishing them, if he is not to suffer the
greatest agony.
If this is the character of each of the
lives, do you still insist that the lifgoof the uncontrolled
man is happier than that of the orderly?
Of course, Socrates' interlocutor rejects the point of the analogy.
Plato, however, in a rare moment of non-dialectical expression, has
Socrates affirm the virtue of the temperate life in the following
statement:
This then is the position I take, and I affirm it to be
true, and if it is true, then the man who wishes to be happy
must, it seems, pursue and practice temperance, and each of
us must flee from indiscipline with all the speed in his
power and contrive, preferably to have no need of being
disciplined, but if he or any of his friends, whether
individual or city, has need of it, then he must suffer
punishment and be disciplined, if he is to be happy. This I
consider to be the mark to which a man should look throughout
his life, and all his own endeavors and those of his city he
should devote to the single purpose of so acting that justice
and temperance shall dwell in him who is to be truly blessed.
He should not suffer his appetites to be undisciplined and
endeavor to satisfy them by leading the life of a brigand— a
mischief without end. For such a man could be dear neither
to any other man nor to God, since he is incapable of fellow
ship, and where there is no fellowship, friendship cannot be.
Wise men, Callicles, say that the heavens and the earth, gods
and men, are bound together by fellowship and friendship, and

68Ibid., p. 275.

order and temperagjje and justice, my friend, not the world of
disorder or riot.
Temperance is fundamental for the happy life, both for the
individual

and

for the

city,

according to Plato's analysis.

The

happy man is the man who has no evil in his soul; he is the man who
shuns

tyranny.

Temperance

self-indulgence.

is not,

Self-control

however,

without

the

soul, Plato says, is itself intemperate.

simply the denial of
proper balance

of the

In the Phaedo Plato writes:

What about temperate people? Is it not, in just the same
way, a sort of self-indulgence that makes them self-con
trolled?
We may say that this is impossible, but all the
same those who practice this simple form of self-control are
in much the same case as that which I have just described.
They are afraid of losing other pleasures which they desire,
so they refrain from one kind because they cannot resist the
other. Although they define self-indulgence as the condition
of being ruled by pleasure, it is really because they cannot
resist some pleasures that they succeed in resisting others,
which amounts to what I said just now--±hat they control
themselves, in a sense, by self-indulgence.
Moderation, Plato implies, must not arise for reasons other than from
the individual's mastery over the dark steed of appetite.

Happiness

cannot be attained by the tyrannical mind.
Moderation,

then,

is the organizing principle for both the

individual soul and for the state.

The many and the philosophers

must both practice the temperate life in order that happiness may be
attained.

For the many, however, it becomes the dominant psychologi

cal characteristic of the happy life, according to Plato.
are

The many

incapable by means of temperament of cultivating the rational

69

Ibid., p. 290.

^Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 51.
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part of the soul to the point of gaining true insight into the nature
of the Good.

For Plato, happiness for the many, which is to say

happiness for the state as a whole, is realized only when the tyran
nical,

appetitive

self

is yoked by reason,

law, or belief in the

virtue of self-control.
In summary, Plato's description of the happy lifeis the same
thing

as

the

virtuous

life.

Philosophers— those who

choose the

upward path to knowledge— are the happiest people of all.
their fortune to possess properly well-ordered souls.

It is

In addition,

they lead contemplative lives characterized by the pursuit of true
knowledge of intelligible virtue.
guardians of the ideal state.

Next in happiness are the spirited

They cultivate honorable obedience to

the point that it checks the appetites and serves reason by upholding
the

laws.

The

attain happiness.
compels

one to

many,

if they possess

temperate

characters,

also

Although they do not experience the periagoge that
follow the upward path, they achieve happiness by

driving from their being all traces of tyrannical self-indulgence in
the passions.

The least happy citizens of the polis are the tyrants.

The life of tyranny, in which reason and courage are made subservient
to the appetitive spirit, is one of aggression, distrust, and ulti
mate misery, in Plato's opinion.

Describing the existence of tyrants

Plato writes:
"Therefore, those who have no experience ofprudence and
virtue but are always living with feasts and the like are, it
seems, brought down and then back again to the middle and
throughout life wander in this way; but, since they don't go
beyond this, they don't look upward toward what is truly
above, nor are they ever brought to it; and they aren't
filled with what really is, nor do they taste of a pleasure
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that is sure and pure; rather, after the fashion of cattle,
always looking down and with their heads bent to earth and
table, they feed, fattening themselves, and copulating; and,
for the sake of getting more of these things, they kick and
butt with horns and hoofs of iron, killing each other because
they are insatiable; for they are not filling the part of
themselves that is, or can contain anything, with things that
are."
Tyrants sustain themselves on only the things that come into and go
out of being;

they never attain knowledge of the things that are.

Arguing that the tyrant stands last in a long line of corruption of
the soul from its pure state in the aristocratic man, Plato claims
that the tyrant is nine times less happy than the true aristocrat.

V.

72

The Psychological Division of Labor
The happy life according to Plato's inquiry into its nature

is one that is associated with knowledge, courage, and temperance.
It partakes of the particular virtues, which Plato describes as being
qualities

of

happiness

fostered

in an

justice,

wisdom,

or

economy by

goodness

itself.

This

a division of labor.

courage,and temperance are,

happy

life

is

The virtues

of

in Plato's opinion,

best cultivated in an economy in which one man works at one job for
which he is ideally suited
nizes

that the

temperamentally.Moreover, Plato recog

division affords

society more

economic

output,

although this consideration is of secondary importance.
The division of labor is discussed in the Republic.

In Book

II, in which Plato discusses the origins of the city, Socrates and

7^Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 268.
72Ibid., p. 270.
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Plato's brother Adeimantus discuss the efficacy of a specialization
of labor.

Plato writes:

[Socrates]
"Now wait," I said. "How will the city be suf
ficient to provide for this much? Won't one man be a farmer,
another the housebuilder, and still another, a weaver? Or
shall we add to it a shoemaker or some other man who cares
for what has to do with the body?"
[Adeimantus]

"Certainly."

"The city of utmost necessity would be made of four or
five men."
"It looks like it."
"Now, what about this? Must each one of them put his
work at the disposition of all in common— for example, must
the farmer, one man, provide food for four and spend four
times as much time and labor in the provision of food and
then give it in common to the others; or must he neglect them
and produce a fourth part of the food in a fourth part of the
time and use the other three parts for the provision of a
house, clothing, and shoes, not taking the trouble to share
in common with others, but minding his own business for
himself?"
And Adeimantus said,
easier than the latter."

"Perhaps, Socrates, the former is

"It wouldn't be strange, by Zeus," I said.
"I myself
also had the thought when you spoke that, in the first place,
each of us is naturally not quite like anyone else, but
rather differs in his nature; different men are apt for the
accomplishment of different jobs.
Isn't that your opinion?"
"It is."
"And, what about this? Who would do a finer job, one man
practicing many arts, or one man one art?"
"One man, one art," he said.
"And, further, it's also plain, I support, that if a man
lets the crucial moment in any work pass, it is completely
ruined."

"Yes, it is plain."
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"I don't suppose the thing done is willing to await the
leisure of the man who does it; but it's necessary for the
man who does it to follow close upon the thing done, and not
as a spare-time occupation."
"It is necessary."
"So, on this basis each thing becomes more plentiful,
finer, and easier, when one man, exempt from other tasks,
does one thing according to nature and
at the crucial
moment."
"That's entirely certain."73
In the passage above Plato sets forth his version of the economic
division of labor.

It is clear that Plato understood the increase in

productive efficiency that accompanies specialization.
level

of

thinking

Adeimantus.

that

Socrates

discussesthe

It is on this

division

with

Yet, productive efficiency is not the primary reason for

the introduction of specialization into the discussion of the consti
tution of the ideal state.
In his discussion of the correct education for the youth of
the ideal state— that which promotes happiness through the develop
ment

of well-ordered

labor.

In

educators

this

souls— Plato

context he

to watch

nature of a child.

carefully

claims

again mentions
that

it is necessary

for the glimpses

Once observed the educator

youth's education into a course that prepares
field that suits that nature.

the division of

one gets

for the
into the

canthen channel

him for work in the

From Book IV:

[Socrates] "And still slighter than that," I said, "is what
we mentioned earlier when we said that if a child of slight
ability were born of the guardians, he would have to be sent

73Ibid., pp. 46-47.

the
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off to the others, and if a serious one were born of the
others, he would have to be sent off to the guardians. This
was intended to make plain that each of the other citizens
too must be brought to that which naturally suits him— one
man, one job— so that each man, practicing his own, which is
one, will not become many but one; and thus, you see, the
whole city will naturally grow to be one and not many."
In this passage one sees the intent of Plato's call for specializa
tion— the

city will

grow to be

one and not many.

important concept in Plato's theory of welfare.

Harmony is an

At the level of the

individual the soul should be harmonious— it should have the proper
balance, and its parts should be present in the proper proportions.
The state, which is, for Plato, man writ large, should also exhibit
harmony.

The functions of society should have the proper balance,

and the classes should be present in proportions that follow those of
the

soul

of

the

individual— the

few,

i.e.,

the philosophers

and

guardians, should rule the many in the same manner and proportions as
reason and spirit in the soul are masters over the passions.

Plato's

division of labor, by fostering a psychological sense of well-being
in the individual, results in the development of a smoothly operating
polis.

As a bonus specialization increases the quality and quantity

of market output in the well-ordered polis.
Historians

of

economic

thought

who

have

discounted

the

importance of Plato's theory of labor specialization do him a dis
service.

Clearly Plato understood the advantages of a division as

those advantages are described by Smith at a much later date.

7AIbid., p. 101.

He
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even

understood the

level

could

further

fact that specialization on an
increase

international

the quality and quantity of output.

Plato did not, however, put much stock in such advantages as these.
One must recall that happiness for Plato does not revolve around the
acquisition of things— at least, not the things that come into and go
out of being.

Rather, happiness, as understood by Plato, and this

understanding is that which develops after careful analysis— not from
mere opinion— comes to those who possess wisdom, courage, and temper
ance.

The economy does not generate commodities and services for the

satisfaction of appetitive urges, according to Plato's theory of the
ideal state.

Instead, it produces such commodities and services that

afford the citizens of the polis with a desirable level of material
affluence.

This level of production is neither so small that it does

not afford men the time to engage in the contemplation of the upward
path, nor so large so as to coerce men to devote their full atten
tions to the simple problems of management of the things that come
into and go out of being.
Plato's division of labor is based upon the idea that happi
ness

is

not

pleasure

hut

virtue.

Plato's

support

for

labor

specialization is consistent with his observation that the natures of
men are different— some being high-minded and capable of following
the upward path,
pursuit

and some more

of appetitive

endeavors.

ideally

suited

Plato's

for the temperate

division is scientific.

Plato understood science to be the exercise of reason; his division
of

labor

is the product of the exercise of reason concerning the

possible means of achieving happiness.

It differs from the modern
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conceptions of labor specialization principally on the point that it
obtains

from the hypothesis that man partakes of happiness rather

than defines it.

Happiness exists for Plato as an intelligible.

For

him, man is not, as the sophists argued, the measure of all things.
Ultimate
serves

virtue

as

stranger,

itself--the

the measure

Good--is

of all

things.

the

universal

In the Laws

speaking the opinion of Plato, says:

concept

that

the Athenian

"Now it is God who

is, for you and me, of a truth the 'measure of all things,' much more
truly

than,

as

they say,

'man.'"

75

Given this understanding of

ontology it is entirely logically consistent for Plato to admire the
specialization of labor for its qualities for producing psychological
and political harmony, rather than for its ability to afford society
more of the things that it must guard against acquiring in excess in
the first place.

VI.

The Moderate Economy
A division of labor is but one prescription for an economy

that Plato calls for in his design of the ideal state— the state that
maximizes happiness.

In the two dialogues devoted to a description

of the good state, i.e., the Republic and Laws, one sees an impres
sive group of prescriptions for the economy that arises from Plato's
theory of happiness.

These economic reforms are well known, but have

typically been overlooked as relatively unimportant value judgments
of an ancient philosopher.
economics.

In fact, they constitute Plato's welfare

After systematically analyzing the nature of virtue in

^Plato, "Laws," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 1301.
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the early and middle dialogues, and after having designed an educa
tional process whereby virtue can be attained, Plato describes in
some detail the characteristics of an economy that would promote the
virtuous life, which Plato understood to be synonymous with happi
ness.

These prescriptions

make

up the basis

for an analysis

of

welfare economics that deserves a position among early theories of
welfare.

That they are subjectively derived, we have seen, is insuf

ficient reason to exclude them from the body of thought on economic
welfare.
Plato's economic prescriptions are derived from his observa
tions

concerning the historical

Hellenic economy.

generation and development of the

Plato was a keen critic of the profligacy that he

witnessed in Athens.

In addition he was armed with the unpleasant

memories he carried of the economy of Syracuse, with which he had
become

familiar while

serving as

an advisor

to Dionysius.

Plato

reacted against what he saw as an atmosphere of tyranny— enslavement
to the passions.

His

economic prescriptions

serve

to repair the

Greek economy by yoking it under the rule of justice and moderation
and rejecting the licentious rule of self-tyranny.
Plato's theory of the origin of the economy is found in Book
II of the Republic.

Searching for knowledge of justice Plato reasons

that if it is detectable in the individual it must be magnified in
the city.

This leads to a dialectical discussion of the historical

beginnings

of an economy.

According

to Plato,

the

city has

its

origin in men's realization that they lack economic self-sufficiency.
That is, one man cannot easily secure the things that can be produced
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in a small economy benefiting from a division of labor.
says:

"a city, as I believe,

Socrates

comes into being because each of us

isn't self-sufficient but is in need of much."

76

Labor specializa

tion afforded ancient man the economic means of securing a standard
of living conducive to the happy life.

In attributing the origin of

the economy to a human need to specialize the tasks of labor, instead
of relating it to some notion of kindred spirits, people, or gens,
Plato

displays

a

more

economic

interpretation

of

history

than

Aristotle's.
A simple, good city arises when a few people specialize and
exchange

the

commodities

and

services resulting from their labor.

The city in which Plato lived, however, was more than this.

Economic

growth in Athens did not stop with the specialization of labor on a
small scale.

Athens,

had grown,

by

resembling

the

describes

the

development

along with its port Piraeus, flourished, and

the time of Plato,
city

of

sows

to a size and state of affairs

mentioned

in

the

Republic.

Plato

development

of

such a city in order

to trace

the

injustice,

as

well

society.

The

of

as

justice,

in

luxurious city is condemned by Plato as being "feverish."77

In the

city of sows, as Plato describes it,
Nothing stands in the way.
For these things, as it seems,
won't satisfy some, or this way of life, but couches, tables,
and other furniture will be added, and, of course, relishes,
perfume, incense, courtesans and cakes— all sorts of all of

7^Plato,

"Republic,"

77Ibid., p. 49.

in The Republic of Plato, pp. 45-46.
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them. And, in particular, we can't still postulate the mere
necessities we were talking about at first— houses, clothes,
and shoes; but painting and embroidery must also be set in
motion; and gold, ivory, and everything of the sort must be
obtained. Isn't this so?
"Yes," he said.
"Then the city must be made bigger again. This healthy
one isn't adequate any more, but must already be gorged with
a bulky mass of things, which are not in cities because of
necessity— all the hunters and imitators, many concerned with
figures and colors, many with music; and poets and their
helpers, rhapsodes, actors, choral dancers, contractors, and
craftsmen of all sorts of equipment; for feminine adornment
as well as other things.
And so we'll need more servants
too. Or doesn't it seem there will be need of teachers, wet
nurses, governesses, beauticians, barbers, and, further,
relish-makers and cooks? And, what's more, we're in addition
going to need swineherds. This animal wasn't in our earlier
city— there was no need— but in this one there will be need
of it in addition.
And there'll also be need of very many
other fatted beasts if someone will eat them, won't there?"
"Of course."
"Won't we be in much greater need of doctors if we follow
this way of life rather than the earlier one?"
"Much greater."
"And the land, of course, which was then sufficient for
feeding the men who were then, will not be small although it
was sufficient. Or how should we say it?"
"Like that," he said.
"Then must we cut off a piece of our neighbors' land, if
we are going to have sufficient for pasture and tillage, and
they in turn from ours, if they let themselves go to the
unlimited acquisition of money, overstepping the boundary of
the necessary?"
"Quite necessarily, Socrates," he said.

^®Ibid., pp. 49-50.
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In this way Plato

describes

the

city in which he finds himself.

Although Plato did not think Athens to be as contemptible as Syracuse
and other Italian cities, it is clear that he did not think it to be
the ideal, just city either.

The economic and social reforms that

are defended in the Republic and Laws are intended to repair Athens
to a

state

that

is

consistent with the idea of virtue that runs

through all the dialogues.
Plato attributes the generation of a luxurious city to the
degeneration of the souls of its inhabitants.

In Books VIII and IX

of the Republic Plato traces this psychological deterioration.
the

simple

city— that which

is

capable

of affording men a happy

life— the inhabitants are true aristocrats (aristoi).
a rule of the best,

i.e.,

posed," Plato writes,

In

aristocracy, prevails.

"is hard to be moved."

In such cities

"A city so com

According to Plato,

however, even the best conceived cities are not static.

One expects,

given Plato’s ontology, that regimes, like people, come into and go
out of being.

This expectation is not ill-founded— Plato espouses a

theory of flux that is remarkably similar to the modern entropy law
of thermodynamics.

He writes:

"But, since for everything that has

come into being there is decay, not even a composition such as this
will remain for all times; it will be dissolved."

Over time human

nature turns the souls of the aristoi away from the path of excel
lence (arete), and the aristocrats divide into factions against each
other.79

79Ibid., p. 223.
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The

existence of

factions

development of timocratic man.
excellence.

in the

city gives

rise to the

The timocrat prefers honor to true

The economic institutions that support timocracy are the

development of money-making as a pursuit in itself, and the private
possession

of

land

and

other

private

riches.

The psychological

condition that spawns the timocrat is an excess of spiritedness over
the reasoning part of the soul.
of virtue

Because such a soul cannot partake

through philosophy it inevitably lapses into pursuit of

false virtues— chiefly money-making.
Like aristocracy,

80

timocracy is unstable.

The psychological

imbalance of the inhabitants of the timarchy which resulted in the
paying

of

"fierce

honor

to

gold

and

silver,"

81

results

development of overweaning stinginess among the timocrats.

in

the

The love

of victories and of honors that accompanies an excess of spiritedness
gives rise to the pursuit of excessive private fortune.

The result

ing excess of stinginess and money-making creates the oligarchic man
and the corresponding oligarchic city.

The oligarch, who has lost

sight of honor and the spiritedness of the timocrat, "turns greedily
to money-making."

"There is," Plato writes, "no other transformation

so quick and so sure from a young man who loves honor to one who
loves money."

82

80Ibid., p. 228.
81Ibid., p. 225.
82Ibid., p. 231.
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Oligarchy
theory.

dissolves

into

democracy,

according

to

Plato's

Noting that it is "not possible to honor wealth in a city

and at the

same time

adequately to maintain moderation among the

citizens," Plato argues that temperance is lost among the inhabitants
of the oligarchic city.
Platonic

formulation

tiousness.
of

this

chance.

83

is

of

freedom,

Happiness

Democracy in its

characterized by the prevalence of licen

In a democracy one

sort

regimes."

This yields democracy.

in

a
a

is free to do as onepleases.
democracy "contains
democracy, however,

all
is

a

Because

species of
matter of

Moreover, without moderation checking the appetitive urges,

the soul of the democratic man is likely to develop into that of the
tyrant.
Tyranny is the ultimate state of the decaying polis.

It is

characterized by fear and desire— people are given over to fits of
desire, and they fear that others might stand in the way of their
securing the objects of their desire.
degenerated
fairest

into tyranny.

citizen,

Socrates,

How else
to

Plato thought Athens to have
could a

death?

regime have put

Plato's

economic change constitute a response to tyranny.

prescriptions

its
for

They are, more

over, consistent with his theory of the soul in flux— the hypothesis
that argues that the soul, if diverted from reason, degenerates from
excellence to tyranny and licentiousness.
Plato reasoned that human nature is such
easily diverted from the true path to happiness.

83Ibid., p. 235.

that the soul is
In Book II of the

194
Republic Plato's brother, Adeimantus, quotes Hesiod in describing the
two paths that the soul can follow when seeking the things that it
desires.

Plato writes:

Vice in abundance is easy to choose,
The road is smooth and it lies very near,
While the gods have set sweat before vig^ue,
And it is a long road, rough and steep.
The self-tyranny that is spawned when the soul follows the smooth
road is not,

in Plato's opinion, consistent with the attainment of

happiness.
Plato's welfare economics seeks to combat the degeneration of
the polis into a state of tyranny.

His prescriptions designed to

prevent this generation, however, can be divided into two categories:
(1) those designed to create the best state, and (2) those that, in
view of the improbability of society choosing the best state, are
intended

to

bring

about

the

creation

of

a

"second-best"

state.

Plato's discussion of the best state can be found principally in the
Republic.

In this discussion Plato associates the regime capable of

maximizing happiness with a caste system in which the ruling classes
of society are propertyless.

The theory of the state found in the

Republic is based upon the principle of harmony.
each thing

in a system,

Harmony occurs when

in this case individuals within a polis,

displays natural, well-ordered relationships with the other things of
the system.

Strings on a lyre, tuned to the harmonious intervals of

the Western scale, exhibit this relationship.

^Ibid., p. 41.

For the Greeks, and
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for Plato in particular,
all

elements

of

the

harmony applied not only to music, but to

cosmos.

Plato's

science

presupposes

the

existence of an underlying logos, i.e., an order to things, within
the cosmos.
with

this

When individuals achieve an existence that is consistent
logos

harmonious.

the

relationship

between man and the

Plato understands man's

proper

cosmos

is

relationship with the

cosmos to center around his attainment of knowledge of the things
that are, and, thus, the virtuous life.
Because man,

in Plato's

understanding of things, ought to

attune himself to ta onta psychologically— the soul is the part of
being that perceives the intelligibles— Plato's theory of the best
state requires an ordering of the city in a fashion that is patterned
after

the

classes.

well-ordered

soul.

Society

is to be

divided up

into

These classes are compared so as to correspond to human

nature, and, in particular,

to the different degrees to which the

souls of the inhabitants of the polis are capable of partaking of
virtue.
point

Individuals
of

the

philosophers.

capable

of

following

the upward path to the

establishment

of

episteme

make

Philosophers

in

the

best

up

state

one

class— the

would

lead

a

contemplative life that prepares them to recollect a knowledge of the
things that are,

i.e., the virtues.

The rulers of the happy state

would be chosen from this class of individuals.
only those who partake

of

reason and

Plato reasoned that

follow the upward path are

capable of resisting corruption, and, therefore, promoting justice.
Individuals whose souls are characterized by an abundance of
spiritedness, who place honor above all else, it is imagined would
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serve as the auxiliaries of the rulers.
stitute

the

second

class

of

citizens

These guardians would con
of the happy state.

Their

function, like that of the spirited part of the soul itself, would be
to serve reason, in the form of the philosophers, by protecting the
state.

Another important role of the auxiliaries would be to uphold

the laws, thereby checking the licentiousness of the many.
The first two classes are intended by Plato to live a com
munistic

life.

Moreover, women,
common.

In the best
children,

state property would cease to exist.

and their education would also exist in

Moved, i.e., erotically drawn to, reason, the inhabitants of

the happiest state would not be much interested in the practice of
labelling as "mine" the things that come into and go out of being.
Property held in common by these classes is limited in the
best state to that which is necessary to provide the guardians with
an adequate level of material well-being.

This level of affluence is

by design neither insufficient to afford guardians the opportunity to
spend time in pursuit of virtue instead of subsistence, nor so great
as

to

awaken the

appetitive part of the

guardian's

soul to the

pleasures of money-making and fortune-building.
Plato summarizes the lifestyle of the guardians in his intro
duction to Book VIII of the Republic. He writes:
"All right. This much has been agreed, Glaucon: for a
city that is going to be governed on a high level, women must
be in common, children and their entire education must be in
common, and similarly the practices in war and peace must be
in common, and their kings must be those among them who have
proved best in philosophy and with respect to war."
"Yes," he said, "it has been agreed."
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"Furthermore, we also accept that when the rulers are
once established, they must take the lead and settle the
soldiers in houses— such as we spoke of before-that have
nothing private for anyone but are common for all. And, in
addition to such houses, as to possessions, if you remember,
we presumably came to an agreement about what sort they are
to have."
"Yes, I do remember," he said, "that we supposed that no
one must possess any of the things the others nowadays have;
but that like champions of war and guardians, they will
receive a wage from the others consisting of the bare sub
sistence required for their guarding, and for this wage they
must take care of themselves and the rest of the city."
The life of the many is not mentioned much in Plato's dis
cussion of the best state.

Presumably, in the happiest regime they

would cease to exist— they would be compelled by reason to possess
well-ordered souls, and would voluntarily take up philosophy as the
helmsman of their lives.
the many must
souls.

Plato does mention, time and again, that

accept moderation as the virtue most dear to their

The many, incapable as they are of acquiring true knowledge

of virtue, must seek temperance, on basis of faith (pistis), as the
avenue to happiness.
Plato

concedes

in

the

Laws,

if

the

Athenian

stranger's

utterings may be interpreted as the opinions of Plato, that the best
regime does not likely exist anywhere.

Moreover, it is unlikely that

such a regime would be spontaneously generated in the future.
propertyless, contemplative

life

of the true philosophers

The

is de

scribed in the Laws as probably only attainable by the gods or their

85Ibid., p. 221.
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children.

86

would be,

To anticipate the actual abolition of private property

in Plato's words,

"too demanding for the birth, nurture,

and education" of the inhabitants of a city.
It
of

the

is doubtless

naive

sort

that Plato was

that

we

87

an idealist, although not

envision today.

For Plato,

idealism

corresponded to an unshakable belief in the existence of virtues qua
Forms.

Plato's

idealism— his

preoccupation

with

the

attempt

to

acquire knowledge of eidoi— did not render him a less than capable
student of human nature.
him.

Plato paid attention to the world around

He understood well the fact that people strive to be happy.

thought, however,
peramental

motivated

by

through
the

pleasure, which,
desire.

some people not serious enough, in terms of tem

endowment,

discoverable

Plato,

to

recognize

hedonism.

opinion

in turn,
therefore,

that

He

that happiness
recognized

happiness

state

is

itself was

that
the

not

the many are
same

thing

as

they identified with the satisfaction of
designed

a constitution for a "second-

best" state, which can be found in the Laws.
"second-best"

He

Plato's theory of the

attempts to theorize the nature of the regime

that would best promote happiness in a society in which the many
would never become philosophers.
Plato's "second-best" regime exists in the form of the con
stitution of a planned city on the island of Crete— Magnesia.

The

design of this city is the focus of the Laws, which is a dialogue

8^Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 126.
87Ibid., p. 127.
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cast in the form of a discussion between three gentlemen— a Spartan,
a Cretan,

and an Athenian (not Socrates).

mitted in Magnesia.
regulated.
exchange,
rigorous

The accumulation of property, would be strictly

Moreover,
and
plan

the

consumption
for

Property would be per

laws
of

education

that

property

regulate
would

( paideia) and

be

the

production,

reinforced

censorship

by a

that would

render moderation and justice desirable to the many.
In the "second-best" city property would exist in the form of
lots to be drawn-up by the state.

Lots would be distributed to the

citizens of the city by its founders.
size,

The lots would not be equal in

but would vary in accordance with the principle of propor

tionate inequality.

According to this principle the inhabitants of a

city deserve unequal distributions of property, because of the tem
peramental
Plato

differences that exist in their natures.

reasons,

individuals'

vary

souls.

in

accordance

with

the

Temperaments,

composition

of

the

Because of this an egalitarian distribution of

lots would be inconsistent with the promotion of happiness— it would
not be harmonious.
The number of lots to be created for the Magnesian population
would be 5,040.
than is

common today.

households
people.

This implies that the city would be somewhat smaller

would

Guthrie

correspond

reports that a community of 5,040

to a population of 40,000

to 48,000

In addition the city would be inhabited by about 7,000 to
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oo

8,000

metics--resident

number of lots being

aliens--and
fixed,

Plato

perhaps

30,000

slaves.

The

envisioned a stable population

corresponding to that reported by Guthrie.

Presumably, a city of the

size envisioned by Plato would be large enough to produce subsistence
for a community of people living happily, without being so large as
to be luxurious.

In addition, taxation in a polis comprising 5,040

households would be convenient, Plato argued,
divisible evenly by the numbers one through ten.

since that number is
89

Accumulation of wealth in Magnesia would be strictly limited
by the authorities.

The permitted spread of wealth would be no more

than fourfold— the most valuable estate would be no more than four
times more valuable than the least valuable lot.

In this way Plato

intended to allow for differences in wealth that suit the tempera
ments of the Magnesians, while preventing an accumulation of wealth
that

would

encourage

the

timocratic

within the souls of the citizens.
that would

development

limit the accumulation of wealth is that

property

accumulated

registered with the authorities,
not

money-loving

One measure described by Plato

buying estates would be punishable by law.
All

of

on

an

selling and

90
estate

would

have

according to Plato's plan.

to be
This

only facilitates assessment of property value for purposes of

taxation, but also permits close monitoring of estates in order to

W. K. C. Guthrie, The Later Plato and the Academy, Vol. V
of A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge:
Cambridge University
Press, 1978), p. 341.
**9Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 124.

90Ibid., p. 132.
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prevent an excessive

accumulation of wealth.

91

These limitations

correspond with Plato’s belief that happiness and material wealth are
not usually found together.

He writes:

I at least would never agree with them that a rich man
becomes truly happy, if he is not also good.
But it is
impossible fotg2 someone to be both unusually good and
unusually rich.
In the Republic Plato concedes the need for the existence of
money within the city.

In Book II he admits that money can serve as

a useful

store of value.

standard

and

In his discussion of the

simple city Socrates reasons with Adeimantus that
"Out of this we'll get a market and an established cur
rency as a token for exchange."
"Most certainly."
"If the farmer or any other craftsman brings what he has
produced to the market, and he doesn't arrive at the same
time as those who need what he has to exchange, will he sit
in the market idle, his craft unattended?"
"Not at all," he said.
"There are men who see this
situation and set themselves to this service; in rightly
governed cities they are usually those whose bodies are
weakest and are useless for doing any other job. They must
stay there in the market and exchange things for money with
those who need to sell something and exchangeg~ for money
again, with all those who need to buy something."
In this context money is seen as being superior to barter because it
enables craftsmen to look after their crafts, rather than remain idle
in the marketplace.

In addition,

it provides work for tradesmen—

91Ibid.
92Ibid., p. 130.
QQ

Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 48.

those who by temperament and physical composition are unsuitable for
work in the crafts.

94

One sees in Book VIII, however, that the existence of money
can serve to turn the souls of noble men away from virtue and create
within them the craving for money-making.

95

For this reason Plato

limits the use of money within the Magnesian economy.

First, there

will only be token money in circulation in Magnesia.

Plato writes

"no private person shall be allowed to possess any gold or silver,
but only coinage for day-to-day dealings which one can hardly avoid
having..."
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He continues:

For these purposes, we assert that they should possess a kind
of coin that carries value among themselves but is valueless
among other human beings.
The city itself, however, must
necessarily possess some money of the sort that is common to
the Greeks, for use by army expeditions and by travelers who
go
abroad
among
other human beings— ambassadors,
for
instance, and any other necessary messengers whom the city
must send out. For the sake of these ^ings, the city, must,
on each occasion, possess Greek money.
All privately held foreign money, such as the common Greek coinage,
is to be confiscated by the state.
In addition to limiting the circulation of currency to just
token coinage for day-to-day use, Plato would not have any craftsmen
work for money.

When craftsmen bring their products to the market

they will exchange them for money, and, in turn, exchange the money

M ibid.
95Ibid., pp. 228-233.

96
Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 211.
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for needed commodities and services.
are

permitted

to

work

for

The tradesmen of the city, who

money,

resident aliens or metics.

will

consist

of the group of

No citizens of the polis will be per

mitted to become money-changers.
Plato places a further restriction on the use of money in the
Magnesian economy.
be no

lending

Money must not be used to make money--there will

of money at interest.

It will be quite acceptable

Plato notes for borrowers in the Magnesian economy to refuse to repay
both

principal

and

interest

upon

being

charged

interest

by

a

lender.98
The citizens of the good polis, then, are to be divided into
four classes
Citizens
Metics

of propertyholders

will
and

craftsmen,

be

other
others

expected

to

visitors

in accordance with their natures.
adopt

will

as tradesmen.

agriculture

work
Neither

permitted to work at two or more jobs.
Plato notes,

requires

full-time

sistent with part-time jobs.

the

as

their trade.

marketplace— some

citizens

nor metics

trade

Exchange of com

modities and services will be regulated by Market-Wardens.
to

ensure

that

exchange

between the

citizens

visitors occurs in the manner prescribed by the law.

98Ibid., p. 129.
"ibid., p. 151.

incon

in the polis will be

regulated so that avarice is checked by virtue.

is

are

The cultivation of virtue,

effort, and is, therefore,

Retail

as

Their job

and metics

99

and

Plato

spells

VIII of the Laws.

out the laws concerning retail trade in

These laws are described as follows:

One the first day of every month the portion that is to
be sold to strangers should be brought forth by the selling
agents (either strangers or slaves, who will act for the city
dwellers). The first commodity is the twelfth-part of grain.
Each stranger should at the first market buy the grain that
he will need for the whole month, along with whatever else
goes with grain. Then on the tenth day of the month the one
party should sell, and the other buy, enough liquid goods to
last the whole month.
The third market, for livestock,
should take place on the twentieth of each month. At that
time there should be whatever selling and buying of animals
is necessary for each, as well as the sale on behalf of the
farmers of any equipment or other goods the strangers must
acquire by purchase from others (such as animal skins and all
sorts of clothing, woven goods, wool felt, and some other
such things).
But as regards retail trade in any of these things,
including barley, wheat turned into flour, and every other
sort of food, no one is ever supposed to sell or to buy from
the city dwellers or their slaves; it should be in the
strangers' marketplaces that a stranger does his selling to
craftsmen and their slaves, and performs those dealings in
wine and grain that are termed "retail trade" by most people.
Once animals have been slaughtered and cut up, the butchers
should distribute them to strangers and craftsmen, or their
domestic servants. And any stranger who wants to, can on any
day buy any sort of firewood in bulk from agents out in the
country, and then sell it himself to other strangers— in
whatever amount and whenever he wishes.
All the other sorts of goods and equipment each needs
should be brought to the common marketplace and sold in a
location for each, where the Guardians of the Laws and the
Market Regulators, along with the City Regulators, should
mark out appropriate boundaries for stalls for the goods to
be bought.
In these allotted spaces they should exchange
money for goods and goods for money, not allowing each other
to get anything without gaining something in return. He who
gives something on trust must be content whether or not he
receives the thing, since there'll no longer be a just cause
of action in such transactions.
If what's purchased or sold creates an excess or a
deficiency contrary to the law that has said there must not
be an increase or a decrease beyond a certain sum, then,
in the former case, the excess should be recorded with the
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Guardians of the Laws and, in the opposite case, the short
fall shouldbe cancelled.
The same ordinances •,concerning
registration of property apply to resident aliens.
These

laws

set strict standards for the Market-Wardens to follow.

They are designed to prevent the degenerationof the soul to a condition
that is inconsistent with happiness.
The Market-Wardens,
first
process

and
of

second

scrutiny," by
uphold

by

describes,

will

classes.They

vote

ten

come

from

are selected

candidates

from

a

the

by

a

list

of

From this group five Wardens are chosen, after "due
lot.

commercial

authorized

property

electing

suitable names.

Plato

to

Market-Wardens
and

fine

retail

citizens

are tobe given the power to

laws
and

ontheir

metics

who

own,

and

will

be

fail to observe the

market laws.
In addition to ensuring that only appropriate commodities
are

traded ateach marketdescribed by the laws, the

are

empowered to

regulate the

Market-Wardens

prices of commodities for sale.

law to be invoked here is:
The
sellerof anything whatsoever
in the
may
never mention two prices for
the things
selling, but must utter the price
simply,
doesn't
obtain this, he would act correctly
the
item away again; ajtyl, he may
not set a
lesser price on this day.

100Ibid., pp. 242-243.
101Ibid., p. 150.
102Ibid., p. 317.

marketplace
he may be
and if he
if he took
greater or

The

Prices that Plato considers to be proper are those that will give the
retailer a "well-measured gain."

103

The guardians of the city are

supposed to meet to establish in writing the "ratio of expenditure to
receipts" that provide this profit margin.
to

be

put

on

display

in

the

The recorded prices are

marketplace

and

imposed

by

the

Market-Wardens.
Plato's laws of the economy extend beyond the regulation of
the marketplace.
agricultural

In Book VIII of the Laws one finds restrictions on

production

and

resource

utilization

as

well.

In

general, these laws require that citizens of the polis not try to
produce more than is proper from an estate.
encroach on another's property.

One must not attempt to

One must not damage the water supply

and thereby render it unsuitable for use by farmers who live down
stream.

And,

importantly,

one

should not attempt to stockpile a

surplus of agricultural products over and beyond what is needed on
the estate.
The regulation of the economy that Plato envisions includes
the restriction of international trade.

Plato, through the Athenian

stranger in the Laws, advises that cities should be founded on land
that is not overly easy to cultivate.

Moreover, the location of the

city should be well away from safe harbors.

In the frame of the

Republic Plato displays his dislike of port towns when Socrates shows

his uneasiness at finding himself detained in Piraeus and outside the
walls

of Athens.

Port towns,

Plato

reckons,

are the avenues

of

introduction into a well-ordered state of strange ways and objects
and artifacts that are designed to stimulate unduly the appetitive
part of the soul.

As with domestic trade, Plato encourages modera

tion when approaching trade with foreign economies.
Plato

approves

city."

106

the

importation

Imported necessities,

used in religious ceremony.

of

"what's

however,

In the Republic

needed

from

another

do not include supplies

Nor are imports of "substances...needed

for an unnecessary purpose in any other art"'^

approved.

In any

case, retail trade between states, whose sole purpose is to increase
the wealth of the state, is never to be allowed in the well-conceived
city.
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Plato's restrictions on trade may strike some modern readers

as Draconian.

To be sure they are inconsistent with an

free-trade within the marketplace.
these

regulations

on

trade,

wealth promote true happiness.
observance

atmosphereof

Nevertheless, Plato reasonedthat

production,

and

the accumulation of

They do so by institutionalizing the

of sophrosyne, moderation,

within the economy.

It is

difficult to imagine the existence of immoderate behavior in a market
in which intemperance is made illegal.

This is the effect of the

laws concerning commerce and property found in Plato's Laws.

■^Plato,

"Republic," in The Republic of Plato,p. 47.

^^Plato,

"Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 240.
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The moderation that Plato seeks in his laws is intended to
produce happiness for the inhabitants of Magnesia by securing true
freedom for them.

Moderation ensures that the soul will not fall

under the influence of its sub-rational parts.

In Book VIII of the

Republic Plato notes that freedom to do what one pleases is the chief
characteristic of a democracy— a form of government that he identi
fies with diseased

souls.

license,

He

is

argues, however,

not

the

that this type of

freedom,

i.e.,

same thing as

true

liberty.

Liberty,

for Plato, arises when the soul subjugates its appetitive

and spirited parts, and, thereby, enables itself to seek the upward
path to reasoned knowledge.

For the many, who are the inhabitants of

the realistic, "second-best" regime, this liberty becomes attainable
through the practice of moderation.
This, then,

109

is Plato's theory of economic welfare.

Perhaps

its most unusual feature is that it is designed to produce happiness
involuntarily among
designed.

the

inhabitants

of the city for which it was

Specifically, Plato claims that the legislation of modera

tion will produce happiness for the many, even though it is unlikely
that

the many would enthusiastically submit to the institution of

such laws.

In this manner Plato's theory of economic welfare is

nearly antithetical to much of contemporary welfare analysis.

This

may explain the history of opposition to Plato's views and the dis
missal

of

his

analysis

as

pre-scientific.

Contemporary

welfare

analysis is based upon the notion that welfare is promoted whenever

■^Plato,

"Republic,"

in The

Republic

of Plato, p.

235.
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at least one individual is able to satisfy some desire and no one
else is penalized; or, when the utility realized from the satisfac
tion of the

individual's

realized

others.

explain

by

market

economic

exceeds

Contemporary

behavior

agents.

desire

in

Plato's

terms

any loss in satisfaction

welfare
of

analysis,

economics

voluntary
on

the

attempts

actions

to

taken by

other hand,

explains

economic welfare in terms of people happily existing in a regulated
economy in spite of the fact that their appetitive impulses remain
unsatisfied.
Compared in this way contemporary welfare analysis seems more
sophistic in nature than Plato's analysis.

From a methodological, if

not a philosophical, perspective contemporary analysis assumes that
man is the measure of the things that are.

The reasoning behind much

of contemporary analysis suggests that (1) men seek the objects of
their desire, (2) this quest sometimes produces conflict when desires
of two or more individuals conflict,

(3) welfare analysis seeks to

suggest patterns of production and distribution that result in the
greatest

level

of

satisfaction

of

desires

that

is

reasonably

attainable.
Plato's

analysis,

by

comparison,

assumes

the

existence of

objective virtue.

Happiness exists as an intelligible Form.

is

people

promoted

itself.

when

acquire

reasoned

knowledge

Welfare

of happiness

According to Plato's epistemology, however, such knowledge

is difficult

to come by.

People attain knowledge of intelligible

virtues by recollecting their characteristics through a process of
serious dialectical inquiry.

For Plato the Good, or, in the Laws,
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God, is the measure of the things that are.
virtue

The Good— the ultimate

in which the particular virtues partake— moves the soul by

making its existence known to it.

Happiness is thus defined as the

result of the soul's partaking of virtue through the virtuous life
that is piloted by reason.
It is consistent for Plato to have reasoned that welfare for
the many is improved through institutionalized temperance.
tion, after all,

Modera

is the virtue to which the sub-rational soul can

aspire, according to Plato's analysis.

It is logical, therefore, for

Plato to have prescribed a series of market restrictions designed to
quell the tyrannical desires that he recognized in the souls of the
many.

Society, Plato reasoned, is chained, by its failure to master

the passions, and in the dark; it is forever looking at shadows and
misperceiving the clues that suggest the existence of virtue itself.
Moved by this view of society Plato sought to promote welfare by
making society virtuous.
grand

scale,

perance.

at least

Plato's

If society could not partake of reason on a
it

theory

could become virtuous by acquiring tem
of

welfare

is,

thus,

the

economics

of

moderation.
Plato's theory of moderation is the product of the systematic
exercise

of

reason.

produce science.

Consequently

it

constitutes

an

attempt

to

It analyzes the best organization of the economy in

terms of the economy's ability to be brought into conformity with an
absolute standard of goodness.

That this analysis does not antici

pate all of the features of modern analysis does not make it nonscientific.

It simply reflects the fact that Plato was nearly the
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first scientist to inquire into the nature of the economy that best
produces well-being.
In summary, Plato reasoned that the Good exists, albeit in a
plane that is "beyond being."
cular virtues
attained,

This supreme virtue engenders parti

with their qualities.

Happiness,

or well-being,

is

according to Plato's system of knowledge, when the soul

recognizes the existence of the Good and conforms to it, producing
harmony.

A harmonious existence requires that no individual attempt

to pursue many crafts,
labor,

and

that

i.e., that there should exist a division of

individuals

produce,

modities and services moderately.

exchange,

and

consume

com

CHAPTER 4

PLATO’S NOTION OF THE SUFFICIENT ECONOMY

I
around

have

argued that Plato

envisioned an economy organized

the principle of moderation.

produce,

An economy in which citizens

exchange, and consume with an eye toward temperance, Plato

argued, would produce the greatest degree of social well-being.
temperate

economy

ficiency.

was

ultimately

based

upon

the

notion

This

of suf

One must remember that Plato concerned himself primarily

with discovery of things that were beyond being— things that are,
i.e., that do not come into and go out of being.
the
that

serious person,
are.

spoudaios, attempts to become like the things

For example,

the

serious

virtuous, i.e., like virtue itself.
of

things

that

are

promote happiness.

According to Plato,

sensed—

person

attempts

to

become

For such an individual the realm

aisthesis— offers

little

that

could

After all, Plato conceived happiness to be an

intelligible concept; to possess happiness one must seek it through a
disciplined program of rational inquiry.
of thought,

men

acquire

physical

According to Plato's system

things

for the purpose

sistence, rather than for the attainment of happiness.

of

sub

With respect

to the acquisition of physical things, Plato considered the operative
principle to be sufficiency--ikanotes.

An economy constructed around

this principle would seek to be sufficient and whole; it would not
lock itself into the viscious cycle of growing to meet the demands of
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the many, whose demands, in turn and as a result of economic growth,
grow.

The

principle

of

ikanotes,

or

sufficiency,

provides

con

temporary policy-makers with a useful solution to the many problems
that are associated with a perpetually growing global economy.

I.

Sufficiency
Plato's

concept

theory of moderation.

of

sufficiency is directly related to his

A temperate life, which is associated with the

happy life, is assured when the many acquire commodities and services
with a goal of becoming sufficient.

Plato introduces the notion of

the sufficient life in the Lysis.

In a passage from a discussion

between Socrates
ficiency

by

and Lysis,

dispelling

one

Plato establishes parameters for suf
common

formulation

sufficiency, i.e., the life of self-sufficiency.

of

the

life

of

Recall that in the

Lysis the overall theme concerns the nature of friendship.

Socrates

inquires about the nature of friendship and, at one point, connects
it with sufficiency.

In the Lysis Plato writes:

[Socrates:] But, you will say, the like man is not a friend
to the like man, but the good will be a friend to the good,
in so far as he is good, not in so far as he is like.
[Lysis:]

Perhaps I may.

And I should rejoin, Will not the good man, in so far as
he is good, be found to be sufficient for himself?
Yes.
And if sufficient, he will want nothing so far as his
sufficiency goes.
Of course not.
And if he does not want anything he won't feel regard for
anything either.
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To be sure not.
And what he does not feel regard for, he cannot love.
Not he.
And if he does not love, he won't be a friend.
Clearly not.*
In the passage above Plato argues that good men are friends, and yet
they are not self-sufficient.

Ikanotes, as Plato envisions it, does

not mean that an individual requires nothing of anyone else.

This,

remember, would be inconsistent with his notion of the specializa
tion of labor.

Sufficiency is, then, clearly not the same thing as

self-sufficiency.
In

the

sufficient life.

Republic, Plato

again introduces

the

idea of the

Discussing the proper size of the ideal city in

Book IV, Plato argues through Socrates that a proper city should not
grow beyond a certain size.

Socrates argues with Adeimantus:

"Therefore," I said, "this would also be the fairest
boundary for our rulers; so big must they make the city, and
bounding off enough land so that it will be of that size,
they must let the rest go."
"What boundary?" he said.
"I suppose this one," I said, "up to that point in
its growth at which it's willing to be one, let it grow, and
not beyond."
"That's fine," he said.
"Therefore, we'll also set this further command on
the guardians, to guard in every way against the city's being

*Plato, "Lysis," in The Collected Dialogues of Plato, ed.
Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1961), p. 158.
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littl| or seemingly big; rather it should be sufficient and
one."
The ideal city, it seems, should be neither too small, nor so large
as to qualify as luxurious.

Rather,

an ideal city should be of a

size so as to yield sufficient production for the subsistence needs
of its inhabitants.
The analogy of the jars from the Gorgias serves to illustrate
the

virtue

of

obtaining

temperance

through the

sufficient amount of subsistence commodities.

acquisition of a

One will remember that

in this analogy Socrates discusses two men possessing several jars
each, while the other, whose jars are riddled with holes, is unable
to achieve sufficiency.

He is reduced, according to the analogy, to

perpetually returning to the sources of the items that he needs to
refill

his

damaged

containers.

By

this

analogy

Plato

means

to

suggest that temperance requires that an individual secure sufficient
stocks

and

stores

of

comfortable existence.

those

physical

items

that

contribute

to a

To constantly consume commodities without a

proper end— sufficiency— in sight, is to misperceive the appropriate
3

ends of human action, in Plato's opinion.
Gerald Alonzo Smith restates Plato's analogy in a slightly
different

form

in his

Historical Perspective."

^Plato,
Bloom (New York:
^Plato,

essay

4

"The Teleological View of Wealth:

A

Smith writes:

"Republic," in The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan
Basic Books, 1968), pp. 100-101.
"Gorgias,"

in

The

Collected

Dialogues, p.

275.

^Gerald Alonzo Smith, "The Teleological View of Wealth: A
Historical Perspective," in Economics, Ecology, Ethics, ed. Herman E.
Daly (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1980), pp. 215-237.
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The practice of medicine may require the prescription of an
addictive stimulant for the sake of good health. The amount
of the stimulant is finite and limited by the end.
When,
however, one takes a stimulant for its own sake, the desire
for it becomes infinite since it is no longer limited by a
final goal but is an end in itself.
The point of each analogy is the same— acquisition of physical things
ought properly to be limited by an end.
human actions
cause,

is

For Smith the proper end of

linked with Aristotle's

causa

finalis, or final

from the peripatetic's theory of causes.

According to this

theory there exist four essential causes for every course of human
action.

These

are the causa materialis, the causa efficiens, the

causa formalis, and the causa finalis.

Smith summarizes Aristotle's

conception of causes in the following example:
An example is the building of a house wherein the wood and
other materials are the causa materialis, the carpenter's
labor and the tools are the causa efficiens, the blueprint or
plan in the carpenter's mind is the causa formalis, and the
desire to have a home for shelter and comfort is the causa
finalis.
The example above does in some respects trivialize the Aristotelian
concept of causes.

It

does provide the reader with

analogies tothe

four causes, but succeeds in reducing the significance of Aristotle's
final

cause of human activity.

envisioned

the

causa

finalis

Aristotle,
to be

the

like Plato before him,

attainment of happiness.

Smith cites the work of four economists— Sismondi, Ruskin, Hobson,
and Tawney— claiming that "[t]hey realized that only that analysis

5Ibid., p. 215.
6Ibid., p. 232.
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which

can lead to appropriate

satisfaction in fruition

causa

finalis

is destined

to give

since only the appropriate causa finalis

gives a fundamental unity to the problem of human behavior."7
too,

realized

wealth.

the

necessity

of

adopting

a

teleological

Plato,
view of

According to this view, the proper end of acquisition is

sufficiency.

Sufficiency,

temperance, which,
happiness.

in turn,

however,

is subordinate to the

end of

is subordinate to the ultimate aim of

Viewed this way Plato's notion of the happy life can be

categorized thus:

sufficiency provides the causa efficiens, modera

tion provides the causa formalis, and happiness provides the causa
finalis

of

enables

the

individual.

human
model

activity.
of

the

That

is,

temperate

sufficiency
life

to

be

is

that which

achieved

by

an

This model life, i.e., the life of moderation, is, in

turn, ultimately oriented toward the final goal of the individual's
attainment of happiness.
Happiness, then, requires that an economy be oriented toward
the goal of producing a sufficient quantity of commodities and ser
vices .

The sufficient quantity that Plato has in mind is an amount

that rids men of poverty, and, yet, does not constitute such a large
quantity of material riches so as to qualify as a luxurious estate.
In the Gorgias Plato claims that poverty is the greatest material
evil.

He writes:

7Ibid., pp. 232-233.
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SOCRATES:
...Look at it in this way. In the fabric of a
man's material estate do you see any other evil than poverty?
POLUS:

No, only poverty.

SOCRATES: And what about his bodily constitution? Would
you say its evil is weakness and sickness and ugliness and
such things?
POLUS:

I would.

SOCRATES:
of the soul?
POLUS:

And do you consider there is an evil condition

Certainly.

SOCRATES:
And do you call this injustice and ignorance
and cowardice and the like?
POLUS:

Certainly.

SOCRATES: Then for these three, material fortune, body,
and soul, you have named three evils, poverty, disease, and
injustice?
POLUS:

Yes.8

The art which rids men of material evil— poverty— is economics or
9

money-making,

in Plato's

opinion.

This

art enables

men to con

veniently and efficiently produce a level of material affluence that
is sufficient to nourish
Among
passage above,
evil.

the

three

a life of moderation.
human evils

injustice is singled

Injustice, after all, is

soul away from the true

that Plato

identifies in the

out as being the most severe

a psychological state which turns the

aim of happiness.

In several places in the

8Plato, "Gorgias," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 260.
9Ibid., p. 261.
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dialogues Plato associates the life of injustice with tyranny.
the Gorgias

he makes

this point

In

clear in the following passage:

SOCRATES:
And is not this just the man who does the
greatest wrong and indulges in the greatest injustice and yet
contrives to escape admonition, correction, or punishment—
the very condition you describe as achieved by Archelaus and
other tyrants, orators, and potentates?
POLUS:

It seems so.

SOCRATES: For what these have contrived, my good friend,
is pretty much as if a man afflicted with the most grievous
ailments should contrive not to pay the doctors the penalty
of his sins against his body by submitting to treatment,
because he is afraid, like a child, of the pain of cautery or
surgery. Do you not agree?
POLUS:

I do.

SOCRATES:
He is evidently ignorant of the meaning of
health and physical fitness. For apparently, as our recent
admissions prove, those who escape punishment also act much
in the same way, Polus. They see its painfulness hut are
blind to its benefitand know not how much more miserable
than a union with an unhealthy body is a union with a soul
that is not healthy but corrupt and impious and evil, and so
they leave nothing undone to avoid being punished and liber
ated from the greatest of ills, providing themselves with
money and friends and the highest attainable powers of
persuasive rhetoric.
But if we have been right in our
admissions, Polus, do you see the results of our argument, or
shall we sum them up together?
POLUS:

Yes, if you wish.

SOCRATES:
Is not our conclusion then that injustice and
the doing of wrong is the greatest of evils?
POLUS:

Evidently.10

The life of tyranny is the opposite of the life of poverty.
The tyrannical state refrains from the production of no thing that
the

appetitive

soul

desires.

10Ibid., pp. 262-263.

The

tyrannical

state

is that which
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Plato associates with the city of sows in the Republic.
of luxury.

It is the "feverish city."**

"stands in its way."
stimulants

causa

existence

requirements
Smith's

soul

Under

of the individual is turned from the

finalis— happiness.

Smith

points

out

that

this

for the enslavement of mankind to the constant

of production and economic

point

particular,

consuming them for their own sake.

the

accounts

"Nothing," Plato writes,

In such a state men become addicted to the

of appetite,

such circumstances
proper

12

It is a city

well.

to the

Referring

to

individual who

the

growth.
jars

Plato understood
analogy,

slavishly attempts

and,

in

to keep his

perforated jars filled, Plato notes that "a life of pleasure demands
the largest possible influx."

13

He continues:

SOCRATES: Then if there is a big influx, must there not
also be a great outflow, and must not the holes for the
outflow be large?
CALLICLES:

Certainly.

SOCRATES:
It is the life of a plover you mean, not that
of a corpse or a stone. And now tell me. You are thinking
of some such thing as being hungry and, when hungry, eating?
CALLICLES:
SOCRATES:

I am.
And being thirsty and, when thirsty, drinking?

CALLICLES: Yes, and experiencing all the other appetites
and being able to satisfy them and living happily in the
enjoyment of them.
SOCRATES:
Good, my worthy friend, just continue as you
began, and mind you do not falter through shame. And I too,

**Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 49.
Ibid.

*"*Plato,

"Gorgias,"

in The

Collected

Dialogues, p.

276.

it seems, must throw all shame aside.
First of all then,
tell me whether one who suffers from the itch and longs to
scratch himself, if he can scratch himself to his heart's
content and continue scratching all his life, can be said to
live happily.
CALLICLES:
orator!,

How absurd you are, Socrates, a regular mob

SOCRATES: That, Callicles, is why I frightened Polus and
Gorgias and put them to shame, but you surely will not be
dismayed or abashed, for you have courage. Only give me your
answer.
CALLICLES: Well then, I sj^y that even one who scratches
himself would live pleasantly.
Socrates goes on to discredit Callicles' notion of the happy life,
likening the life of the man who scratches himself interminably with
the

life

of a catamite.

Smith— to be

He makes

clear

the point described by

given over to attempting to satisfy appetitive urges

without having a final cause in mind is to be miserable.

II.

The Sufficient State
The sufficient state exists somewhere between the state of

poverty and the state of tyrannical luxury.

Such a state would not

have as an economic goal the maximization of economic output.

Plato

suggests that the tyrannical state is that which is caught up in the
production

of

the

largest

influx and outflow of

services.

Its problem is that it does not yield happiness for its

inhabitants, according to Plato's theory.

commodities

and
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The constitution of Magnesia serves as Plato's description of
the sufficient state.

In Plato's condemnation of the Persian regime,

which appears in the Laws, one sees that the Magnesian economy should
not participate in the production of luxury.

From Book III:

Ath.

Now I divine that
good general and
pletely to grasp
didn't direct his

Cyrus, though in other respects a
a friend to his city, failed com
what is a correct education, and
mind at all to [economics.]

Kl.

What makes us assert such a thing?

Ath.

It's likely that he spent his whole life, from youth
on, preoccupied with military matters, and turned his
children over to the women to be brought up. They
brought the children up as though they were happy
from the time they were babies, and blessed from the
moment they were born, lacking nothing.
The women
allowed no one to oppose them in anything, on the
grounds that they were endowed with happiness, and
compelled everyone else to praise whatever the chil
dren said or did: that was the sort of children they
raised.

Kl.

It sounds lovely, this upbringing you've described!

Ath.

A feminine upbringing— the children were brought up
by royal, newly-rich women, and in the absence of the
men, who were unable to find leisure because of wars
and many other dangers.

Kl.

That stands to reason.

Ath.

Their father, meanwhile, kept acquiring flocks and
herds, including many droves of men along with many
other animals, on their behalf; but he didn't know
that they to whom he was going to give all this were
not being educated in their father's art, which was
Persian (for the Persians are shepherds because of
the rough country from which they originate). This
art is a tough one, sufficient to make men very
strong herdsmen, capable of living outdoors, able to
keep watch without sleep, and ready to serve as
soldiers whenever they have to. Anyway, he failed to
see that women and eunuchs had given his sons an
education which had been corrupted by the so-called
happiness of the Medes, and the sons turned out as
one would expect, after having been brought up
without any restraint.
When his children took over
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from Cyrus after his death, they were bursting with
luxury and lack of restraint. First one killed the
other because he couldn't bear to share equally;
after this the one who remained, maddened by drunken
ness and lack of education, had his rule destroyed by
the Medes and by the fellow they, at that time,
called "the Eunuch," who had nothing but contempt for
the silliness of Cambyses.
Through this story Plato relates the corruption of tyrannical luxury.
When individuals receive an inadequate education concerning the true
nature of virtue, they are given over to excess, and killing in order
to prevent the loss of acquired luxury.
that

Such is the fate of regimes

do not reconcile the usefulness of sufficient production and

temperance with the goal of happiness.
The

Magnesian

state

is

also

regime in Book III of the Laws.

contrasted

with the Spartan

Plato associated Sparta with the

ascetic life, in which the city's inhabitants engage in restraint and
material
Sparta,

poverty.
however,

A

careful

cannot

but

reading
reveal

of

Plato's

description

that Plato views

of

the Spartan

asceticism as being that type of moderation that arises from a sense
of

self-indulgence.

The

Spartans

practice

a

severe

form

of

temperance not because they perceive the moderate life to be happy,
but, rather, because the ascetic life breeds tough citizens who are
capable of holding their own in battle.
not happiness

as

excellence

the

in

its

goal,

area

of

but,

This sort of temperance has

instead,

martial

arts.

is designed
The

to promote

Spartans

practice

temperance for fear of falling prey to uncontrolled passion, which

^Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, trans.
Pangle (New York: Basic Books, 1980), pp. 79-80.

Thomas L.
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would render them effeminate, and similar in character to the sons of
Cyrus.

One will recall that this type of moderation is associated in

the Phaedo with a perverse sort of self-indulgence.
terizes such individuals saying:
resist

some pleasures

that

17

Plato charac

"it is really because they cannot

they succeed in resisting others..."

18

This amounts to controlling one's appetites by indulging in others—
in the case of the Spartans,

it is indulgence in honor-loving and

spirited forms of living.
Plato uses the Persian and Spartan economies to illustrate
the excesses to which an economy can subscribe if organized around
models of the soul which are deficient in one sense or another.
Persian economy

The

is illustrative of the tyranny which results when

individuals indulge the passions in an attempt to sate the appetitive
part of the soul.

Plato is careful to show that such a regime is

generated when the many, here represented by the child-like minds of
the spoiled Persian Princes, are not given strong models of honor in
which to invest their faith.
in the virtue of temperance,

The sons of the king are never schooled
according to Plato's story, and thus

become slaves of their appetites.

As Plato argues earlier in the

Republic, such behavior cannot result in the attainment of happiness;
rather,

it breeds

the

tyrannical

overindulgence

of appetite

that

characterizes the Persian state after the passing of the king.

The

lack of trust in the motives and intentions of one's fellow, which

^Plato, "Phaedo," in The Collected Dialogues, p. 51.
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typifies

the tyrannical

soul,

turns

brother against brother in a

battle for that which is fundamentally unattainable.

Plato rejects

the Persian model for the economy as unsound on the grounds that it
precludes the attainment of happiness for individuals by virtue of
its encouragement of cultivation of the appetitive part of the soul.
Plato, too, rejects the model of the Spartan economy for the
reason that

it represents

the institutionalization of a deficient

psychology.

In the case of Sparta, however, it is not that the state

promotes appetitive behavior, but, rather, that it restricts it in an
undesirable
through

way.

When

overindulgence,

Plato
it

discusses

includes

the

notion of temperance

the Spartan psychology.

The

Spartans adopted an ascetic life style, not out of a belief in the
self-evident virtue of temperance, but out of a worship of honor and
spiritedness.
excel

in

reasons,

The Spartans sought to cultivate citizens who could

battle.
the

The

dangers

honor-loving
of

individual

overindulgence

of

the

recognizes,

Plato

passions.

Such

behavior breeds the weakness that proved to be the undoing of the
Persians.

Spartan

virtuous behavior,

temperance,

however,

but, instead,

is

not

grounded

in true

is based upon a psychology which

suffers from an excess of spiritedness.

Just as Plato rejected the

notion that the Persian model of the economy could foster happiness,
so, too, he dismisses the possibility that the Spartan model would
suffice to promote welfare.

To be sure, Plato considered the Spartan

model superior to the Persian.

After all, it represented the result

of an imbalance of the soul which veers from the ideal less than the
tyranny of rule by appetite.

Even so, the Spartan constitution is
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less desirable than one which obtains from a model of the virtuous
soul

in which reason governs both spiritedness and appetite.

this reason, Plato speculateson the design of the Magnesian
Magnesia is designed
where

between

the

For

economy.

to lie, in terms of moderation, some

Spartan and Persian

regimes.

It

is,

recall,

designed to be constructed well away from good harbors, and on soil
of

only

average

productivity.

This

location

insures

that

the

Magnesians would find it difficult to develop a luxurious state.

The

fact that the land would be difficult to work, or that the Magnesians
would

experience

difficulty in establishing a profitable

trade, does not dismay Plato.
to

society.

foreign

He views such hardship as beneficial

In such conditions

the

inhabitants

of a city would

produce a sufficient quantity of economic output by default.
sufficiency would

guarantee

This moderation would,

that the

inhabitants

in Plato's opinion,

This

live moderately.

serve well the ultimate

goal of happiness.
Magnesia

is envisioned by Plato to be a stationary-state.

Its population, recall, is to be limited to the number corresponding
to

a city with 5,040 households.

carefully administered

in a way that promotes sufficiency for all

inhabitants of the city.
uals,

which arise,

The land in the city is to be

Plato

Recognizing the different needs of individ
claims,

from differences in temperament,

Plato permitted a spread of wealth that would amount to a fourfold
difference between the largest and smallest estates.

The absolute

size of these estates, Plato envisioned, would never be allowed to
increase— any surplus value would be turned over to the government.
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In this way the physical wealth of Magnesia would remain constant
over time.

19

The

population

of

Magnesia,

wealth, would remain constant.

like

the

stock

of

physical

In Book V of the Laws Plato describes

a system of population management.

He writes:

[I]n families where there are more than one [child], the
females should be given in marriage according to the law that
will be ordained, and the males should be distributed as sons
to those citizens who lack sons. Personal likes and dislikes
should be followed as closely as possible. If there are some
who can find no one who pleases them, or if a surplus of
females or males occurs, or on the contrary a deficiency
because of a lack of childbirths, there will be a magistracy
which we will designate— the greatest and most honored, in
fact— which should, after looking into all these things,
devise means of assisting those who have too many offspring
and those who are lacking, so as to maintain the five
thousand forty households always intact insofar as is
possible.
There are many devices, including ways of pre
venting birth in those who conceive too many offspring, and,
on the contrary, various ways of encouraging and stimulating
a greater number of conceptions.
The use of honors and
dishonors, as well as the encouraging words of elders
addressed to young people, can accomplish what we're talking
about.
In extreme cases in which the population were to exceed that which is
appropriate

to

5,040

households,

dispatched to build new cities.

the

surplus

of people would be

Plato, however, is not desirous of

permitting an economy to grow beyond a sufficient size.

21

Plato's notion of sufficiency is based upon his observation
that

the

1Q

ideal

city should be

like

a man.

According to Plato's

Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 132.

20Ibid., p. 127.
21Ibid., p. 128.
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theory of being, men possess souls that serve as the bodily organ
capable

of discovering

ligible virtues.

the

existence and

qualities

of the intel

The souls of men are well-ordered if they partake

of the virtues in the proper proportions— this is Plato's principle
of harmony.
with virtue.
soul.

The city, too, ought to exist in harmonious proportion
The well-ordered city is not unlike the well-ordered

In the Republic Plato writes:

[Socrates:]
"Then is that city best governed which is most
like a single
human being?
Forexample, when one
of us
wounds a finger, presumably the entire community— that commu
nity tying the bodytogether with the soul in a single ar
rangement under the ruler within it— is aware of the fact,
and all of it is in pain as a whole along with the afflicted
part; and it is in this sense we say that this human being
has a pain in his finger. And does the same argument hold
for any other part of a human being, both when
it is
afflicted by pain and when eased by pleasure?"
[Glaucon:]
"Yes, it does," he said.
"And, as to what you
ask, the9 city with the best regime is most like such a human
being."
The city is similar in its composition to the body of an individual.
The human body reaches an equilibrium when it is healthy.

If it is

undernourished it withers;

if overfed and pampered, the human body

loses

subject

fitness

and becomes

to disease.

equilibrium in which it is sufficiently nourished.

The body seeks an
In Plato's opin

ion, the ideal city enjoys an equilibrium that is similar to that of
the well-nourished, well-exercised body--if the city is too small it
is

incapable

of producing subsistence for its inhabitants;

if the

city grows excessively it is, in Plato's terms, no longer one, i.e.,

^Plato,

"Republic," in The Republic of Plato, pp. 141-142.
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no longer sufficient.

The city, like the body,

is a finite, open

system, which requires a constant influx and outflow of matter and
energy.

As Plato suggests in his analogy of the jars, the influx and

outflow of materials should not be excessive.

In order that a city

may produce happiness for its inhabitants, it must be founded upon
the virtue of moderation, which requires that it produce the physical
necessities for its inhabitants in sufficient, not luxurious, quanti23
ties.
Economists are beginning to appreciate the importance of the
idea of the stationary-state,
The

popular

models

such as the one described by Plato.

of physical

science

suggest that the natural

condition of life on earth is that of a finite, open biosystem.

This

biosystem requires that relatively low-entropy matter and energy be
available for use, and that higher-entropy wastes be removed from the
system.

Plato's biological

analogy,

likening

the economy to the

human body, is as appropriate for today as it was for his discussion
of the ideal state in antiquity.

Herman E. Daly has pointed out that

economists such as Marshall and Hobson have encouraged the use of
biological analogies in contemporary economics.

Daly himself likens

the economic process to the process of metabolism in the human body.
He notes:
The close similarity of the basic within-skin life process of
metabolism (anabolism and catabolism) with the outside-skin
life process of economics (production and consumption) is
evident...

OO

Plato,

"Gorgias,"

in The

Collected Dialogues, p.

276.
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In either process the only material output is waste. The
purpose (value
produced) of the metabolic process is the
maintenance of
life.
The purpose (value produced) of the
economic process is the maintenance and enjoyment of life.
As man comes to appreciate the view of the world as a finite dowry of
available matter and energy, and one in which the capacity to absorb
the waste by-products of economic activity is limited, he becomes
aware of the inevitability that economic growth cannot be achieved
indefinitely in the

future.

Like the body, the economy must reach a

size that is sufficient to produce a comfortable subsistence
inhabitants,

and, yet, it must not grow so large as to disrupt the

equilibrium— the harmony,
enables

the

forits

human

in Plato's term— of the environment that

economy

to

successfully

slough

off

its waste

by-products.
The economy, as understood from the perspective of contempo
rary economics,
excess

demand

grows
for

in response to the effects on prices of an

commodities

and

services

at

existing

market

prices--the increases in prices that ordinarily accompany conditions
of excess demand precipitate increases in output in the marketplace.
That excess demand should prevail in a market is the result of what
Plato describes as a psychological imbalance in which the soul is
given over to preoccupation with the satisfaction of the appetites.
The

individual

who

poverty-stricken.

possesses
Plato

such

a soul

is,

in Plato's

terms,

defines poverty in the Laws as a problem

24
Herman E. Daly, "On Economics
Economics, Ecology, Ethics, p. 240.

as

a

Life

Science,"

in
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associated
wealth.

with

excessive

greed,

rather

than

with

insufficient

He writes that "poverty consists not in a lessening of one's

property but in an increase of one's avarice."
In

Plato's

mind,

the

ideal

economy

25
is one

in which the

poverty of avarice is displaced by a spirit of sufficiency that is
embraced by the people.

This sufficiency is the belief that there

exists such a thing as "enough."

The belief by the individual that

"enough" possessions may be possessed comes easily, Plato argues, to
the soul that is well-ordered.
ing this

temperament would

A city inhabited by citizens possess

find that

a moderate-sized economy is

capable, under the circumstances Plato describes as being associated
with the location of the Magnesian economy, of producing a volume of
commodities and services suitable for maintenance of a comfortable
lifestyle, i.e., sufficiency.
Contemporary economies have resorted to different solutions
to the fundamental problem of scarcity of desired resources.

Market

economies typically use the price system to ration valuable commodi
ties and services.

In those instances in which a market economy is

incapable of adequately providing a rationing function, for example
when externalities exist,

the market is frequently assisted by the

legal system, which attempts to complement the price system with a
just

method

of

allocating

resources.

In societies

in which the

market is subordinated to the operations of the regime, the legal

^Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 123.
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system provides an almost complete, although frequently unsatisfac
tory,

rationing of the things held dear by individuals.

In either

instance the economy is based upon the notion that people want more
than they can conveniently secure, because of scarcity.

Such econo

mies operate as if there is nothing inherently wrong with such de
sires,

rather the

fault

can be

credited to a less than generous

nature of physis.
According to Plato's theory of welfare, scarcity is rooted in
the soul's tendency towards imbalance— in particular, an imbalance in
which the appetitive part

of the soul masters reason and spirit.

Scarcity is alleviated when harmony is restored to the soul.
this

occurs

enough."

the

Under

individual
such

accepts

conditions

it

the

notion

that

When

"Enough

is

is not likely that an economy

would be plagued by excess demand for output.

Instead, the economy

would be organized to produce a sufficient level of output.
Plato realized that individuals are driven by the tendency to
seek pleasure and avoid pain.
consists

above

all

"By nature," Plato writes, "the human

in pleasures

and pains and desires.

To these

every mortal animal is, as it were, inextricably attached and bound
in the most

serious

ways."

26

Desire and longing are natural and

provide the basis for Plato's philosophia— the theory of the erotic
urge

from the

Symposium.

27

Nevertheless,

true pleasure, which is

desirable, is not associated with the life of profligacy; it can be

26Ibid., p. 119.
2^Plato,

"Symposium,"

in The

Collected Dialogues, p. 553.
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found in the psychological harmony which attends the soul that dis
covers

the

sublime nature

of the

intelligible virtues.

For this

reason Plato did not believe that an economy should strive to produce
an ever-increasing
affords
the

array of

commodities

the many happiness.

level
A

of economic

Sufficiency,

output that

restoration of

and

is

the belief

services.

Moderation

ikanotes, corresponds to

consistent with moderation.

in the virtue of sufficiency

could solve many of the economic problems that hamper economic wel
fare today.
population
capable

of

Daly and others point
exists.

This

maximizing

population

the

level

inhabitants of an economy.
level,

as well

as

one

out that

an optimum size for

corresponds

of

material

to that which
well-being

is

for the

A population that falls short of this

that

exceeds

it,

providing a similar level of affluence.

28

would prove incapable of
There must also exist a

level of physical capital that corresponds to the optimum population.
Such a stock of physical artifacts would sustain life comfortably.

A

smaller capital stock than this would be insufficient to generate a
comfortable subsistence; one that is larger would prove unwieldy and
prohibitive,

if not

impossible,

to maintain.

Adoption of Plato's

notion of sufficiency by the inhabitants of the contemporary economy
would

enable

welfare

to

be

served

without

resort

to

various

unpleasant methods of rationing commodities in a world of poverty—
poverty being defined in the Platonic sense.

28
Herman E. Daly, "The Optimal Population," a lecture on the
Economics of Population, Resources, and the Environment, Economics
4320, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, February 1976.

CHAPTER 5

PLATO'S THEORIES OF USURY AND THE JUST PRICE

An

important

element

notion of economic justice.

of Plato's
Justice,

theory of welfare is the

recall,

is one of the chief

virtues which must be cultivated in the best state.

Justice requires

of an individual that he or she do what is his or her own business.
This behavior ensures that an individual will perform the task for
which he or she is best suited temperamentally.

In the best economy

an individual would be allowed to specialize in a field of endeavor
in which he or she could find happiness.

No citizen in the best

economy would be permitted to speculate in the market-place.
keting and money-changing would be

Mar

left to the class of resident

aliens— metics.
Plato's reason for not wanting citizens to earn a livelihood
within the marketplace is teleological in nature.
the attainment of happiness.
requires

Happiness, in the Platonic conception,

that an individual seek a psychological balance in which

reason rules spirit and the passions.
and

The aim of life is

consumption

is

subsistence— one

The proper goal of production
does

marketplace for the sake of wealth alone.

not

seek profit

in the

Because Plato does not

associate wealth with happiness— "wealth...corrupts the soul of human
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beings through luxury"1--he does not permit the acquisition of wealth
for its own sake in the best economy.
For

this

reason Plato

outlawed forms of increasing wealth

which serve chiefly to enhance one's estate.

Charging interest on

loans, and selling a thing for "more than its real value" are exam
ples of wealth-getting to be outlawed in the best economy.
Plato was not the originator of theories of usury and the
just price.

Baldwin points out that the term "just price" is "almost

as old as existing commercial records and probably as old as economic
exchange

itself."

2

Baldwin

finds

the term

in use

in Babylonian

3

records not long after the time of Hammurabi.
theory of welfare Plato was an

Nevertheless, in his

early articulator of ideas of market

justice which excluded from the best economy the

practices

ofcharg

ing interest on loans and selling above the "true worth" of a thing.

I.

Medieval Just Price Theory
The economic literature devoted to the analysis of the devel

opment of early market theories of value does not credit Plato with
contributing to just price and usury theories.
ture

focuses

on

Instead, the litera

medieval-to-Enlightenment-period

formulations

of

these concepts, while pointing in the direction of their roots in the

^Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, trans.
Pangle (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 319.

Thomas

L.

^John W. Baldwin, "The
Medieval Theories of the Just Price,"
Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, July 1959, re
printed in Pre-Capitalist Economic Thought Three Modern Interpreta
tions , ed. Leonard Silk (New York: Arno Press, 1972), p. 8.

3Ibid.
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philosophy of Aristotle,
little

doubt

as well

concerning the

as

in Roman law.

intellectual

debt of Scholastic phi

losophy to both its Greek and Roman inheritance.
doubt,

further,

that St.

Thomas,

who

There can be

There can be no

along with his

teacher St.

Albert popularized the writings of Aristotle in the Medieval period,
drew heavily upon Aristotelian thought on the principles of economic
justice.

Even

so,

it is unlikely that Aristotle

formulated his

theories of usury and the just price independent of his teacher's
opinions on these subjects.

Why, then, does Plato not appear in the

literature on the Medieval theories of price?
The obvious answer to the question concerning Plato's absence
from the literature on usury and the just price is that his work
simply did not influence the doctors to the extent that Aristotle's
did.

In

the

Platonism

did

strictest
shape

sense

Medieval

influence of St. Augustine.

this

response

Catholic

is

correct,

philosophy

although

through

the

One suspects, however, that the general

dissatisfaction that exists among contemporary economists concerning
Plato's economic thought, accounts for at least part of the tendency
to overlook Plato's contributions to notions of economic justice.

In

this chapter I will discuss these contributions and argue that they,
owing to their similarity to Aristotle's theories, helped shape the
conception of the "real value of things" which flourished under the
Schoolmen during the Medieval period.
The
medieval

literature

theories

developed.

devoted

to

the

analysis

of

ancient

and

of usury and the just price is unusually well-

This fact can be explained by the importance accorded by

237
economists to theories of value and price.

In an attempt to come to

grips with different societies’ methods of valuation economists have
studied well the Schooolmen's tendency to associate price with the
"real value of things."

The literature, however, tends to be split

into two categories— that which associates market justice in ancient
and medieval times with the maintenance of existing class structures,
and that which associates market justice from this period with a wide
amount of freedom in the marketplace.

Many of the popular works on

the notion of the just price, for instance, claim that the medieval
doctors argued in favor of the just price being that which maintains
the status of the seller of a commodity or service.
tion of medieval economic thought is found,
writings of Max Weber and Werner Sombart.
to

have

placed

Scholastic

undue

Heinrich

importance

von

on

Langenstein,

maintaining view of the just price.^

4

the
who

This interpreta

in particular,

in the

Weber and Sombart appear
work

of

did

the

espouse

unorthodox
a

status-

Recent literature on medieval

economic thought, however, tends to associate the doctors' just price
with the market price for a commodity or service.

6

4

cf. the exposition of their theories by Raymond De Roover,
"The Concept of the Just Price:
Theory and Economic Policy," The
Journal of Economic History, 18 (1958), 418-434, reprinted in
Readings in the History of Economic Theory, ed. Ingrid H. Rima (New
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), p. 10.
5Ibid.
^For compelling arguments in favor of the view that the
Schoolmen held the just price to be the market price of a thing,
rather than the cost-covering price or the status-maintaining price,
consult De Roover and Baldwin. For a more recent and quite elegant
presentation of this thesis see Odd Langholm, "Economic Freedom in
Scholastic Thought," History of Political Economy, 14 (1982),
260-283. See especially pp. 277-280.
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Whatever the view,

the literature demonstrates agreement on

one subject— the origins of the medieval theories of market justice.
The literature on medieval economic thought credits Roman law, espe
cially the sixth century compilation of Justinian, and, later, the
influence of Aristotle on Scholastic philosophy as being seminal in
the development of the medieval position on usury and the just price.
In one of the early attempts to describe pre-Smithian value theory
Sewall

suggests

the

importance of the Roman principle

of

laesio

enormis for the medieval Catholic position on market justice.^

The

Romans generally favored a lack of price regulation in the market
place.

Cicero, for example, speaking of the price of bronze statues,

said:

"The only limit to the valuation of such things is the desire
g
which anyone has for them..."
One exception to the Roman principle
of freedom in trade, however, was laesio enormis.

According to this

principle a seller could recover if he received less than one half of
the

real

value

temporary

work

( verum pretium) of a plot
on the just price

follows

of
the

land.

Most

con

lead of Sewall

in

describing the importance of the Roman laesio enormis in the medieval
formulation of the concept of the justurn pretium.

^Hannah R. Sewall, The Theory of Value Before Adam Smith
(1901; rpt. New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1968), p. 7.
8Ibid., p. 5.
9

Ibid., p. 7.

^ F o r an extensive treatment of the implications of laesio
enormis see Baldwin, p. 22.
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Baldwin describes the importance of the principle of laesio
enormis.

He argues that the revival of the compilation of Justinian

by the medieval Romanists, or Glossators, which occurred around the
turn of the twelfth century in Bologna, led to a renewed interest on
the part of the church in Roman trade practices.

In large measure,

the Romanists adopted the Roman practice of permitting trade between
buyer and seller to be transacted without legal intervention.
thirteenth

century

Accursius

and

Odofredus

described

In the

the

legal

contract price as that price which was agreed upon after a bargaining
process

involving a certain amount

of h i g g l i n g . S u c h

contract

prices, however, could be set aside under the law of laesio enormis,
which

in medieval times was extended from Roman considerations of

land dealings to cover other areas of exchange.
The problem of laesio enormis, both in Roman and medieval
times, was that it necessitated the estimation of the justurn pretium
in order that it may be determined to what extent contract prices
diverge from true values.

It had been customary in cases involving

laesio enormis for the court to appoint boni homines, good men, to
agree upon the just price.

Odofredus, however, provided four stan

dards for determining the true or just value of things.

The first

method had the broadest appeal inasmuch as it could be applied to
commodities other than just land.
current

common price

This method involved observing the

for a commodity,

or

communiter.

By current

price Odofredus meant not simply the transitory current price of a

"^Baldwin, p. 21.
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thing,

which was influenced by market conditions affected by war,

disaster, and unusually severe weather, but,
which a

commodity was

commonly sold.

rather, the price for

Odofredus' other provisions

applied

ordinarily in cases

of laesio

enormis which

involved the

exchange

of parcels of land.

One technique whereby the true value of

land could be determined was to compare its price with the value of
recently
amounts

sold

adjacent

pieces

of rent received

determine land values.
knowledgeable

of

property.

on pieces

Finally,

values

of

of

of

land

Alternatively,

the

could be compared to

one could seek the opinion of men

their

patrimonies

for

a

standard of

i
12
value.

Determination of the just price in medieval times appears to
have revolved around Roman practices.

Usually this meant accepting

the prevailing market price for a commodity as its true value.
all

of

the

Roman trade

writers, however.

practices

were

adopted by

the

Not

medieval

Prior to the revival of the Institutes, Digest,

and Code of Justinian,

the decretists from the time of the Emperor

Charlemagne declared the Roman practices of centisima and sescuplum
unacceptable.

Centisima was the normal rate of interest applied to

loans, amounting to twelve percent per annum.

The sescuplum was a

sort of Roman in-kind interest charge equal to one half of the goods
borrowed.

Each practice was outlawed during the Carolingian period

as a form of usury.*3

12Ibid., pp. 28-29.
13Ibid., p. 32.
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By

the

middle

of the thirteenth century the writings

Aristotle had been rediscovered by the doctors.
of

these

writings

works

Greek notions

of the

Aristotle's
justice.

14

With the rediscovery

of justice began to appear in the

Schoolmen concerning problems

trade practices.

of

of just and unjust

In particular, Albert and Thomas revived two of

three notions

of justice— commutative and proportional

With respect to the exchange of economic commodities and

services Albert and Thomas applied the ideas of Aristotle to deter
mine the justice of the transaction.

Proportional justice referred

to the principle of justifiable inequality between members of dif
ferent

socio-economic

classes.

This

difference

could

be

justly

maintained in exchange— a king would maintain his status before and
after an exchange with an underling, as would the subordinate.
between equals

Sale

could be explained by the principle of commutative

justice— bargains struck between trading partners would be just if
the parties be equals.
intended

another

understood it.

type

In addition, Baldwin notes that Aristotle
of

justice,

although

the

Schoolmen

never

This type of justice concerned the proper proportions

concerning the exchange of commodities.

Specifically, one could not

expect the principle of equality to pertain to the trade of different
commodities.

One bed could not justly be exchanged for one house, to

borrow an example from the doctors.

Instead,

it was necessary to

determine the proper proportion which would govern the exchange of
such things,

i.e.,

several beds for a single house.

l4Ibid., p. 62.

The type of
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justice described here is reciprocal justice, which is the type of
justice which governs trade.
In

all this

the

15

Scholastics

through the practice of trade.

intended

to preserve justice

Aristotle had provided elegant models

of justice which the Schoolmen were happy to copy.

In the classical

conception justice meant doing what was one's own, or receiving what
was one's due.

One's due, in turn, depended upon who one was, as

well as what it was that one had to offer.

Exchange between nobleman

and craftsman would preserve the natural inequality which society had
spawned.

Justice

concerning

the

exchange

of commodities

between

those whom the law could view as equals could be counted on through
fair

bargaining

between

equals.

Finally,

although the Schoolmen

never fully articulated the Aristotelian idea of reciprocity, justice
would prevail through exchange if the proportions of exchanged com
modities reflected the true,

objective values of things, which re

vealed a flagon of wine, for example, to be less dear than a fleet of
,.
16
ships.

Baldwin, de Roover, and others have convincingly argued that
the Schoolmen, including Albert and Thomas, held the just price of a
commodity,
price

i.e.,

during

its objective value, to be revealed in its market

ordinary

times.

In

normal

times

the

Schoolmen

maintained that justice would be done if parties to exchange traded
commodities at prices that commonly prevailed.

15

16

Ibid.

Ibid.

Thomas, however, went
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beyond

this

description

another

Aristotelian

of

principle

just
to

trade

regulate

in

borrowing

economic

exchange.

Aristotle maintained in the Politics that there exist two types of
trade.

The first type existed because no one in society is wholly

self-sufficient.
the

This type of exchange between individuals aimed at

satisfaction of subsistence needs.

A second type of exchange

existed because of a desire by some to acquire wealth.

This second

type of trade could not be considered just, because it was intended
to produce a corrupt result.

This Aristotelian distinction, which

Thomas supported, provides, among other things, a rationale for the
dismissal of usury as unjust.
and,

later,

Thomas,

Usury, at least according to Aristotle

constitutes

an

attempt

by

an

individual

to

increase his estate without exchange of subsistence goods.77

II.

Plato's Contributions to the Theories
of Usury and the Just Price
The notions of usury and the just price, handed down from

Justinian and Aristotle and embraced by the Scholastics, presuppose
the

existences

virtue.

of

objective

value

and

justice

qua

metaphysical

Plato, of course, posited the existences of these things.

In fact, the theories of the Scholastics, especially those attributed
to the influence of Aristotle, have close parallels in the work of
Plato.

This should be expected in light of the nature of the rela

tionship between Plato

and Aristotle— that of teacher to student.

And yet, the literature nowhere examines Plato's ideas concerning the

17Ibid., p. 65.

244
nature of justice in exchange.

While the following argument does not

prove that the Schoolmen depended upon Plato for their theories of
usury

and

just

prices,

it does

demonstrate

that an intellectual

common ground, likely attributable to the existence of Aristotle as
philosophical middleman,

does exist between Plato and the medieval

thinkers concerning the nature of market justice.
Plato's
this

notion of justice,

dissertation,

was

worked

out

which is analyzed elsewhere in
at

length

in

the

Republic.

Justice, as it is revealed in that dialogue, is concerned with doing
what is one's own business.

Central to this conception of justice is

the idea that the individual should perform one task only— that for
which he

or she

is

suited

temperamentally.

The

character of an

individual's soul, Plato thought, predisposed him or her to taking up
a certain life style, complete with economic boundaries on both the
type of work that one should pursue and the acquisition of wealth.
This notion of what is economically just for an individual provided
Plato with the rationale for devising an elaborate system of market
regulations which were geared to the preservation of temperance and
sufficiency— the just individual is simply not intended to acquire
wealth beyond his due.
In Chapter III the set of market restrictions concerning the
sale of commodities and services which Plato placed upon citizens of
the best state was described.

With respect to the pricing of com

modities and services, Plato thought it best,

i.e., most just,

if

these things were priced by the Guardians of the Laws, who, in turn,
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would consult experts to determine the prices of things.

From the

Laws:
In order that [a metic] in the city may be for us the best
possible, or the least bad possible, the Guardians of the
Laws are to understand that they are not only guards of those
whom, because they have been well educated by birth and
upbringing, it is easy for them to guard against becoming
lawless and bad, but also that they should guard even more
those who are not such, but are engaged in practices that
have certain strong influence in prompting men to become bad.
With this end in view, the Guardians of the Laws ought
again to meet concerning these matters [of retail trade] with
those who have experience in each branch of retail trade,
just as we earlier ordered them to do in the case of
adulteration, which is a practice akin to this; with respect
to those aspects of retail trade (which is extensive, and
includes many practices of the sort just alluded to) which
have seemed to be highly necessary in the city and have been
allowed to remain, they should meet and see what receipt and
expense balance at any time makes a well-measured gain for
the retail merchant. The receipt and expense balance arrived
at is to be posted in writing and guarded by the Market
Regulators, City Regulators, and Field Regulators.
In this
way, what pertains to retail trade would be pretty beneficial
to each person, and
would dopretty mucl^gthe smallest injury
to those in the city
who make use of it.
Prices

corresponding

to

those

which

provide merchants

with

the

well-measured gains determined by the Guardians of the Laws would be
strictly enforced by the Market Regulators.

In another passage from

the Laws Plato notes:
If what's purchased or
sold creates an excess or a
deficiency contraryto the law that has said there must not
be an increase or a
decreasebeyond a certain sum, ||en, in
the former case, the excess should be recorded
with
the Guardians of the Lawsand, in the opposite case, the

1 ft

19

Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 320.

Saunders translates "recorded" as "confiscated" in his
translation of Plato's "Laws." See p. 353 of Saunder's translation.
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shortfall should be cancelled.
The same ordinances con^
cerning registration of property apply to resident aliens.
The price of a commodity which is prescribed by law is, for
Plato,

the just price.

Plato's just price, however,

differs from

that of Schoolmen in that it does not necessarily reflect the true
value of a thing.
objective

value.

To be sure, Plato believed in the existence of
But,

while

the Scholastics

were

concerned with

determining the verum pretium of a commodity, Plato was preoccupied
with determining the value which would preserve justice among those
making the exchange.

This justice preserved preordained limits to

wealth of Plato's four property classes by permitting prices which
would afford the seller a decent profit, while preventing the seller
or the buyer of a thing from increasing their wealth much beyond what
is prescribed by law--that which corresponds to the value of their
original estates.

Plato writes:

So let the limit of poverty be the value of the allotment,
which must be maintained, and which no magistrate, and none
of the others who desires to be honored for virtue, should
ever allow to be diminished in the case of anyone. Taking
this as the measure, the lawgiver will allow citizens to
acquire twice again, and three times again, and up to four
times again this amount.
But if anyone acquires more than
four times this amount— by finding something or by being
given something, or by money-making, or some other such
stroke of luck— let him dedicate2 ^he surplus to the city and
to the gods who possess the city.
Plato's just price appears to differ somewhat from the main
stream notion of the justum pretium of the doctors.

For the School

men, justice prevails under conditions of exchange whenever contract

90

Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 243.

21Ibid., p. 132.
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prices

reveal

Plato, on the
due

the true, underlying value of things exchanged.
other hand, justice prevails if

proportion.

An

individual,

under Plato's

For

wealth isexchanged in
conception of just

exchange, must not receive an unreasonable gain from trade--a gain
which would prove a temptation to the soul to become corrupt with
avarice.

For

all the difference between the medieval

and Platonic

conceptions of the just price, however, there do exist

common bonds

between the two.
Plato's notion that the just price corresponds to that which
affords the seller ajust gain from trade is repeated by

the Scholas

tics in theirdoctrine of turpe lucrum.

describes an

unreasonable gain from an exchange.

Turpe lucrum

Ordinarily the notion of turpe

lucrum was restricted to cases involving usury.
period,

however,

shameful gain.

the

concept was

In the Carolingian

stretched to cover all cases of

Baldwin points out, in fact, that under Charlemagne

turpe lucrum was extended to cover all forms of greediness, and was
almost synonymous with avarice.

Defined in this manner, turpe lucrum

was connected not just with usury, but also with simony and price
profiteering.
notion

22

of the

The medieval doctrine of turpe lucrum, like Plato's
just price,

attempted to prevent unjust gains from

trade from occurring.
The similarity between Plato's idea of an unjust gain from
trade and the medieval turpe lucrum is, unfortunately, very likely
coincidental.

99

While the neo-Platonists of the Catholic church found

Baldwin, p. 32.
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much to their liking in the philosophy of Socrates and Plato— prayers
were frequently made evoking the name of St. Socrates— the medieval
notion of turpe
rather

it owes

lucrum does not originate
its

existence to the Nicene

in Plato's

work,

but,

Council of 325.

The

philosophy of the early church is not so much indebted to Plato's
ideas as it is compatible with them.

23

If it cannot be said that the Schoolmen owe their conception
of the just price to the writings of Plato,

it can, at least, be

argued that it and Plato's conception are based upon the same notions
of justice.

Plato's just price was intended to preserve the unequal

status of members of his best society.
system of proportionate

inequality.

Plato, recall, believed in a
Individuals were

expected to

accumulate wealth only to the extent that their temperaments allowed
under the strict observance of justice.
of

the

Laws,

inequality."

24

"Indiscriminate

As Plato writes in Book VI

equality

for

all

amounts

to

Plato, no doubt, means by this that a strictly equal

distribution of esteem,

honor,

and wealth among the members of a

society would produce unequal distributions of happiness and good
ness,

owing

to

the

heterogeneity

of

temperaments

among

the

inhabitants of a state.

This idea of achieving justice through a

proportionate

is echoed

tributive
and

York:

inequality

justice,

services

which

between

governs

unequals.

in Aristotle's
the

exchange

Moreover,

notion of dis
of

Aristotle's

commodities
notion

of

24
Plato, "Laws," in The Laws, trans. Trevor J. Saunders (New
Penguin Books, 1970), p. 229.
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distributive justice was adopted essentially unchanged by Albert and
Thomas,

who

thought

that

it

governed

"the

relations

among...social superiors and private individuals..."

of

things

25

The idea of proportionate inequality is fundamental to the
ethics of both Plato and Aristotle.
ence

of heterogeneous

Both men believed in the exist

temperaments.

Because

of the existence

of

different temperaments among men, Plato and Aristotle reasoned that
some men require more and some less than others concerning physical
wealth.

We have seen in Plato's Laws that Plato intended the distri

bution of wealth to be justly unequal.
is more subtle in Aristotle's writing.

The justice of unequal shares
He mentions it, however, in

Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. He writes:
[E]quality will exist between the persons and between the
things concerned; for as the latter— the things concerned—
are related, so are the former; if they are not equal, they
will not have what is equal, but this is the origin of quar
rels and complaints— when either equals have and are awarded
unequal shares, or unequals equal shares. Further, this is
plain from the fact that awards should be 'according to
merit'; for all men agree that what is jus,^ in distribution
must be according to merit in some sense...
Justice,

according

to both Plato

and Aristotle,

demands

equality

between equals and inequality between unequals.
In the literature devoted to the analysis of medieval value
theory much effort has been made to establish the status-maintaining
theory of the just price as being central to the medieval conception

^Baldwin, p. 62.
Aristotle,
"Nicomachean
Ethics,"
in
Introduction
to
Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: The Modern Library, 1947J7
p. 403.
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of market justice.

As De Roover points out, Weber and Sombart were

emphatic in their belief that the Schoolmen thought the just price to
be that which afforded

the

maintain his social status.

seller of a commodity the ability to
It now appears to be the case that the

mainstream thought among the doctors concerning the just price was
that it corresponded to the market price of a thing.

Nevertheless, a

few of the Schoolmen, notably Henry of Langenstein, believed the just
price to be the status-maintaining price.
price

theory appears

to have

its

roots

This formulation of just
in that part of Platonic

philosophy, carried over by Aristotle, which argues that individuals
should receive subsistence commodities in accordance with need and
merit.

For Plato,

any surplus

holdings

of property beyond those

necessary by demonstration of need or merit revert to the state.
Aristotle, too, frowned upon the accumulation of property beyond what
merit dictates.

Thomas J. Lewis explains this side of Aristotle's

theory of exchange well
Case Against the Market."

in "Acquisition and Anxiety:
27

Aristotle's

Lewis notes that in Aristotle

The right to property is limited to what is sufficient to
sustain the polis life of the citizen.
Too little would
leave the citizen without adequate means for the exercise of
his capacities; a vast quantity would exceed the required
amount and no right ^tp this excess would exist (Politics,
1256b, 1257a, 1257b).
According

to

Lewis,

Aristotle

viewed

any

acquisition beyond

the

necessary amount as a "diversion of the citizen's capacities" and,

27

Thomas J. Lewis, "Acquisition and Anxiety:
Aristotle's
Case Against the Market," The Canadian Journal of Economics, 11
(1978), 69-90.

28Ibid., pp. 72-73.
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therefore,

as being unnatural.

While Aristotle realized that the

exchange process would likely result in the accumulation of unneces
sary

surplus,

harness

he adopted

itand

to

force

it in his philosophy in an attempt
the

deficiencies out of surplusses."
Regardless

redistribution of goods to

to

"supply

29

of whether or not all Scholastics

advocated a

status-maintaining theory of the just price it is evident that at
least a few of them did.

Those who did view the just price as that

which covered the costs of the seller and allowed him to maintain his
social status followed in Plato’s footsteps.
fixed prices

The system of legally

which Plato advocates in the Laws is based upon the

notion that a commodity's price should cover the seller's costs and
provide

him

intended

to

with a
have

decentprofit— a "well-measured

his property distribution system,

gain."Plato

in which the

largest estate exceeded

the smallest by a factor of no more than

four, strictly observed.

Commodity prices that would enable a seller

to earn an unreasonable gain, i.e., would enable him to accumulate a
surplus

ofwealth,

would

violate

Plato's

principles of

market

justice.
Concerning

the

problem

of

usury,

Plato

appears

to

have

opposed it for essentially the same reason that Aristotle did, which,
in turn, was the same reason offered by Albert and Thomas for the
abolition of credit from the medieval economy.

The reason given for

the abolition of credit in church doctrine is that income earned from

29Ibid., p. 79.
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the extension of credit constituted turpe lucrum. This view of usury
differs

from the Roman understanding of the usefulness of credit.

Indeed,

the Romans

in-kind, on loans.
arises

routinely

charged

interest,

The Scholastic opposition to usury, therefore,

from influences other than Roman.

church doctrine

both monetary and

Under Albert and Thomas

reflected an opposition to usury for the reasons

provided by Aristotle.

Aristotle opposed usury on grounds that the

generation of income from the lending of money,

i.e., the sale of

credit, resulted from an unjust motive for exchange.

The just moti

vation for exchanging commodities and services in the marketplace is
the desire to trade subsistence goods, which, in turn, arises out of
recognition of the fact that men are not self-sufficient.

According

to Aristotle money was invented to facilitate this sort of exchange—
subsistence good for subsistence good.

Aristotle did not recognize

credit as being a legitimate item to be exchanged in the market.
him interest

income

represented the

To

result of an attempt to make

money from money, which was unnatural.

This view arose from Aris

totle's contention that money is not a commodity, but was, rather, an
artificial invention which facilitated the exchange of true commodi
ties.
is

This notion that interest is obtained when money begets money

reflected

in the

term from ancient Greek for interest-- tokos.

Tokos literally means "offspring," and its application in describing
interest income denotes the Greek view that interest is the child,
the offspring, of money.

30
Aristotle,
pp. 571-572.

30

"Politics,"

in

Introduction

to

Aristotle,

253
Albert and Thomas advocated the Aristotelian view that inter
est

income

exchange.
two

constitutes

the

illegitimate

product

of

an

unjust

Baldwin claims that Thomas' interpretation of Aristotle's

bases

for

exchange

constitutes

influence on medieval economic thought.

the

height

of

Aristotelian

He writes:

Basing his justification of the merchant on a passage from
t*16 Politics, Thomas approximated in his Summa an Aris
totelian distinction between two kinds of commerce.
The
first consisted of an exchange of goods for goods or goods
for money because of the necessities of life, and was natural
and necessary to society.
Men who participated in this
exchange could be called more properly oeconomici or politici
because they provided for the direct needs of their house
holds or cities.
The other exchange was between money and
money or sometimes goods and money for the purpose of profit.
Men who performed this kind of exchange were merchants
( negotiatores) in the true sense.
Under i m y conditions
their profits could be rightfully condemned...
Usury would fall under the heading of the exchange between money and
money,

and,

thus,

could

be

condemned.

Thomas'

view

is

pure

Aristotle, which can be seen when compared with Aristotle's own view
on usury.

From the Politics:

Usury is hated with good reason because of its being
acquisition from currency itself and not from that for which
currency is provided. For currency came into being for the
sake of exchange. The tokos makes it more. And it is from
that that it got its name. For as the offspring are like the
parents, so tokos breeds currency from currency. And in this
way it
of the kinds of moneymaking the most contrary to
nature.
Just as Thomas'
view,

Aristotle's

position against usury echoes Aristotle's

condemnation of the charging of interest echoes

“^Baldwin, p. 65.

■^Aristotle, "Politics," 1258b, translated in The Republic of
Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968), pp. 463-46?.
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that of his teacher.

In both the Republic and Laws Plato forbids the

practice of the extension of credit.

Aristotle's position on tokos

can certainly be seen in Plato's condemnation of money-makers from
Book VIII of the Republic:
"And these money-makers, with heads bent down, not seem
ing to see these men, would with injections of silver and any
man among the remainder who yields; and carrying off from the
father a multiple offspring in interest, they make the drone
and the beggar great in the city."
Plato,

too,

held

that usury was

money begetting money.

unnatural because it represented

In a passage from the Republic which follows

that above, Plato notes that the market would be a better place if
all contracts involving credit were made at the seller's risk.

This

position is elevated to the status of legal prescription in the Laws.
In Book V he writes:

"no money should be lent at interest.

Anyone

who has received a loan will be permitted to refuse to pay it back,
both

interest and principal."

34

Again,

in Book XI Plato argues:

and no one is to make a sale or purchase on credit. If one
person should exchange with another in another way or in any
other places whatsoever, trusting the one he's exchanging
with, he is to do these things on the understanding that
there are no lawful judicial suits for things that are not
sold under the conditions now being stated.
In these passages Plato makes it clear that credit is forbidden in
the best state.

Plato, "Republic," in The Republic of Plato, p. 234.
3^Plato, "Laws," in The Laws of Plato, p. 129.
35Ibid., p. 315.
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Although Plato nowhere makes a detailed argument against the
practice of usury, the basis of his opposition can be inferred from
the statements above.

Plato did not approve of merchandising.

The

merchant class in the best polis was to be composed of metics and
those too feeble to perform useful, i.e., subsistence securing, work.
Merchandising, and especially the exchange of money for money, was,
for Plato, unjust in that it could promote avarice instead of suffi
ciency

and

Plato held

moderation.
to be

Unnatural

exchange

spawns

the most miserable state.

tyranny,

which

Plato's reference to

interest being the multiple offspring of money reveals his opinion
that usury constitutes an unnatural,

tyranny-promoting form of ex

change .
There can be little doubt that Aristotle's rejection of usury
was influenced by Plato's; their association at the Academy confirms
this.

Similarly,

the bond between Aristotle and Thomas is strong.

It seems odd, then, that nowhere does one find an account of Plato's
position on usury in the literature on medieval price theory.

It can

be argued that because Thomas' views are aired in his commentary on
Aristotle

that Plato's

influence

is unimportant.

And,

yet,

this

cannot be so, given the importance of Plato's philosophy to Aris
totle's thought.

I suspect that it is because Plato nowhere makes a

systematic case against usury, unlike Aristotle, that his argument is
overlooked.

Nevertheless, Plato's case does exist.

Indeed, it is

even

systematically,

analysis

stated

justice

and exchange with

if
it.

one

includes

It is only

Plato's

of

the method of Plato's

argument which distinguished it from Aristotle's and Thomas'.

As I
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have argued elsewhere, however, Plato's decision to reason dialectically

rather

contributions.

than

analytically

should

not

discredit

his

His own defense of this methodology, which is found

in the Republic, shows dialectical reasoning to be appropriate for
the consideration of ethical issues in social science.
Plato's stand on the just price and usury is noteworthy for
its similarity to that of the Schoolmen.

Given Aristotle's position

as an intellectual conduit for philosophy between the ancients and
medieval scholars, this fact should not prove surprising.
ular,

interest

to the

Of partic

student of medieval price theory should be

Plato's position on the just price as the status-maintaining price,
which is revitalized by certain heretical doctors in medieval times.
To prove that the connection here is as direct as, say, that between
Aristotle and Thomas, is beyond the scope of this paper.

An histori

cal inquiry into this possibility should be pursued, however.

In any

event, a complete history of just price theory and usury analysis
should include Plato's contributions, which have been shown to origi
nate from the same questions about justice as does the Scholastic
inquiry.

CHAPTER 6

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Plato
ought

clearly analyzed matters

of political

economy which

to be understood to be the concern of the economics of welfare.

The entire corpus of Plato's dialogues is dedicated to the attempt to
understand the nature of the Good, and to how knowledge of the Good
can be used to organize

the best society.

Throughout his career

Plato maintained that the happy life— that which participated to the
fullest extent in the Good--is the life of virtue.
he defined

to be

one

in which the

individual

The virtuous life
is able

wisdom, honor, and temperance in proper proportions.
Plato argues,

to secure

To be happy,

one must follow the biddings of the rational part of

the soul, yoking the spirited and appetitive parts in its service.
In order to
ness,

Plato

judge the extent to which human action engenders happi
reasoned, one must determine the extent to which such

action promotes the ordering of the soul in the proportions mentioned
above.

To maximize welfare for the individuals of society is to do

things that cultivate in individuals well-ordered souls.
Plato understood the happiest life to be the examined life—
that which allows philosophy,
helmsman of the soul.
that

i.e., the love of wisdom,

to be the

As a practical man, however, Plato recognized

the many are not temperamentally suited to the contemplative

life of philosophy.

For the many to be happy, Plato reasoned, they
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must participate in virtue to the extent permitted by their tempera
ments.
many.

To Plato this entailed the achievement of temperance by the
The best constitution of society, i.e., that which most pro

motes the welfare of its citizens,
sufficiency
reasoned
kinds.

are

to be

is one in which temperance and

institutionalized.

The

souls

of

the many Plato

ruled by the passionate urges of appetites of all

For souls so constituted,

the life of temperance, in which

individuals' appetites are subordinated to the honorable laws of the
polis, affords the attainment of happiness.
In the Republic, Laws, and elsewhere Plato designs a consti
tution

for

citizens.

a

state

which

he

felt

maximizes

the welfare

of

its

Included in this constitution are economic prescriptions

which are intended to promote the best organization of the economy-that which affords

the most happiness

for the many.

Under this

constitution citizens are subject to strict monitoring of economic
activity by the state.

Market Wardens determine the time, place, and

prices which govern the exchange of commodities and services in the
economy.

There

is to be

a strict

division of

labor,

determined

according to the psychological temperaments of the citizens of the
polis,

in

merchants.

which

no able-bodied

citizens

are permitted

to become

A system of fiat money is to be imposed, it being felt by

Plato that such a system would minimize avarice.

The practice of

buying on credit, as well as the practice of charging interest on
loans, are abolished under Plato's laws.

Finally, strict limits are

set on the levels of population and physical wealth that are to be
permitted in the economy— in order to be truly sufficient the economy
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must be a steady-state.

The best economy, according to Plato,

is

truly the administered state that Lowry described in his review of
Greek economics.
It

is

difficult

for contemporary

western economists

embrace the administeredeconomy of Plato.

Not only does it violate

theprinciples of liberalism,under which the notion
cal

individualism drives the contemporary

also

derives

from

a

method

contemporary economist.

of

inquiry

to

of methodologi

analysis of welfare, it
which

is foreign to the

The analysis of welfare, as the literature

on the subject shows, depends upon the existence of a welfare func
tion,

i.e., a set of universally supported values and goals, to be

maximized.

Under criteria of liberalism and individualism, a welfare

function must be socially desirable in order to merit consideration
by

the

analyst

for

economic objectives,

candidacy

for

maximization.

Plato's

set of

derived from what appear to be sub-scientific

value judgments, and developed along lines that render it undesirable
by the many, is rejected by welfare economics as unsuitable for the
maximization of welfare.
We have seen, however, that the method of inquiry of Plato's
economic

analysis

is appropriate

for the discovery of the set of

virtues to be upheld by society within the economy, if it is viewed
from the perspective of Plato's epistemology and ontology.
along with
which
of the

its

engender
Good

is,

associated virtues,
existing

things

according

exists

with

to Plato,

their

The Good,

as Forms beyond being,
qualities.

attainable

Knowledge

through the pro

cess of reasoning beyond hypotheses by the method of dialectics.

The
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statements of value which result from such analysis are grounded in
truth, Plato reasoned, and are beyond the doxa, or value judgments,
which contemporary economists dismiss as unscientific.
techniques
qualities
reckoning,

of modern science are
of the

sensibles,

Whereas the

suited to the discovery of the

dialectical

reasoning

is,

by Plato's

suited to the discovery of intelligibles, including the

Forms which he calls virtues.

virtue

It

is understandable

of

an

acceptance

that

contemporary economists,

who by

of positivism or preoccupation with the

development of what Samuelson refers to as "meaningful theorems," do
not warm up to Plato's inquiry into the nature of intelligible Forms.
Such inquiry is, after all, necessarily subjective in nature.
not being,

in Voegelin's

terms,

data

of immanent experience,

necessarily perceived, if at all, by the mind's eye.
case,

Forms,
are

This being the

one must not take

lightly the criticisms and rejections of

Plato's method of inquiry.

How, after all, are we to build a science

of

human

action

around

principles

and

theorems

which

are

not

hypotheses about empirical data, and, thus are not demonstrable or
refutable in the ordinary sense?

That Plato was earnest and sincere

in his approach to the problem of theorizing the nature of Forms,
however, makes it important that contemporary scientists scrutinize
his arguments.
Plato's system of inquiry into the nature of Forms, if valid,
provides the contemporary economist with complementary knowledge to
that generated by the "new" welfare economics.

If valid, however, it

provides the economist with a welfare "function" which violates the
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ordinary

assumptions

of

utility

which

underpin

modern

analysis.

Specifically, it generates, under Plato's line of argument, a set of
welfare maxims which promise to promote welfare if instituted, while
proving undesirable according to the test that society be willing to
voluntarily adopt them.

In short, the problem of Plato's system for

contemporary analysis is that it does not easily fit into the welfare
model— it promises to maximize welfare for the individual by imposing
on

him

or

her economic

sanctions

that

seem unpleasant.

Whereas

contemporary analysis strives to show how society can secure what it
wants, under conditions of general scarcity, Plato's analysis shows
how society can limit its desires to what it can get.

By channeling

human appetites through the adoption of laws which individuals find
honorable and acceptable
create

a

sufficient

as

state.

objects
In

the

of pistis, Plato attempts to
sufficient

state

individuals

temperately limit desires for artifacts of aisthesis in favor of the
erotic pursuit of objects of noesis— virtues and knowledge of them.
The
today.

Platonic

system of economic

thought

is

important

for

Scientists today generally accept hypotheses about the human

environment which hold it to be a finite system.

According to these

models the physical stuff which supports life is understood to be
limited in the aggregate.

Economic policies which minister to the

appetitive part of the soul by attempting to sate it are bound, by
the rules of the model of the environment, to come up short.

Accord

ing to Plato's analysis, however, it is possible to make men happy
while limiting their desires to the attainment of sufficiency.

It is

this promise that makes desirable a return to an economic method in

which hypotheses grounded in noetic reasoning, such as Plato's theory
of welfare, can be systematically analyzed.

To dismiss the economics

of Plato on methodological grounds is to reduce the possibility that
the teleological objective of contemporary welfare analysis can be
attained.
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